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Introduction   As long as we are Muslims, we need to follow Allah’s decree, so… it’s not okay to be gay – it’s not okay to be bisexual – it’s not okay to be okay with stuff  that  God  and  Rasulullah  S.A.W.  [Prophet  Muhammad]  has specifically said it’s not okay….  A viewer’s reaction to the ‘Saya Gay, Saya Ok’ video clip on the blog site, iAwani, Dec 2010  At  the end of 2010, a  seemingly  innocuous video clip  for an  initiative called  ‘It Gets Better  in Malaysia’ attracted much attention and went viral within days of being posted online. Inspired by a similar campaign in the United States, the local organisers, Seksualiti Merdeka, had intended the project to contribute positively (as it had in America), by providing hope to youth struggling with being lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered (LGBT)  in the country.1 This  involved recording messages of affirmation by Malaysians who had survived similar experiences or were supportive of such issues.  Though  fifteen clips were created,  the organisers managed  to upload only  four before  the  project  was  abandoned  due  to  the  overwhelmingly  adverse  and harmful reactions that one particular recording attracted. Unlike  the  first  three clips that went up – two by Chinese men and another by a young Indian woman – the  ‘Saya  Gay,  Saya  Ok  (I’m  Gay,  I’m  Ok)’  clip  by  Azwan  Ismail,  a  male  Malay                                                         1 According to its website <www.seksualitimerdeka.org>, the project sought to counter ‘the overwhelming feelings of loneliness, fear or hopelessness that result from the stigma and discrimination against [LGBT youth]’. 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Muslim  homosexual,  generated  over  150,000  hits  in  five  days.  It  also  received around 3,400  comments. A handful  of were  encouraging;  the  rest  ranged  from condescending (e.g. imploring Azwan ‘to repent and return to the right path [of heterosexuality]’)  to  rude  and  vicious,  some  blatantly  inciting  hatred  and violence towards gays.2  The  ‘Saya  Gay,  Saya  Ok’  incident  was  significant  at  several  levels.  Firstly,  it supports  the  claim  that  in Malaysia  today,  there  is  a  vocal  opposition  to  those who  are  perceived  as  having  aberrant  sexualities.3  In  Azwan’s  case,  male homosexuality  was  the  target.  But  in  different  circumstances,  other  non‐normative  sexualities and genders4 –  lesbians and  transgenders  in particular – have  also  come  under  similar  censure.  Though  the  size  of  this  opposition  is unknown, less arguable is its role in perpetuating a discourse that is narrow and strongly opposed  to difference, whether  this has  to do with  sexual  and gender identity, behaviour, or appearance.  Secondly, the religious, or more precisely, Islamic, flavour that this discourse has taken over  the  last decade,  stands out. The comment  that opened  this  chapter, and  the  way  events  subsequently  unfolded,  indicates  that  the  outrage  was                                                         2 These threats eventually forced Seksualiti Merdeka to remove this video clip from the Internet (‘Taking down Azwan Ismail’s video for his safety’, press statement by Seksualiti Merdeka, 29 Dec 2010, <http://www.seksualitimerdeka.org/2010/12/taking‐down‐azwan‐ismails‐video‐for‐his.html>, Accessed: 29 Dec 2010).  3 This was confirmed when Seksualiti Merdeka was attacked for a second time almost a year later in November 2011. Then its annual festival of the same name generated weeks of controversy and negative attention for the LGBT communities. See Chapter 8 for details. 4 The term ‘gender’ is used more broadly here, going beyond its traditional definition as the social relations between men and women to include the concept of gender identity. Specifically, it refers to transgenderism, which recognises that frequently, whether one identifies as a man, woman, neither or both, has more to do with the ‘regulatory schema of bodily integrity, visual coherence, and bureaucratic intelligibility than with wanton ways of fucking’ (Susan Stryker cited in Rubin, 2010:36). 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Why This Study?  This study probes into how the contemporary discourse on sexuality has come to be defined in the way that it is: as heteronormative and intolerant of sexual and gender  plurality  as  represented  by  the  gay,  lesbian  and  trans  communities.  It also seeks to account for the discourse’s Islamic overtones, and the implications of  this  on  those  who  are  perceived  to  have  ‘unnatural’  sexual  desires  or ‘abnormal’ gender identities.  The heightened anxiety over sexual marginals – defined here as gay men, lesbian women,  transsexuals  and  transgenders9  –  as  evinced  in  the  ‘I’m  Gay,  I’m  Ok’ incident,  is a  relatively  recent development  in  the country’s history. Before  the mid‐1990s, public discourse on ‘deviant’ sexuality was overwhelmingly confined to  heterosexual  wrongdoings.  Perceived  as  the  worst  offenders  were  usually those  in  prostitution,  and  in  addition  for  Muslims,  anyone  caught  for  khalwat (illicit proximity). Very often, it was the bodies of heterosexual women or youth that came under greatest scrutiny. The moral panic over the Minah karan in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the boh sia a decade later, brings home this point.10  
                                                        9 Although local awareness and usage of labels like ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘transsexual’ and ‘transgender’ have grown in recent times, many still do not identify with these. I have retained their usage in this study but with the caveat that their meanings can be understood differently to conventional Western definitions. As well, although I recognise that sexuality and gender are two different concepts, for pragmatic purposes, I am using ‘sexual marginal’ as a generic term for the communities named above. 10 The Malaysian media had first played up concerns over the Minah karan (literally, high‐voltage or electric Minah), the derogatory name for newly emergent young working‐class Malay women accused of being sexually promiscuous (Ong, 1987; Ackerman, 1991). The boh sia (a Hokkien word literally meaning ‘no noise’) phenomenon involved even younger women, more accurately, teenagers, many of whom were from middle class families, and would hang out in public places waiting to be picked up for casual sex (Stivens, 2002). 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Though  the  dominant  sexual  discourse  of  today  has  continued  to  focus  on  the morality  of  heterosexuals,  what  makes  it  distinct  is  its  inclusion  of  new benchmarks of ‘deviancy’ that are tied to the notion of ‘perverted’ sexualities and genders.  This  change  is  even  more  conspicuous  given  that  traditional  Malay society, like communities in other parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago, was more  lax  about  gender  pluralism,  and  showed  far  greater  tolerance  towards those  who  did  not  fit  into  the  heterosexual  mould.11  Further,  while  the consequences  of  this  discourse  bears  hardest  on Muslims,  it  has  slowly  led  to Islamic standards of sexual morality being extended to non‐Muslims, a practice hardly seen in the past.12  Increasingly  apparent  too  is  how  the  tendency  to  solely  ascribe  blame  for  this situation  on  the  Islamic  party,  PAS  (Parti  Islam  Se‐Malaysia),  is  no  longer accurate  nor  is  it  tenable.  For  various  reasons  the  perception  of  PAS  as  a ‘fundamentalist’  Islamist party persists.13 This  includes the party’s public stand on issues of morality, its insistence on imposing hudud (singular: hadd or limit) which many consider to be draconian in its punishments, and efforts by its long‐time  rival  UMNO  (United Malays  National  Organisation)  –  aided  by  both  local and  international media –  to paint PAS as an extremist group. The response  to the ‘Saya Gay, Saya Ok’ video clip, however, suggests other regulatory forces and                                                         11 See Watson Andaya (2006), and Peletz (1996) and (2009). See also Chapter 4 for more on the subject of gender pluralism in pre‐colonial times in Muslim Southeast Asia. 12 This is most obvious in matters of female dressing, where in the name of Islam, official workplaces and a number of public spaces demand that all women be ‘modestly’ attired. The response to the widely publicised news of a Malaysian Chinese gay pastor’s recent marriage to his male partner in the United States shows the extension of ‘Islamic’ values to other areas of sexual morality (‘Perkahwinan paderi gay dikecam, Utusan Malaysia, 24 Aug 2011). 13 Interestingly, though there are certain elements in PAS which continue to speak out about matters to do with sexual morality – e.g. the Youth wing and even the party’s spiritual head Nik Aziz Nik Mat – of late, the PAS leadership as a whole appears to be making less public interventions on these subjects. 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processes at work, which have also helped to produce a discourse on sexuality and  gender  that  demonises  and marginalises  anyone who does not  fit  into  the heteronormative framework.  This  study  seeks  to  explain  how  the  change  observed  above  has  come  about. While it recognises that non‐state actors (e.g. family, peers, community, religious leaders,  etc.)  have  contributed  to  the  advancement  of  this  new  conservative discourse, the primary focus of the inquiry here is the state, specifically, the role of the central government. It will argue that as a key driver behind efforts to mix politics  and  religion,  the  Federal  state  –  working  in  conjunction  with  private actors  –  has  been  instrumental  in  producing  the  narrow  and  intolerant conception  of  sexuality  that we  currently  see  in Malaysia,  one which makes  it difficult to go against ‘naturalised’ heterosexuality.   To make  this  argument,  this  study  poses  three main  questions:  How  does  the state use religion to regulate sexual marginals? How effective has this approach been? Why or why not?  In  addressing  these,  it will  fill  an analytical  gap  in  the current literature on the politicisation of religion by the state on one hand, and the  regulation  of  sexuality  on  the  other.  A  number  of  works  in  relation  to Malaysia have been produced on these subjects,14 but only a handful have given attention  to how religion and politics have been combined to control sexuality, 
                                                        14 On the role of the state in politicising Islam, see especially Lee and Ackerman, 1997; Norani Othman, 1998; Martinez, 2001; Nasr, 2001; Hamayotsu, 2003; and Liow, 2009. For general writings on sexual morality and policing in Malaysia, see tan, 2003; Mohd Darbi Hashim, 2005; Zainah Anwar, 2005a; Norani Othman, Zainah Anwar and Zaitun Mohamed Kasim, 2005; Ng, Maznah Mohamad and tan, 2006; and Shamsul, A.B. and Mohamad Fauzi Sukimi, 2006. 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what more that of sexual marginals.15 This study makes several contributions in this regard.   By  unveiling  the  forces  and  processes  behind  the  regulation  of  non‐normative sexualities  and  genders,  it  serves  as  a  corrective  to  perceptions  that  hastily attribute  efforts  at  enforcing  morality  to  a  stereotypical  conceptualisation  of religious fundamentalists, in this case, PAS. It also shows how heteronormativity not  only  profits  from  the  politicisation  of  Islam,  but  that  its  promotion  both contributes  to  reinforcing  the  legitimacy  of  ‘Islamic’  law,  at  the  same  time complicates  the  project  of  strengthening  Federal  authority.  The  study  thus confirms that the state is an unwieldy institution, not always capable of taming the same power it generates and benefits from in attempting to control sexuality.   
Central Arguments  The  following  account  locates  the  control  of  non‐normative  sexualities  and genders in Malaysia within a larger state project to centralise its authority over Islam.  Rather  than  attributing  the  regulation  of  sexual  desires  and  gender identities to a targeted or decisive state plan, the study makes the claim that this phenomenon  is  better  understood  as  part  of  the  Federal  state’s  efforts  to promote a singular Islam – 1Islam so to speak16 – to enhance its hegemony over 
                                                        15 The writings that approximate the objective of this study closest – albeit in varying degrees – include Rais Nur and A.R., 1996; tan, 1999; Teh, 2002; Backer, 2005; Khartini Slamah, 2005; Sanders, 2005; Berman, 2008 and Lee, 2011. 16 This is a play on current Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak’s ‘1Malaysia’ concept launched in September 2010, that ostensibly seeks to foster better inter‐ethnic relations and national unity. It is widely believed to be a strategy at wooing back non‐Malay support that had been alienated by 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what  Muslims  believe  and  practice  as  their  faith.  Among  its  effects,  this construction of official Islam upholds heterosexuality as the sole legitimate form of sexuality at the same time recognising ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as the only rightful types of gender identity.  The  primary  vehicle  to  impose  this  state  rendition  of  Islam  has  been ‘Syariahtisation’.  During  the  country’s  experience  with  state‐led  ‘Islamisation’, religious penal laws were promulgated nationwide from the mid‐1980s but with relatively  minor  consequence.  In  contrast,  ‘Syariahtisation’,  which  grew  in importance from the late 1990s onwards, involves the state emphasising existing ‘Islamic’  legislation (and  institutions) and augmenting the prominence and role of ‘Syariah’17 in public life and governance.18  As  the  experience  with  the  Syariah  Criminal  Offences  (SCO)  legislation demonstrates,  the  Federal  state’s  success  at  claiming  that  ‘Islamic’  moral standards  are  superior  to  their  ‘secular’  equivalent  –  and  hence  should  be  the benchmark for all Malaysians – rests on its ability to differentiate this from civil legal provisions. This  involves painting  the SCO  laws as  ‘divine’,  and hence not 
                                                                                                                                                              actions of Malay nationalist hardliners including those from his party UMNO, following the dismal results for the Barisan National (BN) ruling coalition at the last general election. 17 The romanised version of ‘Syariah’ is spelt in a number of ways (e.g. Shari’a, Shariah, Shariat) in existing literature. With the exception of direct quotations, I have retained ‘Syariah’ – the spelling utilised in Malaysia – throughout this study for the purposes of consistency. Also, references to ‘Syariah’ or ‘Islamic’ laws are deliberately put in quotes to denote the oft‐ignored fact that these are actually man‐made laws. 18 Though a deeper exploration is not possible here, it is important to highlight how the Federal state has engaged ICT (information and communication technology), the Internet in particular, as part of the ‘Syariahtisation’ process. Apart from the website of JAKIM, the central government also operate websites for fatwa rulings <www.e‐fatwa.gov.my>; and Syariah legal and judicial matters <www.esyariah.gov.my>. Its latest tool with the expressed purpose of preparing ‘’authentic and truthful content about Islam to balance the flood’ of outside information that could threaten the beliefs of Muslims’ is the official portal IslamGRID <www.islamgrid.gov.my>. 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open  to  question.  Such  a  strategy  helps  to  legitimise  what  is  instituted  as ‘Syariah’  so  that  these  laws  –  and  more  crucially,  the  state  –  cannot  be challenged. In reality, whether or not the SCO laws are God‐given is debatable,19 just  like  the  argument  that  ‘Syariah’  and  ‘secular’  moral  laws20  are  decidedly different.  The process of ‘Syariahtisation’ is backed by a conglomeration of state and non‐state forces that are united in their interest in asserting the  ‘Syariah’. The main movers  of  this  Syariah  lobby  are  Federal  state  ‘Islamic’  players,  namely  ruling political  leaders  and  the  religious  bureaucrats  they  appoint,  not  non‐state Islamist actors like PAS or Muslim non‐governmental organisations (NGOs). It is the  Federal  state’s  ability  to  galvanise  all  the  different  alignment  of  interests within  the  lobby  whenever  Islam  is  projected  to  be  under  attack  –  and  this includes when its sexual values are contested – that makes it a key player. As this study  shows,  the defence of  religion  is  often  invoked  to defend  state  interests. This fact notwithstanding,  it  is also important to reiterate that the construction and  influence of official  Islam  is not a one way process. While emanating  from the Federal state’s desire to embolden itself through  ‘Syariahtisation’, efforts to centralise state power have also contributed to a stronger political Islam and the powers of its actors.  
                                                        19 See An‐Naim, 1994; Ali, 2006; Mir‐Hosseini 2006; and Masud, 2009. 20 The term ‘secular’ is used to reflect how the Syariah lobby frames its arguments for reforming the  current  legal  and  judicial  system  in  the  country.  It  is  denoted  in  inverted  commas  in  this study because  it  is a misnomer since  its provisions,  in particular those relating to morality, are closely informed by religious beliefs, albeit with Christian leanings. 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At one level, the state’s instrumentalisation of Islam through ‘Syariahtisation’ has been very effective in keeping sexual marginals in line. Using God’s will to justify the binaries of ‘natural’/‘unnatural’ sexualities and ‘normal’/‘abnormal’ genders, the SCO legislation has generated a religio‐legal discourse that penalises anyone who  does  not  conform  to  the  heterosexual  norm.  Wielding  widespread  and penetrating disciplinary powers,  the  law  is  able  to  strike  sufficient  fear  –  even when  its  enforcement  is  irregular  or  inconsistent  –  to  compel  the majority  of members  of  these  communities  to  regulate  their  own  ‘deviant’  desires  or  face potentially pernicious consequences.   At  another  level,  there  are  also  times  when  the  limits  of  ‘Islamic’  sexual injunctions  are  tested  making  the  outcome  of  state  regulation  unpredictable. Though sexual marginals may police themselves to stay out of the clutches of the state,  this study will reveal  that many continue to  lead their  lives  the way they choose, i.e. as homosexual men and women, or as transsexuals and transgenders. In other words, awareness of  the  law may make them cautious and fearful, but this  is  not  always  enough  to  force  conformity  with  the  imposed  heterosexual ‘ideal’. Depending on variables like gender, class, ethnicity, age and religion, the impact of the law can differ across the spectrum of sexual marginality.   Occasionally too, there are individuals  like Azwan Ismail and other civil society actors who ignore or question ‘Islamic’ sexual heterodoxy more explicitly, and in so doing, unsettle the  ‘divine’ foundations of  ‘Syariah’  law and the legitimacy of the Federal state’s authority that rests on this. In such circumstances, the Syariah lobby has mobilised to counter the apparent threat that such actions pose to the 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Muslim faith. The ensuing contestation between the two sides results in greater scrutiny  of  those  with  non‐normative  sexualities  and  genders  –  even  if  only temporary – and more critically perhaps, reinforces support for official Islam and the related powers of the central government.  While  the  Syariah  lobby  plays  an  integral  part  in  this  process,  it  also  poses challenges to the project of 1Islam. Comprising a multiplicity of actors who are united  in  their desire  to elevate  the status of  ‘Syariah’,  they represent different alignments of  interests that do not always coincide with what the Federal state wants.  Thus,  while  attempts  to  regulate  sexual  marginals  may  give  the impression that Islam is homogenous or fixed, the internal challenges posed by the same forces that have been cultivated to support  ‘Syariahtisation’ reveal  its fragility as a political tool of governance and control. If sustained, this may pave the way for a more plural Islam to emerge, one potentially capable of recognising the diversity of sexualities and genders.  
Methodology and Scope  This study adopts a multipronged research strategy. One approach was to utilise archival records and relevant historical works  to reconstruct what pre‐colonial and colonial ‘Islamic’ and ‘secular’ sexual injunctions in this country looked like. Post‐colonial  prohibitions  against  sexual  marginals  as  listed  in  the  SCO legislation  of  each  State  were  compiled  and  analysed  for  comparison. Corresponding  ‘secular’  laws  including  those  against  ‘indecency’  and ‘immorality’ – given that sexual controls are sometimes framed in these terms – 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were  also  studied  for  the  same  purpose.  This  data  was  supplemented  with selected  Hansard  proceedings21  –  verbatim  records  of  Federal  Parliament  and State Legislative Assembly sessions –  to ascertain what  these  legislatures were concerned with when they deliberated over the moral provisions of both the SCO and ‘secular’ laws.  The research also called for in‐depth interviews. Two kinds of informants were sought: one representing the ‘regulators’ of sexuality and the other, those aligned with the ‘regulated’. The former included political leaders, religious bureaucrats, ‘Syariah’  experts who  support  the  status  quo,  i.e.  the  Syariah  lobby;  the  latter, members  of  the  gay,  lesbian  and  trans  communities,  as  well  as  other  non‐conforming  heterosexuals.  There was  a  third  group  of  informants  too,  namely other experts such as activists, lawyers, and scholars. Each was asked a different but  related  set  of  questions  to  obtain  a  fuller  understanding  on  the  subject matter  at  hand.  All  names  in  this  study  have  been  replaced with  pseudonyms unless  indicated  otherwise.  Brief  profiles  have  also  been  provided  in  the  text where relevant. For a full list of informants, see Annex 1.  A mention of the challenges in securing the desired informants is relevant here. Although  the  target  was  set  at  50  respondents,  only  44  participated  in  this research.  The  most  inaccessible  were  the  religious  bureaucrats,  though  those who  consented  to  being  interviewed  contributed  valuable  insights  into  how Islamic functionaries regard sexual immorality, and how their ideas translate in                                                         21 Due to time and resource constraints, I narrowed down the focus of this part of my research to four States: Kelantan, Pahang, Selangor and the Federal Territory (of Kuala Lumpur). This selection is not arbitrary. It is based on historical, political and geographical considerations as will be explained later. 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and  online  databases.  This  enormously  simplified  the  task  of  official  data collection.  The  third  and  final  method  involved  looking  at  annual  reports  of  the  Federal Islamic  authorities,  as  laid  out  for  debate  and  adoption  by  the  Dewan  Rakyat (Lower House) of Parliament.23 This gave a better understanding of the rationale behind  Federal  Islamic  programmes,  as  well  as  showed  which  programmes received  priority.  It  permitted  the  expansion  of  the  religious  bureaucracy  –  in terms of its budgetary allocations and number of personnel – to be charted over time. This in turn allowed a clearer picture on the importance given to ‘Syariah’ enforcement to emerge. 




Organisation of Study  Following this  Introduction, Chapter 2  lays the background to the commanding influence  the  state  exercises  over  the  discourse  on  sexuality  today,  one  that  is marked by Federal  inflections of  ‘Islam’. This chapter  is  framed by a discussion on heteronormativity and the role of the state in sexual regulation, including the function of then Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad’s Asian values discourse. It also outlines the processes and outcomes of official Islamisation, both the initial phase  and  the  phase  of  ‘Syariahtisation’  as  experienced  from  the  late‐1990s onwards, to show how this has impacted on the lives of sexual marginals today.  Chapter 3 is about the political history of ‘Islamic’ sexual injunctions in Malaysia. It  traces  the  evolution  of  religious  laws  in  the  pre‐colonial,  colonial  and  post‐colonial  periods.  It  focuses  on  the  SCO  laws  and  the  new  ‘Islamic’  moral standards  it  brought,  including  criminalising  those  with  non‐normative sexualities  and  genders.  This  chapter  also  demonstrates  how  these  laws  have grown  in  prominence  by  investigating  the  central  government’s  efforts  at asserting ‘Syariah’.  Chapter 4 continues the historical inquiry of the preceding chapter, but focuses on  ‘secular’  moral  laws  as  implemented  under  British  rule  till  today.  It investigates  the  ‘divinity’  claims  of  SCO  legislation  by  comparing  its  moral injunctions with those under civil  law. Besides accounting for their overlapping provisions,  this  chapter  will  show  how  despite  this,  ‘Syariah’  standards  have 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become  the  benchmark  of  ‘proper’  sexuality  today.  It  also makes  the  case  that ultimately political expediency trumps when it comes to the law’s application.  The next chapter probes into the experiences of sexual marginals with the law. It will  illustrate how the weight of  ‘Syariah’ has been unequally enforced and  felt across and within  the different categories  that constitute sexual marginals: gay men,  lesbian  women,  and  transsexuals.  Factors  like  gender,  class  and  age  are shown  to  affect  this  outcome.  It will  also  argue  that  the  law’s  implementation may  be  sporadic  and  unsystematic,  but  by  establishing  the  unacceptability  of heterodox  sexualities  and  genders,  this  is  sufficient  to  coerce  many  into  self‐regulation.  Having  detailed  the  violations  that  the  religious  functionaries  commit  in  the name of carrying out the law in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 provides some explanations for  this.  It  will  illustrate  how  using  the  SCO  law  in  general,  and  its  corrective measures  for  sexual  marginals  in  particular,  has  not  been  a  priority  for  the authorities.  Notwithstanding  the  challenges  that  this  poses  for  ‘Syariah’ enforcement, the chapter also discusses other reasons why this is so, and reveals what the Federal state’s real intentions are in relation to ‘Syariah’ enforcement.  Chapter 7 accounts for how SCO legislation governing sexual marginals can wield the influence it has despite its poor usage. It shows that the negative attention on gay,  lesbian  and  trans  communities  is  magnified  by  sporadic  but  intense contestations around the application of this law, aided by a sensationalist media. While these controversies are important in challenging the state’s ability to use 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Heteronormativity, the State and ‘Syariah’  Throughout contemporary history,  there have been different episodes of moral panic  over  the perceived breakdown  in  societal mores  and values.  Invented  to appeal  to people’s  fear of  social  disorder,  these have varied  in  scope,  intensity and  duration, with  some  having  longer‐lasting  and more  severe  consequences than  others.  Typically,  every  moral  panic  has  a  scapegoat  or  an  imaginary ‘deviant’  that  serves  as  a  distraction  from  larger  problems  at  hand.  Also characteristic is the media’s role in fuelling such scares.24   Malaysia  is  no  exception  to  this  pattern.  There  have  been  moral  panics,  for instance,  over  those  with  HIV/AIDS,  juvenile  ‘delinquents’,  and  drug  abusers. Popular  as  targets  too  have  been  ‘loose’  women,  that  is,  women  accused  of dressing  indecently  or  behaving  lasciviously  in  public.  Around  the mid‐1990s, however,  a  new  subject  of  panic  was  introduced  to  the  nation  when  sexual marginals  came under greater scrutiny by  the state. Signalling  this change was the discourse on  ‘Asian’ values  led by  then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who insisted that there was a distinctively Asian way of being.25 Amongst others, 
                                                        24 See Cohen, 1972; Goode and Ben‐Yehuda, 1994; Hunt, 1997; Thomson, 1998; Heiner, 2008. 25 These views are captured in Mahathir Mohamad and Ishihara (1995). This discourse was also popular in Singapore – and to a lesser extent, other East Asian nations – where the island state’s Premier, Lee Kuan Yew, was an equally loud proponent. See Zakaria (1994). 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it excluded being homosexual, particularly since this was cast as a threat to the family unit and hence social order.26 As he put it:  We want a family unit to remain, that is, having a husband and a wife and their children… not a man being married to another man or a woman and a woman, or single parenthood. We do not accept such means of unlimited freedom.   (quoted in The Star, 11 September 1994)  By linking it to a number of ‘social ills’ that were reportedly on the rise,27 being gay  was  painted  as  a  Western  ‘disease’  stemming  from  ‘Western’  values  like individualism, selfishness and materialism. As the rhetoric went, failure to reject the West  and  embrace  traditional  ‘Asian’  traits  like  obedience,  discipline,  and sacrificing for the collective good, destroyed the institutions of marriage and the family, and ultimately  led  to chaos and a breakdown of society. This  thesis has since  been  debunked.28 Nevertheless,  its  origins  are worth  retracing  since  this was what first put the spotlight on homosexuals and made them a scapegoat for the nation’s ‘social ills’.29  
                                                        26 Mahathir’s views about homosexuals and the decadent West were already evident in his earlier writings. In his book The Challenge (1986), for example, he criticised the West for normalising ‘men marrying men and women marrying women’ (p70), and claimed this was a result of permitting unlimited equality. As well, although he did not single out homosexuals, he cautioned that ‘the deviant behaviour of a minority can be contagious’ to the point where ‘the majority will no longer be able to control it even with undemocratic means’ (p93). 27 For example incest, pornography, prostitution, cohabitation, drug abuse, disintegrating family units, teenage mothers and unwanted pregnancies.  28 As critics have argued, there is nothing intrinsically ‘Asian’ about the values that were espoused – they are shared by many other non‐Asian societies. The claim to being ‘Asian’ is also dubious since the discourse only had currency in some parts of the region. See Inoguchi and Newman 1997; Pertiera, 1999; Wan A. Manan, 1999; Inoue, 2003; King, 2008. 29 Indeed, prior to this, very little had been said in public about homosexuality due to the stigma around directly or openly speaking about matters of sexuality. 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Contrary to being a solution to a set of social problems,30 opponents of the ‘Asian’ values  discourse  argued  that,  more  than  the  nation’s  moral  wellbeing,  this rhetoric  was  economically  and  politically  driven.31  Responding  to  Western criticisms  that  countries  following  the  ‘Asian’  growth  model  were authoritarian,32 leaders like Mahathir invoked the ‘Asian’ values card. Based on a false  cultural  divide,  this  contrasted  the  image  of  a  morally  upright  and successful East against that of a morally degenerate and declining West, and was used  as  a  warning  against  imitating  the  latter’s  model  of  development  and democracy.   As suggested earlier, the ‘Asian’ values phenomenon was significant in ushering in a new discourse on sexuality in Malaysia, one in which the ‘deviance’ attached to homosexuality – along with other non‐conforming sexualities and genders – became more pronounced and  the  legitimacy of  its persecution reaffirmed.33  It should  also  be  noted  that  since  the  region’s  1997  financial  catastrophe,  the rhetoric  of  ‘Asian’  values  has  not  returned  to  the  heights  it  scaled  before  the 
                                                        30 Aside from the boh sia phenomenon mentioned in the Introduction, Malaysia was going through a phase of moral panic about its youth who appeared more interested in lepak (loafing) than being gainfully employed. This was seen as a threat to the attainment of the state’s developmental goals. 31 Until the 1997 regional financial crisis, it had been a popular explanation for the Asian economic ‘miracle’, i.e. the prolonged period of high growth in some East Asian nations, maintaining that this success was the result of a distinctly Asian trait of prioritising the common, collective good. The state‐led development model of these nations required sacrificing civil and political rights for economic gains, leading some to argue that this discourse was a tool to prop up self‐serving rulers and their authoritarian regimes (Peletz, 2002; Verna, 2002; Lee, 2003). 32 The clash between ‘East’ and ‘West’ was most visible at the United Nations Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993 but tensions had already been building up in the months leading up to this. Dissatisfied with how some Asian countries had insisted on trade protectionism and economic conditionality, a move deemed as giving them an unfair advantage, Western nations responded by targeting their human rights record for criticism (Mauzy, 2006:49). 33 Sodomy was already criminalised under the Penal Code (S377). The law, however, was so rarely used, that few were aware of its existence. Chapter 4 provides details on this provision and its enforcement. 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crash.34  Instead,  its  place  in  setting  the  standards  for morality,  including what counts  as  appropriate  sexuality  or  gender,  has  been  overtaken  by  another discourse, one steeped in ‘Islamic’ values.35  This  chapter  provides  the  framework  to  understand  the  regulation  of  sexual marginals  –  gays,  lesbians  and  transgenders  –  in  Malaysia  today.  It  begins  by reviewing the theory of heteronormativity and the role of the state in buttressing this regime that normalises a specific  form of heterosexuality at the expense of all  other  expressions  of  sexuality  and  gender.  Next,  it  engages  in  a  discussion about the Federal state; first to explain its centralising powers and then to show how this has  influenced the evolution of  Islam in the country.  In particular,  the Federal state’s role in driving Islamisation and creating an emboldened religious bureaucracy  is  interrogated  and  contrasted  against  that  of  non‐state  Islamist actors like the political party PAS.  The last two sections analyse the heightened emphasis on ‘Syariah’ laws in post‐colonial Muslims  societies  like Malaysia  as  a  distinct  phase  of  Islamisation,  i.e. ‘Syariahtisation’.  It  makes  the  connection  between  the  regulation  of  sexual marginals  and  the  centre’s  efforts  at  asserting  ‘Syariah’  at  one  level,  and mobilising a  coalition of  Islamic actors  to defend official  Islam at another. Also included  is  a  review  of  the  features  and  context  of  political  Islam,  and  its treatment  of  women  and  sexual  morality.  The  chapter  ends  by  revisiting  the 
                                                        34 However, rather than having been killed‐off, it surfaces periodically whenever politically necessary. See for example ‘Rais: UN ill‐advised on homosexual laws’, NST, 9 Feb 2004. 35 On how ‘Islamic’ religious beliefs have influenced non‐Muslim realities, see Tan (in press). 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concept  of  state  power  to  caution  against  regarding  the  state  as  necessarily acting according to a predetermined plan or serving specific and fixed interests.  
Heteronormativity and the State  The argument  that homosexual bodies  are  ‘deviant’  and  in need of  ‘correction’ rests on two assumptions. Firstly, that there is a naturally occurring and ‘normal’ sexuality  (i.e.  heterosexuality),  as  opposed  to  ‘unnatural’  and  ‘abnormal’  ones, (i.e. homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexuality, etc.). Secondly, that sexuality and gender – where only  two genders are recognised: man and woman – are  fixed, meaning  that  once  you  are  born  with  this,  they  stay  with  you  for  life.  These assumptions  have  been  heavily  critiqued,  especially  by  queer  theorists  who question the ‘unity, stability, viability, and political utility of sexual [and gender] identities’ (Davis, 2008:101).36   Building on Foucault (1978) and Rubin (1993) for example, they point out that there  is  nothing  inherently  essential  or  ‘natural’  about  being  heterosexual  (or homosexual for that matter). Rather, sexuality – that is, ‘all erotically significant aspects of social life and social being, such as desires, practices, relationships and identities’  (Jackson,  2006:106)  –  is  a  product  of  different  negotiations  and contestations  to  determine  its  meaning.  It  is  being  constructed  and reconstructed all  the  time, often with  conflicting  connotations and values. This explains why definitions of what  is  ‘erotic’  or  ‘sexual’  can  vary  from person  to person,  according  to  context  and  time  as well  as  variables  such  as  gender  and                                                         36 On the history and contributions of queer theory, see Corber and Valocchi (2003). 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class.  Given  this,  queer  theorists  argue  that  sexual  and  gender  identities  are better understood as unstable, malleable and fluid.   They also recognise that just as being ‘heterosexual’ is not permanent, neither is being  ‘homosexual’.  Conscious  that  one’s  sex,  gender  and  sexuality  do  not  fall into  neat  relationships  with  each  other  since  there  are many  combinations  of desires,  identities  and  practices  possible  –  as  exemplified  by  drag  queens  and kings  –  they  have  shown  the  importance  of  interrogating  the  heterosexual‐homosexual binary in destabilising the naturalisation of heterosexuality.37   The privileging of heterosexuality as a normative sexual practice and way of life – and  the converse of  this,  the demonisation of homosexuality and being gay – has been facilitated by the regime of heteronormativity. This refers ‘to practices, to the norms governing those practices, to the institutions that uphold them and to the effects produced by those norms within  individuals’  (Wieringa,  in press) such  that  one’s  conception  of  ‘proper’  sexuality  and  gender  is  slanted  in  a particular  direction.  Through  interlocking  dimensions  encompassing  the structural  to  the  social,  and  the  institutional  to  individual  everyday  practices, heteronormativity  operates  in  two  primary  ways  to  mould  what  being heterosexual and non‐heterosexual demands.38   
                                                        37 Here the work of Judith Butler (1990) has been instrumental. Taking feminist claims about gender being socially constructed one step further Butler argues that these identities are performative. There is no ‘original’ from which they are copied, but rather, they are constituted through a series of repeated acts that mimic expressions of gender that are said to be its results.  38 Jackson, 2006:112. 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To  begin,  it  involves  ensuring  that  those  who  are  heterosexual  remain heterosexual.   Reminders of the dangers – and consequences – of straying from the  heterosexual  path  are  an  important  part  of  this  system.  Simply  being heterosexual  though,  is  not  enough.  There  is  a  hierarchy  even  within heterosexuality.  Using  the  concept  of  ‘passionate  aesthetics’  to  elaborate  how heteronormativity  functions,  Saskia  Wieringa  (in  press)  reveals  this  to  be  a regulatory  regime  that  is  based  on  a  system  of  values  that  has  universal relevance at  the same time is adaptable and can be manipulated to suit certain interests.  This  explains  how  contrary  to  the  assertion  that  there  is  a  unitary heterosexual subject and a universal heterosexual community, different forms of heterosexuality can be idealised depending on a range of factors.39  Heteronormativity, however,  is not only about heterosexuality.  Its effectiveness is also dependent on its ability to exclude and marginalise those who succeed in escaping from the grasps of ‘normality’.40 Often it prevents those with heterodox sexualities  from  appearing  ‘proper’  by  conflating  being  gay  or  lesbian  with perpetrators  of  sexual  violations  like  paedophilia,  bestiality,  and  other  non‐consensual sexual acts. In so doing, Nagel (2000) argues, ‘sexual “deviance” from the heterosexual norm can provoke gender and sexual policing and panics that, in the end, strengthen and further naturalize particular forms of heterosexuality’ (p117).                                                         39 Thus, at a one point in time, in a particular context, this ideal could have been a heterosexual who was married, monogamous, and engaged in sex only for reproduction, not for pleasure. In the same context today, the emphasis may not be on marriage or procreation anymore but simply on being in a monogamous heterosexual relationship. Similarly, in Malaysia, the ideal of being a monogamous married heterosexual only applies to Muslim women and non‐Muslims since the law allows Muslim men to marry up to four wives. 40 This is how the effects of heteronormativity can reach those who are not in sexual relationships. To be sure, in some communities, being celibate or single – especially for women – is stigmatised as well. 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Although  the  theory of  heteronormativity  can be  extended  to  explain how  like homosexuality,  transgenderism has been similarly cast as a moral wrongdoing, most  writings  on  the  subject  have  focused  on  heteronormativity’s  effects  in relation  to  sexuality,  not  gender.  Peletz  (2011) has  argued  that  this  is  a major drawback because it assumes that ‘ostensibly bedrock sexual(ized) difference is invariably  the defining  feature of personal  identity,  the difference  that matters most’  (p21),  and  while  this  may  be  so  in  the  West,  in  Malaysia  where transgender visibility  is  traditionally higher  than that of homosexuals,  this bias ignores  an  important  basis  in  which  bodily  regulation  occurs.41  Despite  this limitation,  the  theory  can  still  offer  a  handle  to  understand  how  the marginalisation  of  homosexuals  in  non‐Western  societies  like  Malaysia’s  has come about – particularly as  this community becomes more public over  time – but only if it incorporates the way localised processes shape its operations.   The fact that heterosexuality constantly needs to be reasserted as a social ‘norm’ while  other  sexualities  are  rendered  illicit  bears  out  the  argument  that  the heteronormative order  is not absolute nor  is  it  fixed. However,  for  the regime’s twin strategies – policing and silencing disreputable heterosexuals, and repelling those  outside  the  limits  of  acceptable  sexuality  and  gender  –  to  work, heteronormativity  relies  on  different  techniques  of  organisation,  management and regulation.  
                                                        41 Similarly in Thailand, Peter Jackson’s study on the emergence of homosexual and transgender identities there in the early twentieth century supports this point. He shows how this development was tied to Western imperialism forcing the Siamese state to engage in a new regime of bio‐power that focused on ‘controlling the beauty of gender rather than prescribing, or proscribing, the pleasures of sexuality’ (2003, para. 89). 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Though not the only player,  the state – understood here as  ‘a set of  institutions with  the authority or power  to make  [and enforce]  rules which govern society’ (Ng et al., 2006:64) – has a key role in this, framing how its citizens comprehend sex, desire and gender by stipulating what is lawful and unlawful, and rewarding or  punishing  this  accordingly.42  Indeed,  the  law’s  claim  to  truth  makes  it  a powerful regulatory tool. Such is its force that the state is able to cast a panoptical gaze  that can cause  individuals  to  internalise  its  ‘disciplinary power’. The more influence it has over how they view the legitimacy of their own sexual desires and activities, the more it is able to persuade them to self‐regulate.43   As this study reiterates, laws against homosexual conduct, for instance, need not be  strictly  enforced  if  the  message  that  such  behaviour  is  outlawed  can  be conveyed  without  incarcerating  anyone  or  if  necessary,  doing  so  only occasionally to  instil enough fear  for the homosexual community to police  itself and  remain  closeted.44  This  is  what  Foucault  meant  by  the  pervasiveness  of modern power in Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison (1977). Modernity offered new forms of control and disciplinary practices as ‘technologies of power’ (p173)  –  schools,  factories,  workplaces,  hospitals  and  the  military  –  which                                                         42 As Jeffrey Weeks (2002) maintains: ‘The state can shape through its prohibitions and punishments. It can also organize and regulate through its positive will and injunctions, and influence through its omissions and contradictions (p34). Furthermore, though the focus in this study is punitive laws, it recognises that there are other types of legislation that can also shape sexual behaviour (e.g. marriage and divorce laws) (Posner, 1992:71). 43 Take the example of S28 of the Local Government Act that was passed in Britain in the late 1980s. Simply by being enacted, this law – which prohibited the promotion of homosexuality through teaching or publishing material – resulted in self‐censorship by schools, libraries and other local authorities, all which wanted to avoid being charged with contravening it (Cook, 2006:71,74). 44 Even so, this is deeply problematic because the mere existence of such laws ‘probably delayed the emergence of a homosexual subculture and by doing so probably reduced the amount of homosexual activity, perhaps considerably’ (Posner, 1992:81). 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enabled  power  to  ‘go  right  down  to  the  depths  of  society’  (p27).  Hence,  what began as a means of surveillance and control in prison metastasized throughout society making everyone a subject of modern power, reconfigured towards self‐censorship and regulation.   For  Foucault,  traditional  punishments  (e.g.  torture, mutilation) may  have  been vastly  more  violent  and  brutal  than  punishments  today,  but  they  yielded  less control over an individual’s body and mind. Unlike before, the idea now is not ‘to punish  less,  but  to  punish  better’  (1977:82). Modern  disciplinary  practices  are subtler  but  more  insidious.  Its  purpose  is  not  to  suppress  or  prohibit  but  to produce docile and useful bodies  that will become amenable  to  instruction and self‐control.45  This  is  certainly  true  in  the  case  of  laws  regulating  sexuality  in Malaysia, both ‘secular’ and religious.  
The Federal State46  To  contextualise  the  role  of  the  state  in  propping  up  heteronormativity  in Malaysia,  an  explanation  about  the  country’s  political  system  is  first  in  order. Malaysia  is  a  federation  comprising  13  territorial  States,  including  one  (the Federal  Territory)47  that  belongs  to  the  national  government.  Assisted  by  the Cabinet  (the  Federal  executive),  this  government  is  helmed  by  the  Prime Minister,  while  the  supreme  head  is  a  constitutional  monarch,  the  Yang  di‐Pertuan Agong (king). This division of power is mirrored in each State which has                                                         45 Hindess, 1996:113. 46 The term ‘Federal state’ is used interchangeably with Federal, central or national government. 47 The Federal Territory includes the capital, Kuala Lumpur (established in 1974); Labuan (1984); and the administrative centre, Putrajaya (2001). 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its own elected government led by a Menteri Besar (Chief Minister), and a titular head, either the sultan for the nine Malay ones or a governor for the remainder.   Following Riker’s definition (1964, cited in Hale, 2004:167‐68), a federal system has the following features: (1)  two  levels  of  government  rule  [for]  the  same  land  and people;48  (2) each level has at  least one area of action in which it  is autonomous; and (3) there is some guarantee… of the autonomy of each government in its own  sphere…  [and]  at  least  the  minimum  level  of  democracy  needed, such that the concept of regional autonomy has some meaning, including some kind of direct popular election to state organs of the highest level of territorial governance unit underneath nationwide state organs.49 At  a  glance,  the  Malaysian  example  appears  to  fit  this  description.  However, some  have  argued  that  the  asymmetrical  powers  of  the  national  or  central government make it more akin to a unitary or at best, quasi‐Federal state.50   Several explanations have been forwarded for this anomaly. One has to do with the Federal Constitution that the British helped formulate. As different scholars have  argued,  the  nation’s  founding  charter  provided  for  a  strong  central government.51 Thus, even if its framers, the Reid Commission, may have tried to 
                                                        48 In some federal systems, there are more than two levels of government. For example, prior to 1965, local councils formed the third tier of government in Malaysia. 49 There are variations to this definition but all adhere to the basic idea of creating sub‐national units of governance. See for example, Cameron and Faletti (2005) who categorise federations according to whether or not they have sub‐national executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. 50 Mohammad Agus Yusoff, 2006:344. 51 The British had wanted to leave behind a system that would continue its legacy of centralising and standardising governance. Its first choice was a unitary state in the form of the Malayan Union. However, when that failed in 1948, they proposed the Federal system as ‘a last resort, a grudging compromise’ to overcome ‘concurrent pressures for unity and for regional autonomy’ 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temper the centre’s dominance by giving States certain  legislative and financial powers as well as ‘a good measure of autonomy’ (Federation of Malaya, 1957:1, cited  in  Mohammad  Agus  Yusoff,  2006:326),  the  Federal  state  was  bestowed with  far  ‘more executive authority  and  in particular held overriding powers  to make  treaties,  to  impose  legal  uniformity,  and  to  deal  with  economic development and situations of insurgency’ (Mahwood, 1984:525).52 Importantly, it  also  inherited  vastly  superior  taxing  powers  compared  to  its  sub‐national counterparts.53  Another explanation for the Federal state’s dominance today lies in its ability to add to the extensive constitutional powers it inherited upon Independence. This has been possible since for more than half a century, the ruling coalition had the mandate to freely amend the Constitution and skew it even more in favour of the centre.54  For  instance,  Federal  executive  powers  were  enlarged  following constitutional amendments that stripped the monarchy and the judiciary of their powers.55 It was only after the 2008 national election, that the opposition parties 
                                                                                                                                                              (Watts, 1966:100). This decision was also taken ‘to help defuse the considerable potential for ethnic or regional conflict’ (Mohammad Agus Yusoff, 2006:325).  52 Enloe (1975) maintains that States were left with ‘few levers of consequence’ at Independence (p152). Though rarely utilised, the Cabinet – by issuing a recommendation to the King – can also push for a state of emergency to be declared, and during this time, the centre can legitimately rewrite a State’s constitution to place control firmly in its hands.  53 For example, while the centre was made responsible for the collection of more ‘profitable’ taxes (e.g. income, excise and customs, road taxes), the only significant tax base assigned to States was land tax. 54 Most clauses of the Federal Constitution can be amended if the government of the day secures a two‐thirds majority support in both houses of Parliament. In the first 14 years alone, the Constitution was amended 15 times (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:16). 55 The monarchy first had its powers curtailed in 1983‐84 when a constitutional amendment did away with the king’s right to veto Federal legislation. The rulers lost further ground when their legal immunity and power to grant royal pardons were removed following another change to the Constitution in 1993. The judiciary suffered a similar fate after further modifications in 1988 made them subservient to Parliament, took away their judicial review powers, and made the Attorney General in charge of the way court cases and assignments were dealt (Mauzy and Milne, 1999:30‐39, 46‐47). 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– organised as the Pakatan Rakyat (PR)56 – won sufficient seats to halt the BN’s free reign over the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives).  B.H.  Shafruddin  (1987)  and  Mohammad  Agus  Yusoff  (2006)  are  among  those who  have  shown  how  central  powers  have  been  fortified  since  1957.  The Malaysian  Federal  government,  for  example,  has  been  able  to  make  States financially dependent on the centre by capitalising on its control of development funds.57  It  wields  additional  leverage  given  States  rely  on  it  to  staff  their  civil service  as  well.58  The  centrifugal  tendency  in  Federal‐State  relations  has  also been ascribed to a dominant national party leadership under UMNO’s hegemonic influence,59 and the BN’s ability to manipulate judicial outcomes.   Equally  important,  both  authors  maintain  that  Federal  influence  has  been uneven  across  States,  mediated  by  different  historical  and  political  factors.60 They also emphasise how efforts to further empower the centre have not always been  smooth  or  effective  given  various  internal  and  external  challenges  it  has                                                         56 Comprising PAS, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, Justice Party), the March 2008 election was not the first time that the three main opposition parties had joined forces. It was, however, the first time that they had run under the Pakatan Rakyat banner. 57 The power imbalance is even more obvious in the case of opposition State governments. Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006) has amply documented how in the 1990s, the Federal state used development aid to try and force Kelantan and Sabah – then under opposition rule – to comply with central policies. 58 With its large financial coffers, the Federal government is the largest employer of the public service and ‘loans’ its staff to States to fill in gaps in their bureaucracy. The fact that the careers of these federally seconded officials are tied to the centre make their loyalties suspect (Enloe, 1975:153). This point is argued further in Chapter 7. 59 This was true up to the 2008 general election when the UMNO‐led BN had overwhelming control of State governments, with the exception of Kelantan (and in the past, Penang, Terengganu and Sabah for brief periods). However, besides denying the ruling coalition a two‐thirds majority in Federal parliament at the last polls, the opposition parties also managed to win over another four States – on top of Kelantan – thus breaking the BN’s grip at the State level. 60 For example, States with federalised bureaucracies such as Selangor and Perak are more reliant on the centre for their personnel than those like Kelantan which has its own civil service. Even then, however, like the other States, the latter still depends on the centre for its supply of professional and technical personnel. 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been  confronted  with.61  Indeed,  where  the  state  is  concerned,  others  have maintained  that  it  is  a  site  of  struggle  from  within  (and  without).62  Neither homogenous nor monolithic, the state comprises ‘a messy set of institutions and their  inter‐relations’  (Puri,  2006:144),  and  having  multiple  actors  who  may adopt  different  or  conflicting  positions  makes  it  difficult  to  predict  how  its intentions will turn out.   This  not withstanding,  their  inquiry  lacks  a  critique  of  how  the  state  has  used Islam to strengthen the centre. Shafruddin’s main concern about political Islam is the threat that  ‘militant and fundamentalist  Islamic groups’ pose to the Federal structure,  reflecting  the  period  his  book  was  produced,  i.e.  when  religious resurgence  was  just  starting.63  On  the  other  hand,  Agus  Yusoff  who  has  the benefit of writing  later discusses  Islam more but  limits his analysis  to how the PAS‐UMNO rivalry  forced  the  latter  to  ‘Islamise’,  and how  the  centre prevailed over the Kelantan hudud controversy.   
                                                        61 One of the more serious challenges to Federal dominance is conflict within UMNO itself, as exemplified by the party’s near demise in 1987 when it split into two factions. As suggested already, the centre is also tested when States are under opposition rule. 62 See Pringle and Watson, 1992; Connell, 1994; Yuval‐Davis, 1996; Weeks, 2002. 63 It is unlikely that anyone then would have been able to predict the consequences of official Islamisation which had just started to gain momentum. For instance, writing even earlier, Cynthia Enloe could not have foreseen the changes to come either, hence her remark that State jurisdiction over Islam was ‘a matter of little consequence in a period of modernization’ (1975:152). 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Politicising Islam: The role of the centre  The connection between Islamism and state power in Malaysia has instead been made in various studies on Islamisation,64 especially relating to the phase under Mahathir’s UMNO‐led BN government from the early 1980s onwards.65 Many of these explain how ‘the greater visibility of Islamic norms, values, and symbols in the  public  arena,  and  [the]  anchoring  of  law  and  policy  making  in  its  values’ (Nasr, 2001:3) occurred. Such narratives commonly attribute Islamisation as the state’s  response  to  a  resurgent  Islam,66  namely,  the  growing  influence  of  the 
dakwah (missionary) movement67 and the threat of PAS.68 Where the former was concerned,  the  BN  government  was  fearful  that  popular  dakwah  groups  like 
                                                        64 See especially Nasr, 2001 and Liow, 2009. Also pertinent are Nagata, 1982; Barraclough, 1983; Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Zainah Anwar, 1987; Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, 1988; Camroux, 1996; Shamsul, 1997; and Hamayotsu, 2002. 65 There have been different sources of Islamisation throughout the history of the Malay peninsular, but the period from the 1980s onwards is distinguished by the role of the state. See Roff (1999). 66 Exceptions to this body of literature include Nasr (2001) who argues that the state turned more ‘Islamic’ to preserve its project of creating a strong Malay capitalist class, while Hamayotsu (2003) claims that UMNO’s ‘incentive structure’ – safeguarding the party’s political and economic base, at the same time placating the interests of the Chinese and capital – was what prompted the state to Islamise its bureaucratic machinery. 67 The term dakwah literally means ‘to call’ or ‘to respond to a call’. This movement emerged partly because the New Economic Policy – introduced following the 1969 ethnic riots – had failed to eradicate poverty and redistribute the nation’s wealth as promised. Worse, the policy appeared to benefit only capital and the elite. The movement was also boosted by global developments in the Muslim world. The oil‐price crisis, the Iranian revolution, Israel‐Palestinian conflict, the anti‐Soviet war waged by the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan all encouraged an increasingly discontented Muslim populace in Malaysia to turn to Islam as the panacea for their socio‐economic problems.  68 Former members of UMNO’s religious bureau who wanted an Islamic post‐colonial state established PAS in 1951. In reality, the party prioritised the advancement of Malay – not Islamic – nationalist causes in its first two decades, and used Islam as a means towards this end. It only changed its approach in 1978, when it sensed it needed to offer rural Malays something new to switch their political allegiance from UMNO. PAS saw this opportunity in the Islamic resurgence. Despite the change to more overt propagation of Islamic beliefs – including the call for an Islamic state and an Islamic Constitution – the party did not completely abandon its Malay agenda until a more Islamist faction took over its helm in 1982 (See Mauzy and Milne, 1983; Farish Noor, 2004; Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, 2007). 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ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia)69 would upstage UMNO, either on its own or in collaboration with PAS.   As  the  argument  goes,  Mahathir’s  solution  over  the  next  two  decades  was  to execute  a  slew  of  socio‐economic,  legal  and  political  Islamic  programmes. Besides building mosques and surau,  subsidising religious schools, establishing an  international  Islamic university,  introducing  Islamic banking  and  insurance, and  upgrading  or  setting‐up  new  Federal  Islamic  institutions,  the  BN government  extended  symbolic  concessions  like  making  Islamic  studies  an examinable subject at school and religious knowledge a requirement to enter the civil  service.  It  also  gave  Islam more  visibility  by  raising  its  radio  airtime  and television coverage, and pumping money into the Islamic arts. It barred Muslims from gambling centres,  regulated  liquor sales, and  implemented dress codes  to enforce women’s modesty in the public service.70 Seeking to contain the Islamist threat  by  co‐opting  them  into  his  administration, Mahathir’s  biggest  coup was securing  the  defection  of  ABIM  leader,  Anwar  Ibrahim,  to  UMNO71 which  also gave added legitimacy to his administration’s ‘Islamic’ initiatives.  
                                                        69 This was a well‐connected and highly effective movement that started off with over 150 members but grew exponentially such that by the end of the 1970s, it had around 35,000 members. More crucially, it was ABIM’s alliance with PAS – which already saw some ABIM leaders contest in the 1978 elections on the latter’s ticket – that was viewed as the real danger (Mauzy and Milne, 1983:633‐34). There were a variety of other dakwah movements including the Islamic Representative Council (IRC) (this continues today as JIM, Jamaah Islah Malaysia), Darul Arqam and the Tabligh movement, as well as smaller idiosyncratic outfits under the tutelage of a charismatic leader. For details, see Nagata, 1997 and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 2008. 70 See Barraclough (1983). At the international level too, the government stepped up efforts for Malaysia to become a major player in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Means, 1978:399). 71 Anwar joined UMNO in time to contest in the 1982 general election, which he won. He was subsequently made a Deputy Minister before being elected as head of UMNO youth later in the same year (Jomo and Shabery, 1988:856,859). 
 35 
Official  religious  agendas,  however,  are  not  always  limited  to  containing potential threats and rivals. As Nasr (2001) shows, there is ‘a direct correlation between Islamization and [the] expansion of state power’ (p127). He argues that: Islamization  was  the  handmaiden  of  the  rise  of  a  strong  late‐developer state in Malaysia in lieu of the weak state that was the legacy of the colonial era. Islamization had provided the Mahathir administration with means to compensate  for  weaknesses  of  the  state  and  to  revise  its  institutional structure in such a fashion as to shore up its authority. (p129)  The  primary  instrument  for  (and  beneficiary  of)  this  process  has  been  the Federal state, or more precisely, the Prime Minister’s Department. This office has assumed  a  critical  role  in  charting  the  direction  and  shape  of  what  Muslims understand  and  practice  as  Islam,  a matter  that  constitutionally,  is  outside  its jurisdiction.  Precisely  because  Islam  falls  under  the  purview  of  States  –  and nowhere has this been more evident than with ‘Syariah’ lawmaking – redirecting the authority over Muslim affairs to the centre is even more vital.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the idea of the Federal state intervening to standardise and control Islamic affairs is not new. 72 Mahathir’s predecessors had kick‐started this process at the end of the 1960s, starting with the formation of the  Majlis  Kebangsaan  Bagi  Hal  Ehwal  Agama  Islam  Malaysia  (MKI,  National Council of Islamic Affairs, Malaysia).73 Though the MKI continues to exist today, 
                                                        72 In a way it is also expected given the unificatory powers extended to the Federal state by the Constitution (Roff, 1998:216). 73 Two of the most important functions outlined for the MKI were (i) ensuring a uniform and effective Islamic administration across all States; and (ii) advising the Conference of Rulers, State governments and State Religious Councils on any matters relating to the standardisation or improvement of Islamic law, administration or education. The Prime Minister, i.e. a Federal 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its  influence  is  considerably  subdued  given  that  its  functions  have  been  taken over by JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), the powerful Federal Islamic coordinating body, which began as the secretariat to the MKI when it was formed in 1968.74  Indeed, the transformation of  JAKIM from a tiny secretariat to a  full‐fledged  multi‐division  department  with  immense  authority  over  Muslims nationwide75 is what distinguishes Islamisation under Mahathir from that of past administrations: the resulting fortified and expanded religious bureaucracy.  The centre’s success at dictating what is deemed halal (permissible) and haram (prohibited) for Muslims is tied to its ability at limiting Muslim understanding of their  faith  to  its  brand  of  the  religion,  a  version  of  Sunni  Islam  known  as Ahli 
Sunnah Wal Jamaah.76 The flipside of this is ensuring that this official version is also palatable to non‐Muslims and foreign capital. It requires the ruling coalition to  distinguish  what  it  sells  as  Islam  from  the  ‘conservative’  and  ‘extremist’ 
                                                                                                                                                              politician, not a religious leader, was made head of this body. In the 1970s, the MKI was responsible for setting‐up the Pusat Penyelidikan Islam (Islamic Research Centre), Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Malaysia (National Fatwa Council), Institusi Dakwah dan Latihan Islam (INDAH, Institute for Dakwah and Islamic Training), Yayasan Dakwah Islamiyah Malaysia (YADIM, National Islamic Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia), the Maktab Perguruan Islam (Islamic Teachers College), and Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan Pelajaran dan Pendidikan Agama Islam (LEPAI, Advisory Board for Islamic Education and Curricula) among others. The government also created its own dakwah organisation, PERKIM during this period. See JAKIM website, <http://www.islam.gov.my>, Accessed: 11 Feb 2009. 74 When the portfolio for Islamic matters was placed directly under the Prime Minister’s Department in 1974, this secretariat became the Religious Affairs Section. As part of Mahathir’s Islamisation programme, it was then upgraded into BAHEIS (Bahagian Hal Ehwal Agama Islam, Islamic Affairs Division) in 1984, before being further improved and expanded into JAKIM in 1997. 75 Amongst JAKIM’s functions is coordinating the enforcement of Islamic laws, i.e. being the link between Federal‐State religious bodies to improve and streamline enforcement, investigation and prosecution between the States (JAKIM, 2003:28). 76 This is despite the fact that such an approach goes against the spirit of the Islamic legal tradition that promotes a diversity and plurality of views (See el‐Fadl, 2003; Mir‐Hosseini and Hamzic, 2010). 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version offered by PAS.77 Hence  the  emphasis on official  Islam being  ‘modern’, and  more  importantly,  ‘moderate’,  i.e.  fully  compatible  with  the  nation’s development and modernisation trajectory.78   This accounts for why Mahathir’s earliest attempt at introducing religious values in his administration – via the Dasar Penerapan Nilai‐nilai  Islam (Instillation of Islamic Values Policy) – was more concerned with promoting an ethical, efficient and effective administration  that would boost national productivity.79  It  is  also why UMNO leaders who play up the importance of ‘Syariah’ have stopped short of  insisting  on hudud,  considered  the  strictest  form  of  ‘Islamic’  criminal  law.80 Instead, they rationalise this discrepancy by arguing that given Malaysia’s multi‐ethnic  and  multi‐religious  composition,  such  a  law  would  be  unfair  on  non‐Muslims. Expectedly, the Federal government has used its constitutional powers to scuttle the plans of PAS‐led States of Kelantan and Terengganu to implement 
hudud,81  even  though  their  respective  State  Legislative  Assemblies  have endorsed the law. 
                                                        77 Hamayotsu, 2002:362. Liow (2009) argues this distinction between UMNO and PAS is not ‘entirely accurate’ and that ‘the ideological divide between the two Muslim parties may not be as sharp as it seems at first glance’ (p182). 78 Certainly, as the following chapters illustrate, it is debatable exactly how ‘moderate’ official Islam is in Malaysia, particularly as there are harsh repercussions for those who do not conform. 79 Twelve values were promoted as ‘Islamic’. Among them were being trustworthy, responsible, sincere, dedicated, moderate, disciplined, and cooperative (See Panduan Rancangan Penerapan Nilai‐nilai Islam, Siri 2, Kuala Lumpur: Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam, Jabatan Perdana Menteri). 80 Besides hudud, the other categories of Islamic crimes are qisas and diya i.e. crimes involving murder or manslaughter where the penalty is ‘an eye for an eye’ in the former and giving compensation or ‘blood money’ to the family of a victim in the latter. The punishment for takzir (discretionary) offences is not stated in the textual sources so a judge can use his or her discretion to pass a sentence within the ambit of what the law allows. 81 Any law passed by the State Legislative Assembly needs two‐thirds ratification by Federal Parliament before it can be enforced. This way, the BN – which controlled Parliament when the Kelantan and Terengganu hudud laws were enacted in 1993 and 2002 respectively – was able to halt the implementation of this legislation. As well, the enforcement of laws requires powers that are vested in the Federal government. Without its approval, no police, prison or judicial authority will partake in the execution of the law (Liow, 2009:59). 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It  has  been  argued  that  the  BN  government  was  able  to  minimise  the  threat posed  by  its  religious  political  rivals  –  including  the  ulama  (Muslim  religious scholar) class – by absorbing them as state Islamic functionaries. This may be so in the case of Anwar and certain ABIM members who followed him into UMNO. But the exercise of revamping existing Islamic institutions and creating new ones also gave rise to numerous employment opportunities within the state religious machinery.  Having  sponsored  the  tertiary  education  of  thousands  of  Malay students under  the NEP,  the BN government was  confronted with  a  surplus of graduates,  many  returning  from  the  Middle  East  with  heightened  Islamic consciousness. Giving them jobs in the religious bureaucracy was an easier way to avoid the possibility of alienating these constituents.   In the literature too, the inclination is to blame the intolerant Islam propagated by the centre on the ulama class which they co‐opted. For example, while Liow (2009) rightly acknowledges the role of  the UMNO‐led Federal state  in  ‘driving the  narrative  of  Islamism  and  shaping  the  politicization  of  Islam  in  Malaysia’ (p179),  he  ascribes  this  to  the  ulama  –  whom  he  also  calls  ‘state‐sponsored firebrands’  (p68) –  in  the  religious bureaucracy.82 As  this  study will  argue,  the influence of the ulama class in this regard has been overstated. Further, even if the  state  Islamic  machinery  has  grown  in  strength  over  the  years,  it  is  a misleading  to  refer  to  all  its  functionaries  as  ulama  since  to  qualify  as  alim (knowledgeable) involves much more than merely possessing a degree in Islamic                                                         82 He maintains that ‘by virtue of their positions and appointments within the state bureaucracy… [they] were effectively empowered to define the parameters of Islamic discourse in Malaysia’ (Liow, 2009:47). Hamayotsu (2003) takes a similar position. 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studies, as is the case with the majority of religious bureaucrats.83 Conflating the two notions masks other processes and forces behind state Islam.  
 ‘Syariahtisation’: Islamisation augmented  The post‐colonial era witnessed growing calls for ‘Syariah’ law to be reinstated in the  Muslim  world.  Many  of  these  advocates  focus  their  efforts  on  reviving ‘Islamic’ criminal law – considered a casualty of both colonial rule when Western codified  laws  were  made  the  norm,  as  well  as  post‐colonial  attempts  at modernising  the  legal  system – a prerequisite  for an  Islamic state.  In countries like  Libya,  Pakistan,  Iran,  and  Sudan,  as  well  as  parts  of  others  like  northern Nigeria  and  southern  Somalia,  this  led  to  the  introduction  of  laws  with  hadd (plural: hudud) penalties.84  These  impose harsh punishment  (e.g.  amputation  of  limbs,  flogging,  stoning  to death) on selected religious offences, which its advocates argue are stipulated in the Qur’an  and hadith.85 Though  this position  is debatable,86 many  continue  to believe that such law has divine origins. As noted before, hudud  is not enforced 
                                                        83 One Syariah expert interviewed noted the ease in which some have pronounced themselves as ‘ulama’. Often a case of ‘self‐invoked power’, she argued that this had given rise to the situation of ‘today I am burger boy, tomorrow I am ulama!’ (Interview with ‘Tina’, 23 Feb 2009). In this way, studies which attribute the state’s conservative Islam to the ulama class in its bureaucracy, legitimise the false claims that the self‐appointed ulama make. 84 There have also been attempts to introduce hudud in other parts of the Arab world, parts of Malaysia (more on this will be said later) and most recently, in Aceh, Indonesia, but these have not materialised. See Peters, 2005; Marshall, 2005; Kamali, 2007. 85 Hadith are reported sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. There are thousands of hadith but only a handful is deemed sound, i.e. where the reliability and trustworthiness of its transmitters and linkages (isnad) have been authenticated (Watt, 1996:89).  86 For example, Islamic law expert Hashim Kamali (n.d.) has argued that while the Qur’an sanctions punishment for such crimes, it does not specify what the penalties are. Instead, these have been derived from fiqh (jurisprudence). 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in Malaysia. Instead ‘Islamic’ offences are dealt with under the less severe takzir penal  laws,  introduced as part of  state‐driven  Islamisation. Nevertheless,  these laws are similarly regarded as Syariah, and therefore projected as God‐given too.   Various  experts  in  Islamic  jurisprudence  have  argued  that  contrary  to  being willed  by  God,  there  is  a  human  element  in  what  is  promulgated  as  ‘Syariah’ law.87  This  is  because  they  are  a  product  of  fiqh  (jurisprudence),  the  study  of Syariah made possible through ijtihad (independent judicial reasoning).88 Unlike Syariah, the ideal and whose principles are divine and eternal,89 fiqh rulings are derived  through  interpretation  of  the  sacred  texts,  and  should  thus  be understood  as  contextual  and  fallible.  This  point  has  largely  been  ignored  by states that have enacted ‘Islamic’ criminal legislation.   While the process of Islamisation in the 1980s and 1990s widened the spread of religious  laws  in  Malaysia,  left  in  the  hands  of  the  respective  states,  their enforcement was  haphazard, weak  and  ineffective.  Consequently,  for  the most part, few Malaysians were aware of or cared about their existence, and even less knew that  they had proliferated during  this  time. This situation changed  in  the                                                         87 See An‐Naim, 1994; Ali, 2006; Mir‐Hosseini 2006; Masud, 2009. Those like el‐Fadl (2005) and Kamali (2007) accept Islamic law as the revealed word of God yet believe it is open to adjustment and change. This variation in the two positions aside, all agree that there is nothing definitive and fixed about what is promulgated as ‘Syariah’ law. 88 Ijtihad became especially important after Prophet Mohamad’s death cut off direct access to revelations from the divine. Through a process of human engagement with the primary sources of authority in Islam – the Qur’an (revelations of God) and Sunna (teachings of the Prophet) – 
ijtihad makes it possible for the Syariah’s broad principles to be extracted and applied to specific and unprecedented issues that have no corresponding text. It is also a vehicle through which the religious values embodied in the textual material of Syariah continue to have relevance despite societal change (Kamali, 2007; An‐Na‘im, 1994, 2008). 89 In fact, the word ‘Syariah’ means ‘the path to the watering place’ (Kamali, 2007:149), also understood as the divinely guided path of right conduct for Muslims. It encompasses all aspects of human life, not only law which forms a small portion, but also the theological and moral right down to religious rituals and matters of hygiene and etiquette (Watt, 1996:88). 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late  1990s,  following  the  creation  of  JAKIM  and  the  Federal  state’s  renewed commitment  to  centralising  the  coordination  of  Islamic  affairs.  As  Maznah Mohamad (2010:513) argues:  [The]  expansion  of  the  Sharia  could  not  have  happened  if  not  for centralized  control.  Centralization meant  that  the  development  of  Islam could be  funded,  coordinated as well  as moderated and  curbed  (if  need be) by the national leadership, specifically through the office of the Prime Minister.  Hence,  contrary  to  those who  believe  that  official  Islamisation  ended with  the removal  of  Anwar  Ibrahim  from  office,90  the  opposite  was  true.  Rather  than retreat, for reasons that will be addressed in this thesis, the assertion of ‘Syariah’ became more forceful over the turn of the century, and its impact has come to be felt by Muslims and non‐Muslims alike, albeit in differing degrees. This phase of Islamisation is what I referred to earlier as ‘Syariahtisation’.   Farzana  Shaikh  (2008)91  uses  this  term  to  refer  to  a  phenomenon  with  ‘an uncompromising  emphasis  on  the  enforcement  of  Islamic  law’  (p595).  In  her definition  based  on  the  Pakistani  experience,  she  also  distinguishes  between Islamisation as a local and ‘state‐directed’ process and ‘Shariatisation’ which she maintains,  is  a  transnational  phenomenon.  Further,  both  have  different  forces driving them; the former the state and ‘secular’ sectors of society, the latter non‐                                                        90 Nasr (2001), for instance, argues that Anwar’s sacking as Deputy Prime Minister in 1998 led to ABIM withdrawing its support for UMNO (pp161‐63). 91 She in turn credits, Mumtaz Ahmed for coining this term to describe General Zia‐ul‐Haq’s policies in the late 70s and 80s. See M. Ahmed (1988), ‘Pakistan’, in S. Hunter, The Politics of 
Islamic Revivalism: diversity and unity, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp236‐39. This phenomenon is also referred to as ‘Sharianisation’ in countries like Nigeria (see for example Imam, 2005). 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‘secular’  actors  seeking  to  attain  the  same material  gains  as  their westernised political counterparts.   Building on this understanding to demonstrate how ‘Syariatisation’ has unfolded in  Malaysia,  this  study  will  investigate  its  impact  in  the  realm  of  sexual regulation.  In  particular,  it  looks  at  the  role  of  the  Federal  state  –  the  Prime Minister’s  office  –  in  giving  ‘Syariah’  laws  greater weight  through  its  efforts  at forcing  conformity  with  model  legislation  endorsed  by  the  centre.  It  will  also show  how  ‘Syariahtisation’  has  strengthened  the  Federal  state’s  powers  by enabling it to draw on the support of various ‘Islamic’ forces, collectively named here as the Syariah lobby. 
 
‘Syariah’ Law and Sexual Regulation  Where matters of sexual morality are concerned, ‘Syariah’ law has been used to deter wavering heterosexuals from deviating from the imposed norms. The focus is usually on zina  (sex outside marriage), a hudud offence,92 and other acts  like 
khalwat and indecent dressing or behaviour, which are believed to lead to illicit sexual  relations. At  the same  time,  these criminalise alternative sexualities and transgendered identities to deny sexual marginals access to privileges that come with  being  part  of  the  heterosexual world.  In  some  countries,  liwat  (sodomy), like  zina,  counts  as  one  of  the  most  ‘dangerous’  of  sexual  transgressions, punishable with death.                                                         92 Due to the potential confusion about an offspring’s lineage and its adverse impact on the family unit, zina – like other forms of sex outside marriage (e.g. prostitution, homosexuality) – is perceived as a source of grave disorder and the eventual destruction of humanity (Avery, 1997). 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A number of contemporary Islamic scholars have dispelled the argument that the Holy Book is unequivocal  in its condemnation of non‐normative sexualities and genders.93  They maintain  that  the  destruction  of  Lut’s  people  –  often  cited  as proof of God’s wrath against homosexuality – was not solely aimed at men who engaged  in  same‐sex  relations  but  also  intended  as  a  larger  message  about ethical  corruption  and  those  who  turn  their  back  on  God.94  Further,  while acknowledging that the Qur’an assumes a heterosexual norm, Kugle (2003), for instance,  disagrees  that  this means  homosexuality  is  forbidden  in  Islam.95  The harsh treatment targeted at men who have anal sex is due to the analogy (qiyas) drawn  between  zina  and  liwat,96  not  because  the  Prophet  sanctioned  such punishment.97 More significantly he says, the idea of sexualities as  ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ is foreign to the Qur’an and the Islamic tradition, having instead been introduced by European Christians.  
                                                        93 See Jamal, 2001; Kugle, 2003; and Habib, 2007. 94 Similarly, there are doubts that the verse ‘women who approach lewdness (fahisha)’ (Surah al‐Nisa 4:15) is about the sinfulness of lesbianism. Instead, it has been interpreted as an injunction against sexual excessiveness between those who are muhrim (See Ali, 2006; Habib, 2007). 95 The terms most commonly used today to refer to same‐sex relations, ‘liwat’ (for men) and ‘musahaqah’ (for women) do not appear in the Qur’an. Neither does the Holy Book explicitly state their punishment. Consequently, the different schools prescribe different penalties for the same offence reflecting once again, the human dimension of ‘Syariah’ law (Peters, 2005). 96 The word ascribed to homosexuality in the Qur’an fahisha – translated most often as ‘lewdness’, ‘abomination’, ‘indecency’ or ‘obscenity’ but also meaning ‘transgression’ – is the same as for zina.  97 As Kugle also points out, there is ‘no evidence that the Prophet asserted, in word or deed, that homosexual relations were a hadd crime, or were to be equated with adultery, or ever punished any actual persons for “crimes” relating to homosexuality’ (2003:220). He also traced the negative perception of liwat to questionable hadith that refer to the Prophet’s purported revulsion of such act. See also Zuhur (2005) who argues that precisely because there was no issue about lineage with homosexuality, it was either ignored or tolerated with occasional policing in the past. 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Others have also argued that such acts are between a person and God, and if at all a societal concern, should only be so if these are committed in public.98 On the other hand, there are those like Kamali (2009) who speak of Islam as a religion of mercy. He  cautions  that  the  emphasis on punishing  a  said offender –  rather than allowing him or her  to repent and reform – goes against  this  tenet.  It has also been said that human dignity is paramount in Islam, so treating anyone in an undignified  and  inhumane  manner  –  as  can  be  the  case  when  prosecuting someone under  ‘Syariah’  law –  is  forbidden. After all, even as  ‘sinners’,  there  is nothing to stop those who do not meet Islam’s heteronormative standards from being  believers  and  practising  its  five  pillars.99  Against  this  new  thread  of understanding,  it  is  telling  how  most  ‘Islamic’  criminal  laws  that  have  been enacted in the post‐colonial world do not reflect the diversity of thought on the subject of sexuality and gender, but instead take rigid and dogmatic positions. 
 In general, those pushing for a return to ‘Syariah’ – i.e. those who politicise Islam, whether  known  as  Islamists,  fundamentalists  or  religious  extremists  –  share several  commonalities.100  Citing  deviations  from  ‘authentic’  Islam  as  the major reason why Muslims worldwide are subjugated, they seek to replace this with an ‘Islamic’ moral order. This, they claim,  is possible by returning to practices of a 
                                                        98 This may be why as long as such relations were not flaunted, medieval Islamic societies either ignored or tacitly tolerated them. See El‐Fadl, 1999. 99 This point was raised during a personal interview (17 Dec 2008) with ‘Annuar’, social reformer and academic. The five pillars of Islam – shahadah (professing one’s belief in Islam), performing ritual prayers five times daily, paying of zakat (alms tax), fasting during the month of Ramadhan, performing the haj (for those who can afford it)– is a set of obligations that every Muslim must meet. 100 It is not the intention here to gloss over the complexities of and differences within political Islam which is recognised as involving an array of actors, interests and strategies with sometimes overlapping or contradictory agendas (see Moghissi, 1999; Ayob, 2008). Nevertheless, the summary here focuses on the commonalities across these variants. See Anderson, 1987; Yuval‐Davis, 1994; Moghissi, 1999; Norani Othman, 2005; Kortteinen, 2008; and Chhachii, 2010. 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glorified past, a time when Islam was almighty and powerful.101 Their discourses also  rely  on  successfully  distinguishing  between  those  who  belong  to  the community,  and  those  who  do  not,  at  the  same  time  quelling  any  differences within.  They  invoke  a  very  selective  and  homogenised  interpretation  of  the sacred texts to legitimise their claims. Such initiatives are also underlined by an authoritarian streak.  By blaming moral turpitude for the breakdown of the family institution – which is  tied  to  the collapse of  law and social order –  Islamists have also declared  its regulation  as  their  priority.  This  discourse,  however,  is  not  unique.  As  shown earlier,  proponents  of  Asian  values  also  made  stamping  out  immorality  their major preoccupation. It is similar to the positions taken by other religious right movements as well, for instance Christian fundamentalists in the US.102 The key difference is that states with ‘Syariah’ criminal legislation have the advantage of being  able  to  rationalise  their  actions  –  including  repression  –  in  the  name  of carrying out ‘God’s law’. This is problematic because as An‐Naim (2008) puts it, ‘once  a  principle  or  norm  is  officially  identified  as  “decreed by God”,  it will  be extremely difficult to resist or change its application in practice’ (p134). 
 In  the  quest  to  legally  enforce  observance  of  Islamic  moral  standards, unrestrained  sexuality  is  painted  as  disruptive,  infectious,  and  dangerous,  and 
                                                        101 Contrary to their claims of going back to the past, these movements are not about preserving but reinventing traditions. They also employ modern means (e.g. technology and communications) to achieve their goals which seldom have anything to do with religious piety. 102 Actually, the term ‘fundamentalism’ has US Protestant Christian origins, going back to the 1920s and a belief in the literal meaning of the Bible (Harding, 2009). On other types of religious ‘fundamentalisms’ in the world (e.g. Hinduism, Judaism), and their commonalities, see  Imam et al. (2004). 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therefore in need of control. Women, cast as symbolic boundary markers of their community,  bear  a  large  brunt  of  this  regulatory  attention.103  Shahnaz  Khan’s study on  the Zina Ordinance, 1979  in Pakistan, enacted as part of hudud  there, makes this point.104 Even though zina  (sex outside marriage)  involves men and women,  the  law has  had  a more  adverse  impact  on women,  particularly  those poor  and with  no  education,  and  cannot  afford  legal  counsel.  Khan  traces  this problem  to  the  law’s  drafters  not  distinguishing  between  zina  and  rape,  and requiring four male witnesses for either offence to be prosecutable. Women rape victims who made police  reports or  ended up pregnant  could be  charged with 
zina if they did not meet this evidentiary condition.105   A  similar  scenario  of  single,  low‐income  and  illiterate  women  being disproportionately charged for adultery under ‘Syariah law’ is also evident in the northern  States  of  Nigeria,  which  in  the  2000s,  sentenced  several  women  to stoning  to  death  for  allegedly  committing  this  offence.  The  Nigerian  case  also shows how, despite  the  long‐standing conflict between Christians and Muslims in the country, these two competing forces see eye‐to‐eye when it comes to the regulation  of  women’s  bodies.106  In  the  name  of  preventing  immorality  in                                                         103 In the Islamist worldview, the preservation of the community is tied to the ‘protection’ of women’s sexuality. In reality, forcing gender conformity is necessary because individual autonomy, especially for women, is perceived as a grave threat to group identity. See Saghal, 1992; Yuval‐Davis, 1996; Pereira and Ibrahim, 2010. 104 Adamu (2008) and Pereira and Ibrahim (2010) show how zina laws in northern Nigeria similarly penalise low‐income and non‐literate women disproportionately. See also Mir‐Hosseini and Hamzic (2010) for the connection between political Islam, the criminalisation of zina, and the control of women’s sexuality. 105 As a hudud offence, those found guilty were either stoned to death if they were Muslim and married, or lashed a hundred times if they were non‐Muslim or an unmarried Muslim. This situation was only rectified at the end of 2006 when rape was removed out of hudud and placed under the ‘secular’ criminal code (Quraishi, 2005). 106 The religious right in both communities supported a bill proposed in 2008 (on Public Nudity, Sexual Intimidation and Other Related matters) that authorised non‐state actors to correct women’s dressing (Adamu, 2008; Pereira and Jibrin, 2010). At the international level, this 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Indonesia,  the  introduction  of  the  seemingly  gender‐neutral  regional  Syariah bylaws (Perda Syariat), have also had the effect of restricting women’s activities and mobility.107  Studies  like Khan’s also reinforce the point made earlier  that  the  law’s passage had more to do with repressive ‘secular’ regimes than direct efforts of Islamists as  would  conventionally  be  believed.  With  a  reputation  of  being  excessively corrupt  the  regime  of  General  Zia  ul‐Haq  introduced  hudud  to  bolster  its credibility and prop‐up its authority. Likewise, Ayesha Imam (2005) argues that morally bankrupt governors in the northern States of Nigeria found it easiest to gain popular support by extending Syariah to the penal codes,  thus capitalising on  a  disenchanted  and  alienated  Muslim  populace.108  Robin  Bush  has  also maintained that  the  Indonesian Perda Syariat were a product of  local politics – i.e.  the  lack  of  capacity  of  incumbent  political  leaders  for  good  governance  – rather  than  ‘a  prevailing  conservative  or  ideologically  Islamist  movement’.109 While she may have overrated the influence of Islamic hardliners in pushing for                                                                                                                                                               collusion can be seen between the Vatican and the OIC (Islamic bloc) which often join forces at the United Nations to vote against resolutions to do with sexual and bodily rights, especially if to do with abortion or homosexuality. 107 The bulk of these bylaws were passed between 1999 and 2004, when there was a period of uncertainty, tension and conflict following the downfall of the Suharto regime. Introduced to address general societal concerns – corruption, immorality, and crime – it includes provisions relating to prostitution, dress codes and female deportment as well as gambling, drinking and 
khalwat (illicit proximity). See Noerdin and Muchtar, 2007; Anwar, 2006. According to Robin Bush (2008), however, with the exception of a handful of districts and provinces like Aceh, the policing of morality through these regulations appears to have fallen considerably since it peaked in the early 2000s. 108 Their actions profited from long‐standing religious conflict in the country, a legacy of British colonial policies that divided the different ethno‐religious communities, and made worse by World Bank structural adjustment programmes that made it difficult for the state to respond adequately to basic social needs (Imam, 2005). 109 Bush, 2008:182. She argues that to improve their chances of being re‐elected, some regional officials who lacked expertise to address the welfare and economic needs of their constituencies found it easier to pass these religious laws and gain instant results. Others saw their support as a way to win votes or return political favours. This development is one of the drawbacks of the decentralisation process in Indonesia, otherwise positive in facilitating regional autonomy and serving as a democratising force. 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Syariah,110 she correctly points out that these bylaws could not have been passed without the backing of ‘secular’ or ‘nationalist’ political parties.111  Unlike the literature on the connection between state power, the politicisation of Islam  and  the  control  of women’s  bodies,  comparable  studies  on  the  interplay between  the  state,  religion –  specifically,  religious  laws – and  the  regulation of sexual marginals are rare.112 This is partly because few countries have in place, holy  injunctions  that  are  backed by  the might  of  the  state, much  less  religious legislation  that  prohibits  same‐sex  relations  or  transgender  identities.  For example, as Peter Jackson (2003) points out, such phenomena have ‘historically been ignored’ by the state in Buddhist Thailand, particularly if articulated in the private  sphere.113  Furthermore,  most  former  colonies  have  continued  the imperial precedent of keeping religion (the church) separate from the state, and 
                                                        110 For historical reasons, the practice of Islam in Indonesia remains very different to that in Malaysia. The existence of two large Islamic movements the Nahdatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah whose leadership have rejected the Perda Syariat, has diluted the impact of radical and fringe Islamist groups like Front Pembela Islam and Hizbut Tahrir where matters of sexuality are concerned (See J. Soedjati Djiwandono (2007), ‘Pancasila in jeopardy, but does anyone care?’, The Jakarta Post, <http://www.the jakartapost.com/Outlook/pol05b.asp>, Accessed: 6 Nov 2007). Nevertheless, ‘fundamentalist’ Islam has also increasingly reared its ugly head across the nation over the last decade. 111 These included Golkar, Partai Demokratik Indonesia ‐ Perjuangan (PDI‐P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), all with an avowedly ‘secular’ agenda. Islamic political parties like Parti Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperity and Justice Party) and Partai Bulan dan Bintang (PBB, The Crescent and Star Party), did not wield sufficient support to pass this legislation on their own but were important enough for the larger parties to take them into consideration when forming government. 112 The closest equivalent are reports conducted on human rights violations, but these are generalised studies rather than focused on the impact of ‘Islamic’ laws on non‐normative sexualities and genders. See Wilcke, 2008; Broecker, 2010, both commissioned by the international NGO, Human Rights Watch. 113 The only time homosexuality and bestiality were deemed illegal in Thailand was in the early twentieth century, when the state was forced to match the Siamese legal code to European notions of being ‘civilised’. This clause was later abolished following a review of the code in 1957, having never been systematically enforced. Despite this apparent official tolerance, members of the homosexual and trans communities today face stigmatisation and discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity (Jackson and Sullivan, 2000). 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those that have criminalised non‐normative sexual and gender expressions have largely done so using ‘secular’ laws.114  In  countries  such  as  Malaysia  which  have  declared  homosexual  relations  and cross‐dressing  as  ‘Islamic’  offences, writings  on  sexual morality  and  regulation have  not  only  been  scarce  but  also  limited  to  studies  on  transgressive heterosexuality.115  The  situation  is marginally  better  in  Indonesia where  there are nascent explorations into the impact of political Islam on the homosexual and trans communities there. Evelyn Blackwood’s work on sexual discourses and the state’s shifting strategies of control stands out in this regard.   Arguing that the Indonesian state’s interest in criminalising ‘perverse’ sexualities is  relatively  new,  Blackwood  (2007)  highlights  the  role  of  two  developments: firstly, the augmented political influence of the religious lobby, and secondly, the agitations of  international gay and lesbian rights activists, both traceable to the last two decades of the 20th century. The former happened after Suharto – and those who led the country after him – saw it fit to strengthen the state by wooing the religious vote, having kept them out of politics during the early phase of the New  Order.116  This  paved  the  way  for  ‘Islamic’  values  to  slowly  become  the 
                                                        114 In Pakistan, for example, where though there are both hudud and ‘secular’ laws, the latter (via the Penal Code) is the preferred mechanism for regulating homosexuality (Peters, 2005). 115 See Ong, 1990; Ackerman, 1991; Stivens, 2002; Mohamad Darbi Hashim, 2005; Shamsul A.B. and Mohamad Fauzi Sukimi, 2006. Julian Lee’s publication Policing Morality is an exception but does not delve into the dynamics between the regulation of sexual minorities and political Islam. 116 On the relationship between the Suharto regime and the Islamists, see Liddle, 1996; and Hefner, 2000. 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and sexual regulation. (emphasis added)  The experience of  the UMNO‐led  central  government of Malaysia  supports  this claim.  Despite  having  accumulated  considerable  power  after  two  decades  of Islamisation,  the  Federal  state  is  finding  it  increasingly  difficult  to  determine how its 1Islam project unfolds, not to mention being challenged in containing its discontents.120  Besides  the  pre‐existing  complications  that  arise  because  ‘the power to decide on matters pertaining  to  Islam in  the country  is very diffused’ (Tan,  in  press),121  this  study  will  illustrate  how  the  central  government’s authority is further challenged not only by those it seeks to control, but also by the same actors – state and non‐state – it relies on to facilitate ‘Syariahtisation’, i.e. the Syariah lobby.  Turning  to  the  impact  of  state‐led  sexual  discourses,  one  should  not  assume either  that  these  are  have  a  pre‐determined  logic.  Nor  do  they  elicit  uniform experiences or  reactions  from  those  targeted  for  regulation.  Far  from having a monopoly  over  the  nation’s  moral  and  sexual  agenda,  the  state’s  ‘piecemeal, incoherent  or  reactive  ways’  (Cook,  2006:72)  of  regulating  the  sexuality  and gender  identity of  its citizens  is also evidence of pressure exerted by non‐state actors. Moreover, Foucault (1977) argues that while state power intensified with the  transition  to modernity,  it was not  solely  repressive and unidirectional. On the  contrary,  because  he  understands  power  as  productive,  he  also  sees  its 
                                                        120 See Nasr, 2001; Liow, 2009. 121 Besides JAKIM and other federal level religious bodies, decisions on Islam are also made at the State level by other actors including the Chief Minister, the Legislative Assembly, and the Sultan. 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A Political History of ‘Islamic’ Sexual Morality in Malaysia  Over  the  last  decade,  ‘Islamic’  values  have  grown  to  become  the  marker  of acceptable sexuality and gender in Malaysia. Whether this has to do with desires, behaviours,  or  identities,  such  notions  of  ‘right’  and  ‘wrong’  expressions  have come  to  assume  strong  Islamic  overtones.  As  evinced  each  time  the  public  is alerted  about  the  unlawfulness  of  sexual  marginals,  this  development  has exerted  additional  pressure  on  those  who  are  not  heterosexual  and/or  are perceived  as  disrupting  conventional  definitions  of  ‘man’  and  ‘woman’,  to conform to a heteronormative ‘ideal’.  By charting the evolution of ‘Islamic’ sexual injunctions in Malaysia, this chapter will  show  how  ‘Syariah’  standards  have  become  influential  over  matters  of sexual  morality.  Its  central  investigation  focuses  on  the  Syariah  Criminal Offences  (SCO)  legislation,122  enacted  throughout  the  country  from  the  mid‐1980s onwards.123 It will also trace how this law – and hence Islam – has become a tool to justify the current vilification of sexual marginals in the country.   
                                                        122 Generally, these are known either as the Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment or Act depending on the legislating body. The former applies when passed by a State Legislative Assembly; and the latter, when passed by Federal Parliament. 123 Once one State has taken the lead and enacted a particular religious law, others will usually follow suit but may make minor modifications. In this case, Kelantan started the ball rolling in 1985, followed by Kedah (1988), then Melaka and Perlis (1991), Negeri Sembilan and Perak (1992), Selangor (1995), Penang (1996), Federal Territory and Johor (1997), and finally Terengganu (2001). In East Malaysia, which is outside the scope of this study, the law arrived in Sarawak in 1991, and Sabah in 1995. Pahang is the only State without this standalone law. However, since it has the same provisions under its Administration of Islam and Malay Customs Enactment 1982, Pahang is also included in this discussion. 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The  chapter  claims  that  rather  than  attributing  this  change  to  singular  causes like the Islamic political party PAS or conservative ulama, for example, it is more helpful  to  see  it  as  a  product  of  larger  and  intersecting  historical  and  political imperatives,  in which the state has been a driving force. Here, a major  impetus comes  from  the  desire  of  the  Federal  government  –  under  the  tutelage  of  the UMNO‐led Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition – to centralise control over Islam. To this end,  it has pushed for greater standardisation of  ‘Syariah’  laws, couched as attempts to improve the administration and hence status of Islam in the country. Its mixed record of success, however, shows that the outcome of state action is not  always  foreseeable,  especially with  Islam where  its  politicisation  has  been accompanied by contestation as well.   Before proceeding, it is necessary to point out that the ambit of the SCO laws is wider and that sexual morality, much less sexual marginals, is not its only object of scrutiny. Taking the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 (No. 559) – SCOA (FT) 1997 for short – as an example, besides ‘Offences relating to  decency’ which  cover moral  transgressions,  the  list  of  religious  crimes  also include actions connected to aqidah (belief),124 ‘sanctity of the religion’,125 and a host of other ‘miscellaneous offences’.126 Highlighting the broader base of today’s ‘Islamic’  criminal  laws  does  not  detract  from  how  they  have  intensified  the policing of  sexuality. Rather,  it places  this  regulation  in perspective, within  the wider context of state‐led efforts at promoting a very specific form of Islam, one                                                         124 For example, wrongful worship and practising of false doctrine. 125 For example, disrespecting or ridiculing Islam and its officials, teaching without a tauliah (permit), consumption of alcohol, gambling, and failure to fast during Ramadhan. 126 For example, acts encouraging maksiat (vice), encouraging a woman to leave her husband, preventing a married couple from living together or enticing a spouse to abandon his/her duties or to divorce, false evidence, non‐authorised collection of zakat (religious tithe). 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that, as this study will show, is intolerant of pluralism including where sexuality and gender are concerned.  Following  this,  the  chapter  presents  a  survey  of  ‘Islamic’  sexual  prohibitions during the pre‐colonial and colonial period, and contrasts this with the changes introduced through the enactment of SCO legislation in the mid‐1980s. Given its role  in  setting  new  religious  standards  of  sexual  morality,  the  next  section examines the origins and impetus of this law. It looks first at the impact of anti‐colonial sentiments, then at the role of PAS in the law’s formulation, and finally, at how much its passage had to do with a desire to outlaw sexual marginals. The last  part  details  and  critiques  the  role  of  the  Federal  government  in  elevating ‘Syariah’,  specifically,  the  function  of  its  Technical  Committee  on  Syariah  and Civil Laws and the challenges it confronts in trying to enforce a uniform SCO law across the country. 
 
‘Islamic’ Sexual Injunctions: The pre­colonial and colonial period  The earliest mention resembling an Islamic decree against sexual impropriety in Malaysia  is  traceable  to  the  14th  century  Batu  Bersurat  Terengganu  (the Terengganu  Stone).  This  stipulated  different  penalties  –  stoning,  flogging  and fines  –  for  various  crimes  including  sexual misconduct.127  Among  these was  a fragment  of  a  ruling  about  ‘immoral’  women  indicating  that  this  was  a 
                                                        127 Punishment depended on one’s marital and class status, as well as whether one was a slave or free person (Hooker, 1976:128). 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punishable offence as well.128 Over a  century  later,  the Undang‐undang Melaka (Laws of Melaka),129 often regarded as  the  first  Islamic  legal digest of  the  land, spelt  out  zina  (unlawful  sexual  intercourse)  as  an  offence  punishable  with flogging  or  rejam  (stoning  to  death).130  The  penalty  for  sex  outside  marriage, however,  depended  on  one’s  marital  status,  with  the  severest  punishment reserved for adulterers.131 As with zina, those found guilty of liwat (sodomy) and bestiality faced whipping or death sentences.132  Under British  rule,  colonial  legislators  reaffirmed  the  importance  of  regulating unlawful  sexual  intercourse by  introducing an Order  in Council  in Perak called Adultery  by  Muhammadans  1894.  This  was  among  the  very  first  codified ‘Islamic’  laws of  the Malay peninsular.133 Here  ‘adultery’ was defined as a man who  knowingly  had  sex with  the wife  of  another man  ‘without  the  consent  or connivance of that man [i.e. the husband]’.134 Thus, it was only an offence if the 
                                                        128 ibid. Some rules like this one cannot be fully deciphered due to the Stone’s poor physical condition.  129 Also known as the Risalat Hukum Kanun, there are various versions of this digest as additions were made to it over time, spanning from the mid‐15th to 17th centuries (Liaw, 1976). 130 Its provisions were later replicated in the other Malay States – Pahang (1596), Kedah (1650), Johor (1789) – when they adapted the Undang‐undang Melaka and made it the basis of their respective legal digests (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1985:42). Its influence is also visible in the 18th century Ninety‐Nine Laws of Perak (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1987:52). Though all these laws criminalised zina, they differed in their punishments for the offence. Hence, where only male adulterers were sentenced under the Melaka laws, the Pahang version punished women as well (Hooker, 1984). 131 Aside from this, one’s social standing also determined the penalty imposed. See Undang‐undang Melaka, Chapter 40 ‘Rules governing unlawful intercourse’ (Hooker, 1984:159). 132 ibid.:161. See clause 40.2 and 43.5 (Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, 1989:74). 133 The same law was later enacted in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, which together with Perak formed the Federated Malay States (FMS). Prior to this, a handful of other piecemeal Orders in Council had been adopted (e.g. forbidding kathi to collect zakat; banning unauthorised flags in mosques; prohibiting Muslims from borrowing money to finance their haj; compulsory Friday prayers) (Willer, 1975:4, 89). Even earlier, the Mahomedan Ordinance 1880 which governed Muslim marriage and divorce had been introduced in the Straits Settlements (SS). This was later replicated in the FMS starting with Perak in 1885 (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1987:53). 134 Penalties varied across States. In Perak, ‘adulterous’ men and women got the same sentence, i.e. up to six months in jail and/or a fine of $250 (See Adultery by Muhammadans (Perak) 1894, S2). In Selangor, the penalty was up to two year’s imprisonment for men and a year for women, 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Khalwat  (illicit  proximity)140  was  deemed  illegal  only  at  the  start  of  the  20th century.141  According  to  Roff  (1974),  it  was  covered  under  early  measures against  prostitution  in  Kelantan.142  Usage  of  the  term  ‘perempuan  jahat (‘notorious’  women)’  went  beyond  ‘prostitutes’  to  denounce  independent‐minded  and  non‐conforming  women  like  those  who  socialised  with  men  who were  not  their  muhrim.143  A  similar  regulation,  the  Prohibition  of  Improper Intercourse  Enactment  1923,  was  later  introduced  in  Terengganu.144  Like Kelantan, women who contravened social norms could also be banished from a 
                                                                                                                                                              Kelantan first took the form of the Notice to Control Prostitutes in Kota Bharu, No. 5 of 1916 before the Notice of the Removal of Prostitutes from Towns and Villages took effect in 1919. The former relied on the public to report incidences of ‘perempuan jahat (‘notorious’ women)’ (Haryati Hasan, 1998:177). 140  The  term  khalwat  is  generally  understood  as  referring  to  a  Muslim man  or  woman  found alone in ‘suspicious’ circumstances (e.g. a secluded location) with another person of the opposite sex who is not their spouse or muhrim (those whom one cannot marry or have sex with due to familial  ties).  The  assumption  is  that  this  will  lead  the  couple  down  the  path  of  illicit  sexual intercourse. Khalwat  laws are often defended as a precautionary measure to avert  the ultimate sex crime of zina.  141 Such a regulation is fairly unique in the Muslim world, with Malaysia being a vanguard. Saudi Arabia has a similar prohibition against khulwa (a state of seclusion) dating back to the 1980 Law of the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Its application there has drawn international criticism but only since the late 2000s, particularly after it was used in the case of a 75‐year old woman who was sentenced to 40 lashes and four months in prison (‘Khalwat sentence against elderly widow causes uproar’, 11 March 2009, <http://wfol.tv/index.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=56& Itemid=1> Accessed: 23 March 2009). Another country with khalwat prohibitions is Indonesia. However, the law there is not national but restricted to the province of Aceh (Sumatra) and the district of Tasikmalaya (West Java). Introduced as regional regulations, they only came into being post‐1998 after the downfall of Suharto (Private communication with Andy Yentriyani, Commissioner, KOMNAS Perempuan, 5 Aug 2010). 142 If guilty, a woman was fined no more than $100 and/or imprisoned six months (Notice to Prohibit Khalwat and Prostitution 1916 cited in Haryati Hasan, 1998:44,179). 143 Haryati Hasan’s illuminating historical study of Malay women ‘prostitutes’ in Kelantan uses documents of the State’s Religious Council (Majlis Agama Islam Kelantan, MAIK) to show the range of women who were labelled as ‘perempuan jahat’ (‘bad’ woman). 144 Interestingly, while the English version of this law specified that prostitutes and pimps were targeted for regulation, the Malay equivalent, ‘Undang‐undang Ketegahan Berkhalwat’, emphasised khalwat. Most likely as in the case of Kelantan, the law sought to control both offences. 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said town for up to two years. But the Terengganu law went on to include non‐Muslims in its ambit, as well as to harshly penalise abettors of such acts.145  It took more than ten years before khalwat entered the statute books in the other Malay  States.  This  happened  with  the  introduction  of  the  Muhammadans (Offences)  legislation  in  1938.  Subsequently,  this  transgression  gained  enough disrepute  for  it  to  count  as  one  of  only  two  sexual  offences  listed  in  the  1952 Administration  of  Muslim  Law  Enactment  (AMLE)  of  Selangor.146  Widely regarded  then  as  an  omnibus  statute  incorporating  all  pre‐existing  laws  on Islamic matters,147  the  Selangor  AMLE was  eventually  replicated  in  the  rest  of the  colony.148  It  is  not  entirely  clear  why  adultery,  which  hitherto  had  been treated as the most serious of Muslim sexual transgressions, took a backseat  in this  law. This  shift of official  attention  from adultery  to khalwat  is  curious and suggests some flexibility in the process of naming ‘Islamic’ sexual crimes.  There were no more attempts to prohibit other  ‘Islamic’ sexual offences for the rest of colonial rule. However, other previously criminalised sexual acts that had been left out of the AMLE (Selangor) 1952 eventually resurfaced – some into the                                                         145 Anyone who allowed their house to be used for khalwat faced up to 19 lashes of the rotan (cane) and/or a $50 maximum fine (Prohibition of Improper Intercourse 1923, S4). 146 The other was ‘illicit intercourse between divorced persons’. See Part IX ‘Offences’, S157 and S158. There was some variation in how these offences were framed in the other States. For example, in Kedah, khalwat was known as ‘bersunyi‐sunyian’ (S149, Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1962), while ‘illicit intercourse between divorced persons’ was referred to as ‘resumption of cohabitation’ in the Terengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1955. 147 In Selangor, these provisions were previously covered under the Council of Religion and Malay Custom Enactment 1949; the Muhammadan (Offences) Enactment 1938; Muhammadan Marriage and Divorce Registration Enactment (FMS Cap. 197); and selected portions of the Courts Enactment (FMS Cap. 2), and Muhammadan Law and Malay Custom (Determination) Enactment (FMS Cap. 196). 148 This occurred between 1953 and 1978. Besides Kelantan, which called this the Council of Islam and Malay Custom and Kathis Courts Enactment, 1953, the other States chose titles that bore closer resemblance to Selangor’s. 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early  period  of  Independence  –  as  different  States  adopted  their  equivalent  of this law. So incest was reintroduced as a religious offence in 1956;149 adultery in 1960;150 prostitution and pimping in 1965,151 and cohabitation in 1978.152   
Post­Colonial Sexual Morality: The emergence of ‘unnatural’  





Pre­colonial and/or colonial  Post­colonial S20. Incest  S22. Muncikari S21. Prostitution  S24. An act preparatory to sexual intercourse out of wedlock S23. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock*  S25. Liwat* S27. Khalwat  S26. Musahaqah   S28. Male person posing as woman   S29. Indecent acts in public 
* Pre­colonial offences  These  offences  can  broadly  be  divided  into  two  groups.  The  first,  comprising incest,  prostitution,  sexual  intercourse  out  of  wedlock155  and  khalwat  (illicit proximity),  were  criminalised  during  the  pre‐colonial  and/or  colonial  periods. The  second  group  –  consisting  of muncikari  (pimping),  an  ‘act  preparatory  to sexual  intercourse  out  of  wedlock’,  liwat  (sexual  relations  between  male persons),156 musahaqah (sexual relations between female persons), men posing as women,  and public  indecency – were  the  ‘newer’  crimes, mostly  introduced from the 1980s onwards.157  Where non‐normative sexualities and genders are concerned, the SCO legislation heralded three changes: (i) it reintroduced liwat as an ‘Islamic’ offence after this                                                         154 The section numbers and language for the provisions listed below are as they appear in the SCOA (FT) 1997. 155 This refers to zina. In the SCO laws, the term ‘zina’ only appears in the Kelantan version, and Perlis uses it only in reference to muqaddimah zina (an act leading to zina). Elsewhere, it is also referred to as ‘unlawful’ or ‘illicit’ intercourse. These terms are used interchangeably here. 156 Although liwat (and bestiality) were prohibited under the Undang‐undang Melaka, they were not named as religious offences throughout colonial rule. As such, it is placed in the right‐hand column in Table 1 given its reintroduction as an offence under the SCO legislation. 157 In some States, ‘new’ sexual offences also include ‘unnatural’ sex (referring mostly to bestiality), and indecent dressing. 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had been omitted from religious laws throughout British rule (and up to almost three decades of Independence); (ii) like the provision adopted in Pahang a few years  earlier,158  it  highlighted  that  sex  between  women  (musahaqah)  was unlawful,  and  (iii)  it  extended  ‘Islamic’  law  to  the  trans  community  –  largely male‐to‐female  cross‐dressers  –  by  ruling  such  behaviour  as  illegal.  In  each instance,  the  law  has  reaffirmed  heterosexuality  by  emphasising  the ‘abnormality’ of sexual marginals.  Though these SCO takzir laws share certain commonalities, they differ in varying degrees as each State has produced its own version of the law.159 As mentioned earlier  too,  under PAS, Kelantan  and Terengganu  also  adopted  separate hudud laws in 1993 and 2002 respectively, which prescribes much stricter penalties for 
zina  and  liwat,  though  thus  far,  their  enforcement  is  on  hold.  This  variation between the States may be indicative of what each prioritises. More importantly they show how unlike what the Federal state promotes as a singular Islam, there are  divergent  views  about  what  constitutes  ‘Islamic’  crimes,  including  acts relating to sexual marginals.   In  the case of  liwat and musahaqah,  for  instance, most States have respectively referred to these as sexual relations between men and women. Pahang though, does use  the  term musahaqah, while Melaka has opted  for  ‘homosex’  [sic.] and ‘lesbian’.160  Selangor,  on  the  other  hand,  has  replaced  the  terms  liwat  and 
                                                        158 See below for an account of this amendment in Pahang. 159 The information shared here is drawn from an earlier work of the author (see Tan, in press). 160 S150, Administration of Islam and Malay Customs (Pahang) Enactment 1982; and S2, Syariah Offences Enactment (Melaka) 1991. 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musahaqah with a blanket prohibition against same‐sex relations.161 Elsewhere, Perlis  and  Kedah162  acknowledge  that  heterosexual  couples  too  can  engage  in 
liwat. With  cross‐dressing, most  employ  the more  derogatory  term  pondan  or define this as a crime involving a ‘male person posing as a woman’. Perlis is the only State to prohibit women from passing as men.163  Where punishments  are  concerned,  there  is no  consistent pattern. The offence with  the  least  variation  in  its  penalty  is  cross‐dressing.  In  most  cases,  this  is capped  at  a  fine  of  RM1,000  and/or  a  4‐12 month  jail  sentence.164 With  liwat, over a third of the States in the peninsular impose the highest sentence possible, i.e.  a  fine  of  RM5,000/three  years  in  jail/six  lashes  of  the  rotan  (cane)  or  any combination  of  these.  Yet  liwat  is  not  a  crime  in  Pahang,  Perak165  or Terengganu.166 Sentencing for musahaqah appears even more arbitrary, starting from as little as a RM500 fine and/or four months jail time167 to the maximum of RM5,000/three years in jail/six lashes of the rotan or any combination of this.168 However, unlike  liwat,  there  is near consensus that musahaqah should be dealt 
                                                        161 S27, Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor) Enactment 1995. 162 See S2 of the Criminal Offences in the Syarak (Perlis) Enactment 1991, and the Syariah Criminal Code (Kedah) Enactment 1988. 163 S7(1) and S7(2), Criminal Offences in the Syarak Enactment (Perlis) 1991. 164 Perlis which has a maximum fine of RM5,000 and/or three years imprisonment, is the exception. 165 There does not appear to be any explanation why liwat was exempted from the Perak laws when musahaqah (S53) was not. Perhaps as Pahang’s lawmakers explained, there was no need to include liwat in religious laws since this was already a crime under the Penal Code (see below for details). 166 In Terengganu, liwat – like zina – is part of the State’s hudud law, enacted in 2002, where those guilty are either stoned to death if they are muhsan (married) or lashed 100 times and jailed if not. Since hudud has not been enforced, by default, liwat cannot be punished in the State. 167 For instance, in Kelantan and Kedah. 168 For instance, in Johor, Penang, FT and Terengganu. 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with  takzir  and  not  hudud  law,  because  no  penile  penetration  (of  the  vagina) takes place in sex between two women.169  If  any pattern  is discernible,  it would be  that States which passed  the SCO  law later,  i.e.  from the mid‐1990s onwards, have much harsher penalties compared to those which adopted it earlier. Compared to Kelantan which  limits caning to 





when  the British administration allegedly subverted  the  local  judicial and  legal system.  This  was  done  in  two  ways:  (i)  by  creating  a  justice  system  which privileged  Civil  courts  run  by  English  judges  over  Kathi  (religious  judge)173 courts (as Syariah courts were known then) and Penghulu (village head) courts; and (ii) by replacing existing ‘Islamic’ law with English common law.   Under  the  treaty  agreements  between  the Malay  rulers  and  the  British,  every Malay  State  had  to  have  a British Resident  or Advisor whose  views  they were obliged  to accept.174 Matters concerning Malay  religion and custom, at  least on paper, were left in the hands of the Sultans. The reality was vastly different. For example,  the  newly  established  State  Councils  –  through  which  laws  and regulations were passed, including religious ones175 – excluded the Sultans from key  decision‐making  hence  diminished  their  actual  powers  over  religious affairs.176  Indeed,  the  British  interfered  in  many  aspects  of  colonial administration, including Islam, whenever they believed that their authority was at stake.177  
                                                        173 The spelling kathi is retained here to reflect its use in colonial law.  174 This commenced with the signing of the 1874 Treaty of Pangkor in Perak, followed by the rest of the FMS and then from 1909, those in the Unfederated Malay States (UMS)(Kelantan, Kedah, Terengganu, Perlis) and Johor (Andaya and Andaya, 2001). 175 Early examples include kathi appointments, mosque administration and zakat collection. 176 Hooker, 1984:131; Ahmad Ibrahim, 1987:55. According to Andaya and Andaya (2001), the Sultan may have been the head of the State Council but the power to propose the agenda and bills for consideration of Council members lay in the hands of the Resident, in consultation with the Governor. Later when the State Council lost its consultative function, it became a rubber‐stamping body for British policies (p175). Willer (1975:11) adds that while the British regulated Islam through the State Councils, religious leaders also started to have more input after 1920 when more official ‘Islamic’ bodies were created (e.g. committees and subcommittees of the State Councils). 177 The British saw the kathi’s role as potentially affecting political stability and hence worthy of intervention and supervision (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1981:35‐36). The Governor’s prerogative to hire and fire religious officials had already been included in the SS Mahomedan Ordinance 1880, as was his right to amend religious laws. 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The jurisdiction and powers of religious courts were restricted at the start of the 20th  century  with  the  passage  of  the  Courts  Enactment.178  At  the  apex  of  the court hierarchy were  the English  Judicial Commissioner and Senior Magistrate, followed by  the First Class and Second Class Magistrates. Then came  the Kathi and  Assistant  Kathi,  and  below  them,  the  Penghulu.  Unlike  their  civil counterparts, the jurisdiction of Kathi and assistant Kathi courts were limited to ‘Muhammadan’  offences,  namely  marriage,  divorce,  inheritance,  and  other offences  that  were  regulated  by  ‘Islamic’  law  (i.e.  breaches  of  morality,  petty crimes).179 A First Class Magistrate could impose a one‐year jail sentence, a $500 fine, and 12 lashes of the cane; but a Kathi was restricted to fines not exceeding $10.180 Neither  a Kathi  nor his  assistant  or  a Penghulu could  enforce decisions they made, but had to rely on a First Class Magistrate instead. Finally, though the Sultan  could  officially  appoint  and  suspend  a  Kathi  or  his  assistant,  these decisions  needed  the  approval  of  the  State’s  British  Resident  before  taking effect.181   These  limitations  made  religious  laws  difficult  to  implement.  Problems  like lengthy  delays  before  cases  were  heard  and  light  sentences  for  offences  like 
khalwat182 convinced some Muslims that these laws were toothless. Despite this, the British made no attempts to rectify matters because as the Solicitor‐General                                                         178 The first Courts Enactment was introduced in Perak in 1900, before other Malay States followed suit. 179 The Penghulu courts dealt with disputes involving Malays or other ‘Asiatics’, that were deemed of even lesser consequence. 180 The powers of the Assistant Kathi and Penghulu were smaller, i.e. a maximum fine of $5, or in the case of the latter, 14 days in prison in lieu of payment (Courts (Perak) Enactment 1900). 181 S13(ii), Courts (Perak) Enactment 1900. 182 As the penalty for khalwat offences was more than $10, these cases were usually heard in Magistrates courts where non‐Muslim judges were in charge (Mohamed Khalil Hussein, 1958:78). 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of  Malaya  noted  in  1951,  it  would  ‘possibly  bring  on  a  demand  for  giving jurisdiction to the purely religious Courts’, which the colonialists did not regard a ‘high priority’ (cited in Mohamed Khalil Hussein, 1958:80).  This situation continued in the early post‐colonial years under the country’s dual legal system. In 1948, the formation of the Federation of Malaya and the passage of  the  Courts  Ordinance  freed  religious  courts  from  the  bottom  of  the  pre‐existing judicial structure but excluded them from the ensuing national system of Federal courts. Instead the Federal Constitution made Islam into a State matter, with the Sultans having ultimate control of religious affairs. Religious courts had jurisdiction  only  over  Muslims,  and  where  criminal  matters  were  concerned, their  authority was  further  restricted  to offences  ‘conferred by Federal  law’.183 Moreover,  the  Muslim  Courts  (Criminal  Jurisdiction)  Act  1965  controlled  the penalties that Syariah judges could mete out in criminal cases, capping this at a maximum of six months in jail and/or a fine of RM1,000.184   Partly, the bitterness over this Federal law arose because it limited the ability of Syariah  judges  to mete out  sentences  that were perceived as commensurate  to the offence committed. A Magistrate Court judge could deliver a heavier penalty ($500)  for  a  petty misdemeanour  like  littering185  compared  to what  a  Syariah Court  judge  could  for  what  were  considered  serious  offences  in  Islam  (e.g. 
                                                        183 See the Constitution of Malaysia, Ninth Schedule, List II, State list. While this provision empowers States to enact a separate set of laws for Muslims, including the ‘creation and punishment of offences… against the precepts of that religion’, it also limits these powers to matters falling outside the Federal list (See also Ahmad Ibrahim, 1985:48). 184 Ahmad Ibrahim, 1981:35. 185 First Class Magistrates could impose sentences of up to five years in jail or RM10,000 and/or 12 lashes of the cane (Subordinate Courts Act ,1948, S87). 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khalwat or drinking).186 It was only in 1984, when the law was amended as the Syariah  Courts  (Criminal  Jurisdiction)  Act,  that  religious  judges  were  able  to administer  higher  punishments:  a  maximum  of  RM5,000/three  years imprisonment/six lashes of the cane, or any combination of these. This brought some respite  from further agitations by proponents of greater  ‘Syariahtisation’, but only temporarily.  In contrast  to  this marginalisation of  the religious courts,  the second grievance about  colonial  rulers  –  that  they  dislodged  pre‐existing  ‘Islamic’  law  with western positive law – is more tenuous. This is primarily because the assertion rests  on  a  premise  that  ‘Islamic’  law  was  already  the  law  of  the  land  before British  arrival.  Typically,  proponents have  supported  their  claims by  citing  the existence  of  pre‐colonial  religious  decrees  and  legal  texts  like  the  Terengganu Stone  and  Laws  of  Melaka,  and  the  Constitutions  of  Johor  and  Terengganu  to demonstrate Islam’s influence.187 They also refer to the time when Malay rulers applied Islamic law before the British arrived.188 To boost their claims, they have even  quoted  R.J.  Wilkinson,  a  well‐known  British  administrator  who  in  1908, declared,  ‘There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Moslem  law  would  have  ended  by 
                                                        186 Under the original 1952 Selangor AMLE, the penalty for khalwat was capped at a month in jail or a fine of $100, while for drinking alcohol, the fine was $50 (see S157 and S151).  187 These were dated 1895 and 1911 respectively, i.e. prior to British intervention in these states (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1981:23). However, English lawyers were said to have drafted the Johor Constitution (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1987:52). 188 The more famous examples include the reigns of Sultans Muhammad II (1837‐86) and Ahmad (1886‐89) of Kelantan, and Sultans Umar (1837‐1876) and Zainal Abidin III (1881‐1918) of Terengganu. During Sultan Ahmad’s rule, for instance, gambling and public entertainment were prohibited (Abdullah Alwi Hasan, 1996:267). 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becoming the law of Malaya had not British law stepped in to check it’ (cited in Roff 1998:211).189   At  one  level,  these  observations  are  true  and  reflect  Islam’s  spread  and importance  during  pre‐colonial  times.  To  say  that  they  also  denote  the supremacy  of  Islamic  law  before  British  colonisation  occurred,  however,  is  an unsubstantiated  leap.  For  instance,  the  Terengganu  Stone  and  the  Laws  of Melaka may have  contained decrees on various  subjects pertaining  to Muslims but  these  were  not  strictly  ‘Islamic’  but  rather,  hybrid  injunctions.  As  M.B. Hooker (1976) writes, classical Islamic law did not prescribe monetary penalties nor did it commute flogging or stoning sentences into monetary fines. That these were stated on the Terengganu Stone reflects the influence of Malay‐Indonesian legal  thought  (p128).  Similarly,  the Melaka  text was not an  Islamic  legal digest per se but an attempt at streamlining Malay adat  (customary law) with Islamic law. This explains why religious penalties for wrongdoings were listed alongside 




institutional  means  to  do  so.191  Colonial  observers  like  Stamford  Raffles  and Hugh Clifford also noted that the legal digests – whose copies were also very rare –  were  either  ‘almost  unknown’  or  contained  punishments  regarded  as  ‘too barbarous’ to enforce.192 Written for the royal courts, they were appreciated by only a handful  and  scarcely utilised  to  settle disputes. Given  this,  the  same R.J. Wilkinson mentioned  earlier,  cautioned  against  taking  the  ‘so‐called  codes  too seriously’ (cited in Gullick, 1958:14).   Even  staunch  advocates  of  the  view  that  ‘Islamic’  law  prevailed  before  British rule have acknowledged that there is ‘little record of the way [religious] law was administered’  (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1985:42).193 At best,  this has been anecdotal or in the example of Kelantan, noted as effective only around the capital. The lack of uniformity  in  the  administration  of  the  law,  poor  communication  and  a  weak understanding  of  Islam  among  those  in  the  periphery  are  among  the explanations for its poor spread.194  Another  contention  is  whether  or  not  the  imposition  of  colonial  rule  actually derailed or contributed to the expansion of Islamic legalism. As argued, English law grew in influence not only because the British had promoted its application, but  also  because  they  had  consciously  restricted  Islam  to  the  sphere  of  family law  and  certain  offences  against  the  religion,  while  marginalising  its  courts                                                         191 Reid, 1989:80. More broadly, as Barbara Watson Andaya (2006) observes, ‘It bears repeating that even when written codes existed, the exercise of ‘law’ in most of Southeast Asia remained localized, personalized, and arbitrary’ (p158). 192 Cited in Milner, 1981:48 and Gullick, 1958:14 respectively. 193 See also Abdul Samat Musa, 2003:96. Others like Gullick (1958), Milner (1981), and Hickling (2001) share this position. 194 Abdullah Alwi Hasan, 1996:267. Another possible reason is that the legal digests were ‘“standards” for law’ rather than ‘“expressions” of law’ (Hooker, 1984:5). 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within  the  judicial  hierarchy.  Nevertheless,  the  positive  impact  of  British reorganisation  and  codification  of  Islamic  law  and  the  systematisation  of  the religious  courts  cannot  be  underestimated.  Some  have  pointed  out  the importance of  this  in helping to spread religious  laws – and this would  include popularising  what  were  regarded  as  moral  or  sexual  offences  under  Islam  – among  others,  by  providing  a  ‘greater  measure  of  uniformity  and  greater interpretive influence’ for religious functionaries (Horowitz, 1994:257).195  The  above  notwithstanding,  the  view  that  the  British  had  subordinated  the Islamic  legal  and  judicial  systems  during  their  reign  prevailed  into  the  era  of Independence  and  became  the  basis  for  further  agitations  to  assert  the ‘Syariah’.196 This includes renewed attempts to increase the Federal limit on the punishment for ‘Islamic’ criminal offences, ostensibly to bring these on par with civil law.197   
Why Kelantan? This discontent  formed  the backdrop  to  the enactment of  the Syariah Criminal Code  (SCC)  in  Kelantan  in  1985.  Its  passage  reflected  a  foremost  desire  to modernise  the  administration  of  Syariah  courts  in  the  State,  and  in  so  doing, 
                                                        195 See also Roff, 1998; Yegar, 1984. 196 One of the first initiatives was the Nasir Committee, set up in 1972 to look at the unsatisfactory position of the Syariah courts and their officials. Its recommendations paved the way for subsequent improvements to the ‘Islamic’ judiciary and subsequently, its legislation (Ahmad Ibrahim, 2000). 197 Where a Syariah High Court can presently impose a maximum fine of RM5,000/three years imprisonment/six lashes of the cane or any combination of these, the latest recommendation has proposed raising this to RM20,000/20 years imprisonment/24 lashes of the cane or any combination of these (‘Proposal to punish non‐Muslims for khalwat’, The Star, 2 Apr 2008). 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enhance  the  esteem  of  ‘Islamic’  law  in  the  eyes  of  the  public.198  Targeting  the Shar’iyah Courts and Muslim Matrimonial Causes Enactment (hereon the Syariah Courts Enactment) 1966, for review and revamp, the Kelantan State Council had set‐up a 12‐man Committee of legal and religious experts as early as 1976.   The  Committee  had  two  subcommittees,  including  one  that  focused  on  akhlak (conduct).  How  much  sexual  and  gender  transgressions  featured  in  its deliberations,  however,  is  questionable  especially  since  its  initial recommendation was the Syariah Courts and Muslim Family and Society Affairs Enactment 1976 i.e. not a law exclusively about moral, let alone sexual, offences. This proposal never materialised due to the political uncertainty at the time.199 When a different State government was formed in 1978, the Committee resumed work  and  produced  six  new  enactments  –  including  the  SCC200  –  which collectively replaced the old law.201   Why  though  was  Kelantan  the  first  to  come  up  with  a  separate  statute  for ‘Syariah’  offences? One  explanation  assigns  this  to  the  State’s  Islamic  past,  the fact that it had some semblance of a religious bureaucracy in place as early as the 1830s,  and  how  by  1915,  it  had  already  set‐up  the  first  Majlis  Agama  Islam                                                         198 The Kelantan SCC’s history presented here is drawn from two sources: a study by the then Registrar of the Kelantan Syariah Judiciary Department, Abu Bakar Abdullah Kutty (1988), and proceedings of the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly when the bill was deliberated. 199 The UMNO‐PAS rivlary was worst in Kelantan, where UMNO emerged triumphant from 1978‐1990. From 1974 to the end of 1977, i.e. the time in which official attempts at law reform started, Kelantan was ruled by an UMNO‐PAS coalition government (See Farish A. Noor, 2004).  200 The others were the Syariah Courts Administration Enactment No.3/82; Islamic Family Law (IFL) No.1/83; and the Syariah Criminal Procedure Code No.9/83.The Syariah Civil Procedure Code was passed in 1984, as was the Syariah Evidence Enactment (Abu Bakar Abdullah Kutty, 1988:5). 201 Each enactment fleshed out corresponding sections of the Syariah Courts Enactment 1966. For example, the SCC 1985 was based on Section V ‘Offences’ of the old law. While the latter contained only 13 provisions, the former had 35. 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(Council  of  Religion)  to  facilitate  its  administration  of  Islamic  law.202  Another postulation,  and  perhaps  one  favoured  by  those  quick  to  link  conservative religion with PAS, wrongly attributes this  initiative to the Islamic party, said to be  governing  Kelantan  at  the  time.  In  fact,  it  was  an  UMNO‐led  BN  State government that was responsible for the SCC’s passage.   While PAS may have been part of the original Committee reviewing the Syariah Courts  Enactment  1966,  the  influence  it  had  in  the  ensuing  SCC  is  debatable, especially when its members on this body were replaced after the party ceased being part of the State government in 1978.203 The debates during the tabling of the SCC bill at the State Legislative Assembly confirm that PAS was – at least on the face of it – opposed to, rather than supportive of, the law. Its representatives criticised  it  for not being  Islamic,  claiming  that  it  reflected Western  legal  ideas rather than ‘Syariah’.204   Even  if  some  of  this  disagreement may  have  been  for  show  and  prompted  by political rivalry, the opposition of PAS during this time also reflected the party’s belief  that  severe  punitive  measures  were  the  way  to  counter  moral transgressions.  Hence,  when  deliberating  the  bill,  its  representatives  spoke  in 
                                                        202 An official mufti (to advise the Sultan on religious matters) had already been appointed by the state in the 1830s. There were also two Syariah courts, one for matters relating to marriage, property and moral observances, run by the mufti and several kathi; the other a criminal court overseeing Malay customary and Islamic laws. Johor was the only other State with a religious body prior to British rule, but this was in the form of a department (Abdullah Alwi Hasan, 1996:266‐68). For a detailed account of the Majlis and the early religious bureaucracy in Kelantan, see Roff, 1974.  203 Abu Bakar Abdullah Kutty, 1988:4. Although this did not substantially alter the Committee’s composition, it would have restricted PAS’s formal influence of in this process. 204 Penyata Rasmi Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN) Kelantan, 16‐17 Mac 1985, p38. PAS Deputy President Fadzil Nor was also reported as saying that the ‘half‐hearted’ nature of these laws made them un‐Islamic (‘No cause for criticism of syariah law’, Straits Times, 11 Feb 1987, p8). 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favour of harsher penalties  (e.g. whipping,  stoning  to death)  for zina,  justifying this with Qur’anic references.205 Its assemblyman for Salor, for instance, argued that monetary fines did not deter the rich since ‘for them, $5,000 [was] not a lot to  pay  to  satisfy  their  lust’.206  This  belief  that  the  party  was  duty‐bound  to enforce religious laws in line with scriptural injunctions, was likely to have been a  consideration  behind  the  introduction  of  the  more  severe  hudud  laws  in Kelantan and Terengganu after PAS took control of these States.207  While  Kelantan  may  have  been  the  first  to  adopt  a  comprehensive  law  for religious offences, it was not alone in recognising that existing ‘Islamic’ criminal provisions were lacking and needed improvement. Some BN State governments had already started to address these gaps by amending their AMLEs in the  late 1970s and early 1980s. Part of this was possibly a reaction to the dominance of civil  laws;  the  other,  a  response  to  a  resurgent  Islamic movement  and  PAS  as highlighted previously.  In this regard, Pahang’s  intervention is notable.  Its Administration of Islam and Malay Customs Enactment 1982 was the first to criminalise the acts of ‘indecent exposure’  (mendedahkan  tubuh)  (S183),208  and  ‘outrage  of  modesty’ (menjatuhkan  maruah)  (S184),  defined  as  public  displays  of  affection  (e.g. embracing  and  kissing)  by  unmarried  couples.  Additionally,  S150  was introduced to explicitly outlaw same‐sex relations between women, a first in the                                                         205 Penyata Rasmi DUN Kelantan, 16‐17 Mac 1985, p39.  206 Mustapha Ibrahim quoted in ibid., p40. 207 PAS regained control of Kelantan in 1990 and has held power since. Its rule over Terengganu was shorter, lasting one term from 1999‐2004. 208 Section 183 was not about male ‘flashers’, but women dressing immodestly and prohibiting them from publicly exposing a ‘large part’ of their bodies. 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country’s  legal history.209 This prohibited a Muslim woman from having  ‘carnal relations’ (hubungan jenis) with another Muslim or non‐Muslim woman but what this meant was problematically left undefined.210  
Legislative motivations Given  that  the  regulation  of  sexual  offences  is  a major  component  of  the  SCO laws,  it  is  pertinent  to  ask: what  part  did  the  desire  to  outlaw  non‐normative sexualities and genders play in its passage? The answer to this question can be found in the debates – or rather, the lack of them – that transpired when the SCO laws were tabled at the legislative assemblies in Kelantan, Pahang, Selangor, and the FT.211  The  members  of  the  Kelantan  assembly  heard  how  the  time  was  right  to consolidate  ‘Islamic’  offences  under  a  SCC  enactment,  particularly  since  the Syariah  Courts  (Criminal  Jurisdiction)  Act  had  just  been  amended  to  allow religious courts to impose heavier penalties on errant Muslims.212 The floor was split between those who supported the bill and those who opposed it, a division not  surprisingly  governed  along  party  lines.  The  only  references  to  sexual offences, however, were in relation to prostitution and pimping, and activities of the  pondan  (male‐to‐female  trans)  community.  Proclaiming  the  latter  as  a serious ‘social ill’ which warranted greater controls to prevent their spread, one                                                         209 More will be said on this in Chapter 5. 210 The original penalty was a jail sentence of three months and/or a RM500 fine. This was raised to RM2,000 and/or a one year jail term in 1987. 211 The choice of these States is not arbitrary. Kelantan is selected for having (re)introduced the crimes of liwat and pondan; Pahang for being the first to denounce lesbian sex (along with ‘indecent’ behaviour and ‘immodest’ dressing) as religious offences; Selangor for having a common prohibition on same‐sex relations (i.e. its law does not mention liwat or musahaqah); and the FT whose law is upheld as the model for all States. 212 Penyata Rasmi DUN Kelantan, 16‐17 Mac 1985, p36. 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assemblyperson  welcomed  the  new  law.213  Nothing  was  said  about  liwat  or 
musahaqah even though these had turned up in the State’s statute books for the first time.  Prior  to  this,  the  tabling  of  the  Pahang  Administration  of  Islam  and  Malay Customs  Enactment  in  1982  had  yielded  a  similarly  superficial  debate  by  the State assemblypersons present.214 Abdul  Jalil Mohd Seh (Maran) noted that  the proposed bill showed the government’s willingness to address ‘Muslim anxieties’ (kegelisahan  umat  Islam)  but  did  not  elaborate  what  these  were.  The  sexual provision  that  garnered  most  attention  was  the  indecent  bodily  exposure prohibition  (S183).  Here,  the  attempt  to  debate  the  effectiveness  of  the  law  – criticised  for  being  too  broad  and  vague215  –  rapidly  degenerated  into  sexist banter about why women, and not men, needed regulating.216   Only one  legislator, a woman (Latifah Abdul Ghaffar, Beserah), questioned why the bill  sought  to  criminalise  female  same‐sex  relations when  the practice was not known to be widespread. She added  that  if anything,  it was male same‐sex relations that ought to be targeted. She did not get a reply to the first part of her question  but  was  told  that men were  left  out  of  the  bill  because  sodomy was 
                                                        213 ibid,, p45. There was concern that groups of pondan had allegedly taken over parts of Kota Bahru, loitering in back lanes and hassling male passers‐by at night. 214 The Chief Minister of Pahang at the time was the current Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Abdul Razak. Only 29 then, he was present at these proceedings but appears to have remained silent throughout the time that the sexual clauses were debated. 215 Abdul Jalil Mohd. Seh had argued that it was impossible to enforce such a law because its scope was too wide. His alternative, however, was prohibiting women from exposing their aurat (bodily part that must be covered) (Penyata Rasmi DUN Pahang, 6‐10 Dis 1982, p232). 216 The excuses revolved around women’s aurat being ‘larger’ than men’s – and thus presumably more offensive – as well as myths around rape, i.e. that women’s exposed bodies would arouse men’s sexual desires and that would lead them to commit rape. Assemblypersons partaking in this debate joked freely with each other on this matter (ibid., p272). 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already under the Penal Code.217 One can only speculate why the other States did not apply the same rationale later.  This laid‐back approach towards the criminalisation of sexual offences was also evident when  the Selangor State Legislative Assembly deliberated over  its  SCO bill  in  1995.  In  explaining  the  need  for  the  law,  the  State  Executive  Council member who tabled the bill, Zainal Abidin Ahmad (Sg Air Tawar), made only an oblique  reference  to morality when he  spoke about  the government’s hopes of the  law  addressing  the  ‘social  ills’  that  accompanied  urbanisation  and industrialisation.218   The task of questioning the bill’s sexual provisions fell upon the sole opposition assemblyperson, a non‐Muslim, who sought clarification on the revised khalwat clause.  He  did  not  criticise  the  proposed  law’s  newer  prohibitions  against ‘unnatural’  offences  or  public  indecency,  and  instead  welcomed  the  bill  for ‘giving greater clarity on what constituted Syariah offences and  jurisdiction’.219 Later,  when  asked  why  he  supported  the  law  then,  he  said,  ‘[W]hen  they enact[ed]  it,  they  had  good  intentions,  that’s  very  sure.  But  when  it  comes  to implementation…  the  officers  [are]  overzealous,  that  is  the  problem’.220  At  the 
                                                        217 ibid., p270. The same reason was given for excluding men from the Syariah ‘indecent dressing’ provision, i.e. there were pre‐existing Federal provisions that could be used on them. 218 See Penyata Rasmi DUN Selangor, 31 Jul dan 1 Ogos 1995, p391. 219 ibid., p390. 220 Private communication (5 Nov 2009) and interview (26 Nov 2009) with ‘Goh’, member of the Selangor State Legislative Assembly. He also said that under the BN‐led Selangor State government, State assemblypersons used to receive copies of bills to be tabled at the very last minute, leaving them little time to study its contents.  
 80 
same  time,  he  pointed  out  that  in  the  State  assembly  ‘nobody  dares  to  touch [Islamic issues], everybody will try to praise it’.221  When the FT SCO bill was finally tabled at the end of 1996, the line of inquiry at the Dewan Rakyat  fared  little better. A  single PAS member of parliament  (MP) dominated question time with his intervention that stretched over 45 minutes, in which  sexuality  was  broached  only  when  he  gave  a mini‐sermon  on  zina  and 
khalwat.  Rather  than debate  the  specifics  of  the  Islamic morality  provisions  of the bill, the floor traded views on all kinds of other matters.222 That no one was interested  in discussing the expanded powers of  the  law over sexual marginals can be gleaned from the sole reference to musahaqah, made only to correct the Arabic spelling of the term.223  Several additional  remarks are pertinent at  this  juncture.  In  the BN‐dominated State  assemblies,  lawmakers  gave  the  sexual  provisions  of  the  SCO  laws  scant attention,  encouraged  instead  to  prioritise  the  bill’s  speedy  passage.224 Where there was a stronger presence of opposition legislators, debates were livelier but only because it seemed like each side was trying to outshine the other’s religious 
                                                        221 This aversion to speaking about Islamic affairs is compounded by claims that non‐Muslims have no right to discuss such matters. The interviewee recalled one occasion when a BN assemblyman tried to prevent him from debating on the Syariah Evidence Enactment for this reason (ibid.) 222 House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Vol. II, No. 82, Wed, 18 Dec 1996, pp139‐169. MPs from both sides of the divide capitalised on the opportunity for additional political mileage by raising topics that ranged from apostasy and hudud laws, to employers who prevented workers from performing their Friday prayers, closing eateries during Ramadhan, and gambling. 223 ibid., p167. 224 Zainal Abidin Ahmad who tabled the bill, claimed that it was important for the bill to be approved on the same day. No reasons were given, nor were any questions asked (See Penyata Rasmi DUN Selangor, 31 Jul dan 1 Ogos 1995, p389). In Parliament, the SCOA (FT) 1997 was passed within an hour of being tabled (Hansard, Vol. II, No. 82, Wed, 18 Dec 1996, pp139‐169). 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credentials.  Little  that  was  meaningful  was  said  about  the  bill’s  sexual provisions.225  In another case,  the  legislators were told (or  it was  implied) that they  should  just  accept  the  contents  of  the  bill  either  because  these  had  the endorsement  of  the  Islamic  authorities  or  because  the  drafting  committee  – whose views were portrayed as authoritative – had already extensively debated the matter.226   In one sense, the manner in which the MPs and assemblypersons treated the SCO laws  and  their  sexuality provisions was  little  different  to how other bills were considered at  the  time. This was when  the BN was dominant,  especially  at  the level  of  State  legislatures.  Assemblypersons were  freer  to  pass  laws with  little accountability  since  the  system  of  checks  and  balances  was  not  as  well developed  as  it  is  today.227  Still,  the  overall  indifference  towards  debating  the law’s  expanded  jurisdiction  over  Islamic  sexual  crimes  suggests  that  few disagreed with extending its powers over the bodies of Muslim subjects.  
The SCO Laws Revisited: ‘Syariahtisation’ and the Federal factor  State‐sponsored  Islamisation  saw  a  proliferation  of  ‘Syariah’  legislation  across the  country  particularly  too  as  other  States  followed  Kelantan’s  footsteps  and                                                         225 See the debates at the Dewan Rakyat (ibid.) or the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly (Penyata Rasmi DUN Kelantan, 16‐17 Mac 1985). 226 See Penyata Rasmi DUN Selangor, 31 Jul dan 1 Ogos 1995, p389‐390 and Penyata Rasmi DUN Pahang, 6‐10 Dis 1982, p272. In Selangor, the legislators were told that the bill was drafted by the Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws, prepared in consultation with the mufti, Syariah Chief Judge, and all the State Legal Advisors and heads of the Jabatan Agama Islam. As well, it had the approval of the Majlis Agama Islam Selangor. 227 Generally, the level of intervention by legislators has improved since March 2008, after unprecedented electoral wins for the Pakatan Rakyat coalition resulted in a significant increase in the number of opposition representatives in both State and Federal legislatures. 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introduced  their  own  set  of  specialised  religious  statutes  after  1985.  From  the Federal  government’s  perspective,  the  Constitutional  provision  that  empowers States with religious jurisdiction has given rise to numerous problems tied to the absence  of  uniform  laws.228  Ostensibly  to  overcome  this  dilemma,  it  has  been pushing for a common set of  ‘Syariah’  legislation from as early as the 1970s.229 Hence, though Kelantan was the first to introduce an SCO law in the country, it is the Federal  version,  i.e.  the SCOA  (FT) 1997  that  is upheld  today as  the model legislation.230  As  argued  in  Chapter  2,  this  desire  to  standardise  the  administration  of  Islam, however, should also be understood as an aspiration to consolidate  the central government’s authority over Muslims. The more successful it is in usurping State religious  jurisdiction,  the  greater  its  likelihood  of  ensuring  that  all  Muslims conform  to  a  version of  this  religion whose definition  can be determined  from the  centre.  The  Technical  Committee  on  Syariah  and  Civil  Laws  (hereon,  the Technical Committee), a Federal body created in 1988, has played an important part in this plan.231                                                          228 These include ‘forum shopping, reciprocal enforcement of judgments, and conflict of laws in general’ (Horowitz, 1994:263). 229 Abdul Monir Yacob, 2005:10. 230 Though FT only adopted the SCOA in 1997, some of its provisions had already been incorporated in the Administration of Islamic Law (FT) (Amendment) Act of 1986, i.e. just one year after the Kelantan SCC was passed. This included liwat and taqarrub (an act leading towards) zina. Besides a fine and jail sentence, these acts – along with zina and the consumption of intoxicating liquor – were penalised with six lashes of the cane. With this, FT became the second State after Kelantan to prescribe caning for religious offences (Farid Sufian Shuaib, et al, 2001:205). Interestingly, in the FT SCOA 1997, caning was dropped from the sentence of 
taqarrub zina and drinking alcohol. 231 The Technical Committee was an offshoot of a larger Committee formed by the National Council for Islamic Affairs (Majlis Kebangsaan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam, MKI) in May 1988 to study the Syariah and Civil legal systems (Dewan Rakyat, Penyata Rasmi Parlimen, Jilid 3, Bil.14, 24 Mac 1989, pp2448‐49). See also Abdul Monir Yaacob, 2001a:17‐18. 
 83 
The Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws Led by Ahmad Ibrahim,232 a prominent common law professor – who is widely celebrated  today  as  the  architect  behind  the  transformation  of  the  nation’s ‘Islamic’ judicial and legal system – the other pioneer members of the Technical Committee  included Abdul Monir Yaacob, Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman and Sheikh  Ghazali  Abdul  Rahman,233  also  legal  scholars  knowledgeable  about  the civil  or  Islamic  systems;  and  Wan  Mohamed  Wan  Mustapha,  a  High  Court judge.234  It was Ahmad  Ibrahim, who set  the parameters of  the body,235 and  in determining how it was to function, he played a vital part in redefining the scope of existing religious legislation. Not surprisingly, his efforts to elevate the status of ‘Syariah’ laws have inspired many after him to lobby for Syariah supremacy, a point elaborated on  in Chapter 7. Suffice  to  say here, his adherents have  taken his cue that there is a lost and golden Islamic past, and made it their mission to rediscover and reinstate this to its rightful place in Malaysia..236 
                                                        232 Originally from Singapore, Ahmad Ibrahim migrated to Malaysia in 1968. Before that he served the Singapore government in various capacities including as its Attorney General. Coming from a religious background – his father was involved in Islamic social welfare work – Ahmad Ibrahim went on to excel in the field of English common law (Al‐Mansor Adabi, 1986). Some believe that he left Singapore because he had been marginalised for wanting to raise the status of the Malays and Islam in the republic (Abdul Monir Yaacob et. al., 2007:69), motivations he carried over with him into Malaysia. He had pushed for the Technical Committee from as early as 1981 (See Ahmad Ibrahim, 1981a:36). 233 Sheikh Ghazali is presently with the Syariah Section of the Attorney General’s Chambers, having served many years as the Syariah Chief Justice before that. 234 Little has been written about the formative years of the Technical Committee. Its original composition is therefore hard to ascertain. These five names were obtained through Abdul Hamid Mohamad, former Chief Justice of Malaysia and member of the Technical Committee in the 2000s (Private communication, 14 Jan 2010). However, in a very recent unpublished paper on the history of this body, Abdul Monir Yaacob (2011) also mentions Othman Ishak, head of Universiti Malaya’s Akademi Islam and Kamil Awang from the Attorney General’s Chambers as its pioneer members.  235 Abdul Monir Yaacob et al, 2007:118. 236 Their efforts to rewrite history, however, often take the form of asserting their opinions as ‘truths’. For example, the Third International Conference on Harmonisation of Civil Laws and Syariah in 2007 passed a resolution to recognise that ‘Shari’ah provides [sic] a complete law – including family law, commercial law, penal law and maritime law – in Malaysia before the intervention of colonial powers’. The same is evident in the comments of a senior official at IKIM, the government religious think‐tank: ‘[H]istorical facts categorically prove that the Syariah legal 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There are two views about the function of the Technical Committee. One is held by the likes of Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman and Abdul Monir Yaacob, who as indicated  were  founding  members  of  this  expert  body.  Writing  in  1989,  the former  concurred  with  another  observer  that  the  Technical  Committee  was meant  to  ‘review  the  whole  of  Malaysian  laws  and  make  recommendations towards amending any provisions which [were] contrary to Shari’ah Law’ (cited in 1989:78).237 Today,  this  approach  is  better  known as  the  ‘harmonisation’  of ‘Syariah’  and civil  laws,238  and often  is  conflated with  ‘Islamisation’  though  the two are conceptually different.  As Mohammad Hashim Kamali  (2007)  explains,  ‘harmonisation’  is  about  being open  to  ‘reciprocity  and  exchange  in  the  quest  to  establish  harmony  between two  different  legal  rulings  or  legal  traditions’  (p394).  It  is  a  process  ‘not  to civilianize the one or to Islamicize the other, but to harmonize the two’ (p403). Correctly applied, it is potentially more acceptable since it is ‘inherently inclusive and open to the cross‐fertilisation of ideas’ (p393). Present practice, however, is biased towards making civil laws in line with ‘Syariah’, rather than balancing this                                                                                                                                                               system preceded the civil one by at least 600 years’ (emphasis added) (‘Malaysian legal transformation’, The Star, 12 Apr 2011, <http://thestar.com. my/ news/story.asp?file= 2011/4/12/focus/8460544&sec=focus>, Accessed: 12 Apr 2011). See also the commentary posted by the head of the Muslim Lawyers Association, Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar, ‘Enakmen jenayah Syariah hak mutlak umat Islam’, 7 Sept 2009, on the blogsite of the Persatuan Pegawai Syariah Malaysia, <http://ppsm.blogspot.com/2009/09/enakmen‐jenayah‐syariah‐hak‐mutlak‐umat.com>, Accessed: 30 Sept 2009. 237 See also Abdul Monir Yaacob who writes that Ahmad Ibrahim had also highlighted this objective at the Technical Committee’s first meeting (2011:5). 238 This became more popular in the early 2000s after having been successfully applied to Islamic banking and finance, and making such conventional products Syariah‐compliant (Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 2008:12). The importance the Federal government places on harmonisation can also be seen in the biennial international conferences on the harmonisation of Syariah and Civil law that the Attorney General’s Chambers has organised with the International Islamic University since 2003. 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with efforts to ensure that  ‘Syariah’ – in reality, fiqh (jurisprudence) – is also in harmony with civil law. This lack of compromise, or even the mere appearance of it, has convinced some that what is transpiring is a process of Islamisation.  Former  Chief  Justice  Abdul  Hamid  Mohamad,  also  supportive  of  greater ‘Syariahtisation’,239 holds a different view. He argues  that  though some see  the Technical Committee’s role as  ‘harmonisation’, this idea – and even less, that of ‘Islamisation’ – did not cross their minds in the beginning. Rather, they ‘were just doing  what  needed  to  be  done’  which  was  to  come  up  with  better  and  more comprehensive  laws  that  could be used  to help elevate  the standing of Syariah courts.240  Out  of  necessity  and  practicality,  it  made  sense  to  bring  together ‘Islamic’ scholars and common law lawyers, and their complementary expertise, to draft ‘Syariah’ laws (2008:1‐2).  It was easiest  to  copy existing common  law especially where  laws of evidence, and  civil  and  criminal  procedures  were  concerned.241  Employing  a  process  of blending and modification i.e. removing and substituting features that were not in  accordance  with  Islamic  principles,  and  adding  what  was  needed  to  fill existing  gaps,  the  Technical  Committee  ‘shaped  the  Shariah  to  suit  modern circumstance’.242  Even  Ahmad  Ibrahim  concurred  that  previous  measures  to                                                         239 Abdul Hamid Mohamad’s engagement with the Technical Committee began long before he was appointed as a member of its main body in the early 2000s. In fact it dated back to the 1980s when, as the State Legal Advisor of Kelantan and Perak, and later, as High Court judge, he supported the Committee’s work in different ways. In the 1990s, he was Chair of the Committee’s Penang branch (Private communication with Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 14 Jan 2010). 240 Abdul Monir Yaacob, 2011:5. 241 Likewise, practices of the Civil courts have also been imitated whether this has to do with ‘the names of the courts, the manner of addressing the judges [or] their dress on the bench’ (Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 2002:133) 242 Private communication with Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 14 Jan 2010. 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improve  religious  laws  relied  on  the  same  approach  of  adapting  existing legislation.243  As  he  put  it,  ‘no  attempt was made  to  draft  the  law  only  on  the basis of the Quran, Sunnah and the Shariah text books’ (1987:58).244  Contrary  to  claims  otherwise,  ‘Islamic’  laws  of  today  have  thus  ended up  little different to their colonial predecessors in the sense that they too have turned out as a ‘[reformulation of the] Syariah in English legal terms’ (Hooker, 2002:217).245 Although some may perceive harmonisation as a code word for  ‘Islamisation’ – and  in  certain  respects  civil  laws  have  been  Islamised  –  it  is  also  true  that through bodies like the Technical Committee, the Federal state has perpetuated the ‘secularisation’ of Syariah law that commenced under colonial rule.246   It  is  easy  to  credit  the  Technical  Committee  with  shaping  the  SCO  legislation, including its moral provisions. However, knowing that Kelantan passed its SCC in 1985  (i.e.  some  years  before  the  Technical  Committee  began  to  streamline religious laws) indicates that at best, this expert body was a vehicle to propagate – rather than set – the sexual norms contained in the Kelantan law. The section titled ‘Offences relating to decency’ of the SCOA (FT) 1997, which outlines a list                                                         243 For instance, the Islamic Family Law enactments took after the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1966. Another example is the Syariah Court Enactments which followed the Courts of Judicature and Subordinate Courts Act. 244 Malaysia is not alone in this regard. In 1948, under the guidance of Abd al‐Razzaq al‐Sanhuri, the Egyptian Civil Code was revised in a similar manner where Islamic principles were blended with Western legal thought. Like Ahmad Ibrahim, al‐Sanhuri was trained in modern jurisprudence and motivated by a desire to reinstate Islamic law to its original status prior to being marginalised by European colonisation. His approach started with having Syariah play a secondary role, i.e. applied only when there were gaps in civil legislation, but with the ultimate goal of having it replace Egypt’s ‘Western‐inspired system of law’ (Saleh, 1993:162). It is uncertain if these two men ever met. 245 Again this situation is not peculiar to Malaysia, the Ottoman Empire’s Majalla (civil code) is also said to have been ‘Islamic in content but European in form’ (Hill, 1988:34). 246 See Maznah Mohamad (2010) who argues that rather than the Malaysian state being subjected to a process of desecularisation as is often claimed, it is Syariah that is being ‘secularised’. 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of  moral  offences,  was  derived  from  the  SCC  1985,  albeit  with  some ‘improvements’ (e.g. higher penalties).   Rather  than  the  Technical  Committee  per  se,  the  common  link  between  the Kelantan SCC and the model FT SCOA was Ahmad Ibrahim. It is well known that he  played  a  critical  part  in  steering  the  Technical  Committee’s  work.  Less publicised  but  equally  significant  was  his  role  in  crafting  the  Kelantan  laws, including the SCC, years before he was appointed onto the Technical Committee. In 1977, both he and Nik Rashid Nik Abdul Majid, a law academic, were co‐opted into  the  Committee  to  review  the Kelantan  Syariah  Courts  Enactment  1966.247 According  to  Daud  Muhammad,  then  Secretary  of  the  Committee  (presently Syariah  Chief  Judge  in  Kelantan),  Ahmad  Ibrahim’s  expertise  and  dedication were outstanding in this regard.248  
Challenges in forcing conformity A key function of the Technical Committee has been to persuade States to accept Federal  model  laws,  including  the  SCOA  (FT)  1997.  Despite  these  efforts,  the central  government  has  encountered  palpable  resistance  to  its  mission  of standardisation. Attempts at streamlining  ‘Syariah’  laws have occasionally been perceived as an encroachment of State powers, and depending on Federal‐State dynamics, tensions have fluctuated over the years.249 This is further complicated 
                                                        247 Abu Bakar Abdullah Kutty, 1988:2. 248 He not only actively participated in all meetings but also worked on the draft laws in his own time, personally translating these into English to speed‐up their adoption by the Kelantan State legislature (Abdul Monir Yaacob et al, 2007:112). 249 During Mahathir’s rule especially, relations between the two were exacerbated each time the Federal government capitalised on controversies to blame State‐level agencies for the poor implementation of ‘Syariah’ law (e.g. abusing their powers, wrongly interpreting Islam, etc.) and 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by how each State has  its own set of gatekeepers of  ‘Islam’  (e.g. State religious authorities,  lawmakers,  the  Sultan,  etc.).250 The process of  convincing  States  to take up Federal religious  initiatives  is  thus extremely  time‐consuming so much so  one  of  the  Technical  Committee’s  roles  has  been  likened  to  that  of  a  sales agent,251 sometimes successful, sometimes not.   Given  this,  the  Federal  government  –  through  the MKI  (Majlis Kebangsaan Hal Ehwal  Agama  Islam,  National  Council  for  Islamic  Affairs),  a  body  in  the  Prime Minister’s Department which advises  States on matters  related  to  ‘Islamic’  law and  administration  –  headed  to  the  176th  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Rulers (Majlis Raja‐Raja) in 1997 to secure its support for a set of uniform ‘Syariah’ laws in the country. Since each ruler has the final say on Islamic matters of his State, the Federal authorities were able to claim that it had the consensus of all States to standardise ‘Syariah’ laws once it got the consent of the Council of Rulers.252 In theory,  this also enabled them to bypass the other conventional gatekeepers of State religious affairs and minimise any potential resistance they posed.   As it turned out, the Council accepted JAKIM’s proposal to be the conduit for its streamlining efforts but instructed the Attorney General to first conduct a study 
                                                                                                                                                              use this to push for Islam to come under its jurisdiction (‘Federal govt “should take charge of Islamic affairs”’, Straits Times, 19 Apr 1996, p33). 250 Martinez, 2001:479. 251 Horowitz, 1994:269. 252 According to Shad Faruqi (2011), the main function of the Council of Rulers (also known as the Conference of Rulers) is to elect and remove the King, to elect his Deputy, approve or reject certain constitutional amendments, and give advice about some appointments. Article 9 of the MKI’s regulations, however, boldly declares that once the Council of Rulers accepts a recommendation of the MKI, all States are compelled to accept this decision (JAKIM, 2003:98‐99). 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before  agreeing  to  further  action.253  Six  laws  were  identified  for standardisation,254 and in 2005, Parliament was informed that five were ready as model ‘Syariah’ legislation, among them the proposed SCOA.255  Despite these attempts, till today the Federal government has failed to enforce a standard  Syariah  criminal  statute  nationwide.256  Originally,  the  official  account attributed  the  lag  to  the  time needed  to  further  study and  fine‐tune  the model laws,  as  well  as  to  complete  the  legal  procedures  to  facilitate  this  change.257 These days it is more common to hear the authorities confidently stating that the law will be  standardised  soon but not  committing  to when  this will happen or saying why  there  has  been  a  delay  of  over  20  years.258  This  is  despite  all  the formal and backdoor attempts at securing compliance.  This failure is partly due to recalcitrant States showing that they still wield some control  over  religious  matters,  limited  though  this  may  be  to  foot‐dragging tactics.259  The  story  off  the  record  highlights  the  lack  of  consensus within  the 
                                                        253 ‘Rulers agree to uniform Syariah laws in all states’, Straits Times, 1 Aug 1997, p39. According to this report, Kedah wanted to see the proposal before deciding. 254 Following the verdict by the Council of Rulers in 1997, both JAKIM and the Attorney General’s Office jointly produced six model Syariah laws. As with Kelantan, the laws covered matters of Islamic administration, family, civil and criminal procedures, evidence and criminal law (Mohd. Mohandis Yassin, 2005:190). 255 The others were the Syariah Criminal Procedure Code, the Syariah Court Evidence Act, Administration of Islam Act, and IFL Act (Hansard, No. 15, Thurs, 14 Apr 2005, p4). 256 Only Penang and Johor’s Syariah criminal laws mimic the FT SCOA, 1997, where the provisions under ‘Offences relating to decency’ are identical.  257 See ‘Malaysian States standardize Shari’ah laws’, 15 April 2005, <www.islam‐online.net>. Accessed: 4 Apr 2008. 258 There are similar difficulties with other ‘Islamic’ laws. For instance, since the Federal state proposed a model IFL in 1984 – and the Council of Rulers approved this in the same year – it has never managed to persuade States to adopt this in its entirety (‘In dire need of uniformity’, NST, 12 Jan 2003, p8). 259 As it turns out, securing the Council of Rulers’ agreement has not helped much as States continue to push for their interests in negotiations with the central government over these laws (Abdul Monir Yaacob, 2005:15). 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Technical Committee, about leaving criminal matters to ‘Syariah’ jurisdiction.260 There  is  also dispute over  the  relevance of provisions  like  that  for zina, which some  believe  should  not  be  criminalised  as  a  takzir  but  hudud  offence.261 Together,  these  factors have consigned  the SCOA (FT) 1997  to remain a model law on paper thus thwarting Federal plans to strengthen its claims over Islam.  
Conclusion  The  introduction  of  SCO  legislation  in  Malaysia  has  been  an  important development in extending state control over the realm of sexuality. Not only has it  reinforced  the regime of heteronormativity and allowed  for  the heterosexual ‘ideal’ to be upheld, but by naming and penalising non‐normative sexualities and genders,  it has also paved  the way  for  the demonisation of sexual marginals  in the name of Islam.   The  implications  of  the  SCO  law  on  sexual  marginals  notwithstanding,  this chapter has also shown that there were larger imperatives governing its passage. Understanding this provides a more complete account for the law’s emergence, one  that  steers  away  from  lumping  blame  on  an  undifferentiated  entity  of Islamists,  and  instead  highlights  the  role  of  the  ‘secular’  state  and  its politicisation  of  religion.  Specifically,  it  has  critiqued  how  the  Federal government has tried to enlarge its authority by centralising control of the SCO 
                                                        260 Arguing that these are better off regulated through existing Federal laws, at least one member of the Technical Committee – the late Harun Hashim, former Supreme Court judge – had called for the repeal of SCO legislation (Personal communication with Zainah Anwar, 3 Nov 2009). 261 Interview with ‘Hassan’, senior Syariah judge, 2 Jun 2009. 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‘Secular’ Sex Laws: A precursor to ‘Syariah’ morality?  A common argument  in  favour of Syariah criminal  legislation and  its expanded authority  relies  on  berating  ‘secular’  law  –  i.e.  English  common  law262  –  for failing  to  safeguard  the  akhlak  (conduct)  of  Muslims.  This  is  perceived  as  a problem because along with aqidah (belief) and Syariah, akhlak is regarded as a critical part of a Muslim believer’s ability to experience Islam as a way of life. For some also, akhlak goes beyond doing good deeds and preventing wrongdoings in this  world;  it  is  about  not  committing  sin  now  to  avoid  retribution  in  the afterlife.263  Its  defence  is  thus  paramount.  In  this  regard,  the  ‘secular’  legal system is seen as inferior because it does not treat acts that are morally wrong as legally wrong as well. Consequently,  it  is said, this results  in  ‘social  ills’  like sex outside  marriage,  prostitution  and  homosexuality  being  left  unpunished, contrary to what is required by Islam.264  It  does  not  take much  to  realise  that  contrary  to  the  claims  above, Malaysia’s ‘secular’ laws are steeped in moral considerations. Admittedly, adultery is not a criminal  offence  under  English  common  law,  but  extra‐marital  affairs  can  be grounds  for  divorce  and  is  prosecutable  under  civil  law.265  Furthermore,  the 
                                                        262 The terms ‘secular’, English common law and civil law are used interchangeably in this study. 263 Comment by Noor Awang Hamad, Syariah lawyer and lecturer at the Centre for Islamic Thinking and Understanding, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UiTM), Kelantan, 18 Mac 2009. 264 For a typical example of those who take this position, see Kamar Ainiah Kamaruzaman and Abu Bakar Hamzah (1991).  265 In fact, adultery was an offence in the original version of the Penal Code that was introduced in India. This provision disappeared when the Code was exported, otherwise more or less in tact, to the Straits Settlements in 1871. The reason for its removal is unknown. However, the fact that it was formulated and enforced as a crime by the colonial administration in India means that the 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argument  against  ‘secularism’  is  based  on  the  false  assumption  that  ‘secular’ states  always  have  far  more  liberal  positions  about  sexual  politics  than theocratic states. This myth has been amply debunked by writers like Bernstein and  Jakobsen  (2010)  who  point  to  the  case  of  the  former  US  Republican government  and  the  right‐wing  policies  on  gender  and  sexuality  under  the administration of George W. Bush.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  expose  how  little  Malaysia’s  ‘secular’  and ‘Syariah’  legal provisions diverge on  the subject of bodily regulation, especially where unorthodox sexualities and genders are concerned. It will account for how this has happened by tracing the history of early English law and its prohibitions against moral impropriety, which were imported into the colony at the outset of British  rule. What were  these moral  laws  and  their  origins,  and  how did  their introduction  fit  into  the world  that  they were  imposed on? How did  the values they embodied influence post‐colonial regulations of the same nature?   The chapter will also consider how else one can explain the overlapping features of both sets of law, and proposes that another part of the answer lies in looking at who had a hand in the passage of the nation’s  legal codes, both  ‘secular’ and religious.  To make  better  sense  of why  so much  effort  has  gone  into  ensuring that  ‘Islamic’ and  ‘secular’  laws are perceived as distinct,  the final section deals with  the  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  Syariah  Criminal  Offences  (SCO) legislation. Included here is a critique of the case of Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat 
                                                                                                                                                              British also viewed it as legally unacceptable but may have omitted this clause in Malaya to accommodate local considerations. 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Madja  v  Ketua  Pengarah  Penjara Malaysia  &  Anor.  This  should  have  yielded  a very different outcome given the build‐up around Syariah as a superior option to ‘secular’ remedies. Precisely that it did not, provides valuable insights into what drives Syariahtisation and sexual regulation.  
The English Moral Legacy   One of the worst results of the expansion of Britain was the introduction of  its  guilty  inhibitions  about  sex  into  societies  previously much  better sexually adjusted than perhaps any in the West… (Hyam, 1990:3)  British  rule  in  the Malay  peninsular  allowed  for  English  law  to  be  imposed  in stages. One such law was the 1860 Indian Penal Code, cloned and exported to the Straits  Settlements  in  1871,266  before  reaching  the  Federated  Malay  States  in 1884.267 Through this law and others like it, the British transplanted a particular type  of moral  order  onto  the  domestic  populace.  Deliberately  or  otherwise,268 this moral order was one, which as Ronald Hyam  in  the quote above  suggests, cared little about being in tandem with local realities.   
                                                        266 The Penal Code took effect in September the following year (Braddell, 1982:41). Apart from a handful of amendments, members of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council saw little reason not to adopt the law as it had been formulated for India. Where sexual offences were concerned, there was no debate and almost all the related provisions appear to have been accepted in total (See Short‐hand Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, 8 August 1871, Singapore). 267 Hickling, 2001:179. 268 Britain’s colonial expansion, unlike Spain’s or France’s, was not led by the religious order so for a nation that prioritised trade and profits, it is significant that it ended up introducing as many moral laws as it did (Sanders, 2007). 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Indeed,  recent  works  have  revealed  that  there  was  far  greater  tolerance  for sexual  and  gender  diversity  in  this  part  of  the world  during  the  early modern period,  before  the  British  and  other  colonial  powers  arrived.  For  instance, studies on gender pluralism and women in Southeast Asia (c.15th‐18th century) by  Michael  Peletz  (2006)  and  Barbara  Watson  Andaya  (2006)  respectively, amply  illustrate  the  occurrence  of  non‐normative  sexualities  in  a  number  of societies  in  the  region  during  this  time.  Both  also  show  how  within  these, ‘double‐gendered’  or  ‘sexually  ambiguous’  individuals  played  important ritualistic  roles  and  occupied  key  ceremonial  positions.  Peletz,  for  example, writes  about  the  Bissu  transgendered  ritual  specialists  who  led  sacred ceremonies in South Sulawesi and were guardians of the royal regalia, as well as the sida­sida (eunuchs) who were tasked with protecting the spiritual powers of Malay rulers.269 Watson Andaya concurs, adding  that  the existence of same‐sex relations among men, and to a lesser extent, women, can be discerned from court literature, royal decrees and chronicles of this era.270   She  also  maintains  that  Islam’s  arrival  did  not  immediately  nor  substantially alter  this  situation  since  its  initial  expansion  was  more  one  of  ‘amicable localization’ (p88). It was not incongruous for pre‐Islamic traditions – including 
                                                        269 2006:312‐13. 270 She highlights a nineteenth‐century Balinese palace account of how ‘onanie (insertion of balls) and masturbation were common in the women’s quarters, as were wax dildos and even yams and bananas’ (2006:192). She also cites depictions of female intimacy on a Thai temple mural to support her observation, but adds that such transgressions by women were not regarded lightly. This is evident in a royal edict in Ayuthya that prohibited sex between palace women. The penalty for contravening this was fifty lashes, being marked with a tattoo on the neck, and forced to walk around the royal grounds (ibid.), presumably as an act of shaming. Tales of male rulers who were homosexual were better known. One such case was the late 17th century ruler of Johor, Sultan Mahmud, labelled by Europeans as a sadist and ‘sodomite’ for reportedly forcing the sons of several nobles into his bedroom (p173). Another was the 18th century Javanese ruler, Pakubuwana II, whose sexual proclivities were also amply documented (p93). 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the  practice  of  having  transgendered  ritual  figures  –  to  continue  prevailing alongside religious  injunctions against  transvestism during  this period.271 Even when  the  influence  of  Islam  grew  and  displaced  the  significance  of  the transgendered  ritual  specialist,  it  did  not  result  in  an  immediate  change  in attitudes  towards  those  with  non‐conforming  sexualities.  Perhaps  this  is  why Malay  society  could  still  be  observed  treating  homosexuals  and  transgenders with ‘amused tolerance’ up to the late 1960s.272  
Section 377 of the Penal Code As  the  principal  statute  governing  felonies  in  the  colony,  the  Penal  Code delivered  a  clear  message  that  the  British  would  not  condone  ‘unnatural’ offences.  Section  377  punished  anyone  found  guilty  of  indulging  in  ‘carnal intercourse  against  the  order  of  nature’.273  Though  defined  as  acts  of ‘penetration’, it is likely that official imaginings of what constituted sex did not go beyond  penile  penetrative  activity.  While  the  law  could  also  be  read  as prohibiting fellatio – the insertion of the penis into the mouth – history suggests that the object of colonial regulation was sodomy: anal sex involving the penis,274 whether this was with a man, woman or animal. In short, when first introduced 
                                                        271 That customary practices and Islam coexisted can be seen in an example from mid‐17th century Banten, a province in West Java. Despite this being a centre of Islamic study, the arrival of an infant prince in 1661 was greeted by a ceremony which included dancing by ‘men in women’s clothes’ (Watson Andaya, 2006:89). 272 Peletz, 2006:317. 273 The original provision read: ‘Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished with penal servitude for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, and for every second or subsequent offence shall be liable to whipping’ (Penal Code, Ordinance No. 14 of 1871). 274 In Malaysia, anal sex with the use of objects was not unlawful until the Penal Code was amended in 2004. For more on how this change came about, see below. 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in the Malay peninsular, the criminality of ‘unnatural’ sex revolved around three elements: a penis, an anus, and the act of penetration involving the two.275  In  1938,  the  law  was  amended  with  a  new  subsection  S377A  ‘Outrages  on decency’.  With  this,  non‐penetrative  penile  sex  between men  also  came  to  be criminalised.276  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  like  S377,  the  impetus  for  this change was not local. Instead, it was related to a curious episode that took place in England in August 1885. A thin House of Commons deliberating late one night over  the  Criminal  Law Amendment Act  1861  hastily  accepted  a  backbencher’s proposal  to  imprison men who  engaged  in  acts  of  ‘gross  indecency’ with  each other.277 The significance of their actions cannot be underestimated,278 more so for Britain’s colonies where it was introduced with little or no debate.279  In sharp contrast to the first legal efforts at regulating sexual acts between men, there was no equivalent to proscribe such behaviour between women. Nowhere in  the early picture of  ‘unnatural’  offences did  sex between women – or  cross‐dressing for that matter – feature. Lesbian relations were simply inconceivable in 
                                                        275 Importantly, though sex may have been consensual, the law intended to punish only the perpetrator, i.e. the man found guilty of penetrating an anus with his penis, not its recipient. 276 See FMS, Penal Code (Amendment) Enactment 1938 (30/1938). 277 Many questions have been raised about this episode, essentially over what Member of Parliament Henry Labourche, really intended by proposing his amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment bill. F.B. Smith argues that contrary to popular belief, Labourche meant to prevent the passage of the bill. This was because he believed it to be ‘badly drawn up’ (1992:169) and needed further study before a Select Committee instead. The fact that his proposal was clearly unrelated to the subject of the bill – the protection of women and girls and the suppression of brothels – made its hurried adoption even more suspicious. 278 Though the pre‐existing Offences against the Person Act 1861 outlawed buggery, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 soon became the more popular tool to police and punish gay men given its lower standards of proof. Unsurprisingly, the law’s potential to be used against them made it notorious (Smith, 1992:537). 279 See Proceedings of the Federal Council of the FMS (PFCFMS), 1939, pB62, B98. 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the eyes of the imperial authorities, or perhaps more accurately, not seen as real enough to be classified as sex, natural or otherwise.   The gravity the British authorities in Malaya ascribed to sodomy can be surmised by  S377’s  penalty:  a  lifetime  of  hard  labour/a  jail  term  of  up  to  ten  years/a monetary fine. Repeat offenders faced the additional prospect of being whipped as well.280 The sentence  for  ‘gross  indecency’, deemed a  lesser offence because penile penetration was not involved, followed the English example, i.e. capped at two years in jail.281 Remarkably, the punishment for sodomy was identical to that for  convicted  rapists  even  though  the  former  involved  consensual  sex  and  the latter did not.282 Section 377’s focus was on the abnormality of anal sex. Sex was not considered sex but for the purposes of reproduction. The authorities not only had  zero  compunction  about  penalising  those who  engaged  in  ‘deviant’  sexual activity, but also formulated the law to target those who willingly did so.283 
 In his study on the genesis of  ‘sodomy’  laws  in the British colonies, Alok Gupta (2008)  exposes  S377  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  as  a  racist  piece  of  legislation, devised ‘to set standards of [sexual] behavior, both to reform the colonized and to protect the colonizers against moral  lapses’ (p5).  It assumed that the tropics turned  these  nations  into  a  hotbed  of  sexual  licentiousness,  where  ‘unnatural’ acts  like  sodomy  thrived.  In  the  name  of  setting  right  the  ‘natives’,  Britain  – which  projected  itself  as  morally  virtuous  and  superior  –  had  an  excuse  to 
                                                        280 It was only later that the law was amended to extend whipping to all offenders (See SS, Penal Code (Amendment) No. 35 of 1933). 281 FMS, Penal Code (Amendment) Enactment 1938 (30/1938). 282 See S375 and S376 of the Penal Code, Ordinance IV of 1871.  283 Section 377 was explicitly framed to punish those who ‘voluntarily’ engaged in sodomy. 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embark  on  a  Christian  ‘civilizing  mission’  (p27)  with  consequences  that  went beyond  bodily  controls.  To  insist  that  the  greater  openness  of  locals  to  sexual and gender diversity would result in the ‘infection’ of Europeans who fraternised with  locals  was  at  best  an  exaggeration,  particularly  when  same‐sex  male relations were already prevalent in England centuries earlier.284  The Indian Penal Code also offered the British a chance to formulate a  law that was more precise about what was deemed as ‘unnatural’ sex. Prior to this, they had  deliberately  left  the  meaning  of  unlawful  sexual  acts  vague.  If  anything, sodomy (or buggery as it was then known) was viewed as a crime that was best left nameless285 as their mere mention and ensuing public debate was feared to cause more harm than good.286 With time, the need to streamline all  legislation and keep them relevant with the pace of change became more pronounced. The dominions of the British Crown presented it with the opportunity to refine and test laws like S377, with less potential of incurring a backlash.287  
                                                        284 The first recorded prohibition against sodomy in England was in a 13th century legal treatise known as the Fleta which sentenced the guilty to being buried alive. After England left the Roman Catholic Church in the early 16th century, the state took over the task of prosecuting this offence from the ecclesiastical courts (Sanders, 2007). Under the 1533 Statute of Henry VIII, there was a House of Lords’ provision which prescribed hanging for the ‘detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery (Sodomy) committed with mankind or beast’ (cited in Bartee and Bartee, 1992:34). The death penalty was finally abolished and replaced with life imprisonment when the Offences Against the Person Act was amended in 1861 (Cocks, 2003:30).  285 Their aversion was such that sodomy was referred to by its Latin expression in the 18th century: peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non nominadum (that repulsive sin not fit to be named among Christians) (O’Malley, 1996:138). 286 See for instance, the views of Thomas Babington Macaulay, head of the Indian Law Commission and the prime mover behind the Indian Penal Code (cited in Gupta, 2008:17). 287 This was unlike Britain where greater freedom of speech could attract more opposition to these efforts at legal reform. A year after the enactment of the Indian Penal Code in 1860, Britain amended its Offences Against the Person Act, replacing the death penalty for sodomy with a jail sentence modelled on the Indian experience (Gupta, 2008:20). 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Imperial fixation with keeping white men safe from sexual contamination by the local  population  should  also  be  understood  beyond  finding  only  sodomy  as repulsive.  There  was  a  deep  connection  between  fears  around  ‘unnatural’  sex and the combined sentiments in Britain at the time, about sexuality on one hand, and on another, the inferior colonised Other.288 This was the early phase of the Victorian era where the  idea that sexual restraint should be the norm – even if the  reality  on  the  ground  told  a different  story  – had  started  to  take  root. The concern that the colonies offered white men unbridled opportunities to sex was compounded  by  racist  ideology.  The  real  objection  was  interracial  sexual relations. Whether heterosexual or homosexual, such liaisons were discouraged as  they  were  feared  to  blur  distinctions  between  ruler  and  ruled,  a  situation which  potentially  threatened  the  Crown’s  aura  of  authority.289  Efforts  at segregation  had  less  connection  to  saving  European  men  in  the  colony  from sexual  perversity,  and  everything  to  do  with  maintaining  a  façade  of  white supremacy.  
Other colonial bodily controls Besides  S377  of  the  Penal  Code,  British  sexual  values  were  also  transplanted through  several  other  laws.  The  Minor  Offences  legislation,  for  example, contained a handful of moral regulations, of which the most significant today is Section  21.  Passed  in  1898  as  a  provision  to  deal with  ‘riotous,  disorderly,  or indecent  behaviour’,  an  amendment  in  1931  enabled  the  law  to  be  used  to prosecute  anyone  for  ‘persistently  soliciting  or  importuning  for  immoral                                                         288 For a historical treatment of these subjects, see Stoler, 1989; Hyam, 1990; McClintock, 1995. 289 Hence the speed and covertness in which sex scandals involving white men and locals were dealt with (See Aldrich, 2003). 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purposes’  in  a  public  space.290  Before  efforts  to  assert  ‘Syariah’  criminal standards were intensified in the 1990s, this was the primary legislation through which cross‐dressing – male‐to‐female in particular – was addressed. Like other colonial  moral  controls,  loosely  defined  terms  like  ‘riotous’,  ‘disorderly’, ‘indecent’ and ‘immoral purpose’ left it open to be broadly interpreted (and often abused) by law enforcers.   Another target of this law was ‘obscenity’. Anything from publicly ‘exposing one’s person’291  to  putting  up  of  ‘indecent’  prints  or  exhibitions292  was  deemed ‘obscene’  and  penalised.293  Reasons  to  criminalise  ‘obscene’  gestures  or behaviour, however, did not always stay the same. When the Minor Offences Act was  first  proposed  in  1898,  one  of  its  objectives was  to  discourage men  from urinating in public. Then, such an offence was regarded more of a nuisance and accordingly,  the  maximum  penalty  was  $10.  Just  before  Independence,  the criminality of publicly exposing one’s penis – even for purposes of relieving one’s self  –  took  on  a  different  meaning  as  the  act  became  tied  to  the  intention  of insulting another person with  ‘lewd’ behaviour. Not only was such an offender labelled a ‘rogue and vagabond’ but also faced a $250 maximum fine and/or six months in jail.294  
                                                        290 The penalty was $10/up to 14 days imprisonment, or $25/up to three months in jail for repeat offenders. See FMS, The Minor Offences (Amendment) Enactment 1931. The punishment in Kelantan for repeat offenders was more severe: a maximum of $50 or ‘rigorous imprisonment’ for a maximum of two months (The Minor Offences Enactment (Amendment) 1938). 291 Inspired by the British Vagrancy Act 1824, this phrase referred to exposing one’s penis. 292 Federation of Malaya, The Minor Offences Ordinance 1955, S28(d). 293 Similar ‘obscenity’ provisions can be found in the Penal Code today. Section 292 outlaws such materials (books, magazines), while ‘obscene’ songs and performances are regulated under S294. 294 Section 28(e), The Minor Offences Ordinance 1955. 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Entertainment was another realm in which British sexual values were imposed. The original law regulating theatres and theatrical performances,295 appeared to be  primarily  concerned  with  public  safety,  i.e.  ‘prohibiting  dangerous performances’,296  but  one  of  the  grounds  to  revoke  an  operator’s  license  was performances with  ‘dangerous,  indecent,  immoral  or  improper’  content.297 The idea  of  ‘censorship’  proper  was  formalised  only  with  the  passage  of  the Cinematograph  Films  law  in  the  mid‐1920s.298  Under  it,  the  criteria  for scrutinising films remained loosely defined. However, for the first time, the state could  appoint  an  Official  Censor  with  the  powers  to  axe  anything  he  deemed objectionable.  Following this, the push to censor ‘obscenity’ in film grew in stronger. Historian Rex  Stevenson  (1974)  notes  how  some  Europeans were  disgruntled  that  local men  were  able  to  view  movies  which  depicted  ‘white  women  bordering  on nudity’ (p210), arguing that this threatened not only the respectability of these women but also  their sexual  safety.  In reality,  their objections were  tied  to  the earlier‐mentioned fear, that unregulated cinema would encourage and legitimise interracial sexual relations, and hence ‘undermined the prestige of the white race [and  colonial  rule]  in  the  Far  East’  (ibid.).  This  dissatisfaction  eventually 
                                                        295 This was the Theatres Ordinance/Enactment, adopted in the SS and FMS in 1908 and 1910 respectively. A different legislation to keep public amusement centres in check was introduced several years later. By 1936, both these laws were consolidated into the Theatres and Places of Public Amusement Enactment, as it was called in the FMS. 296 PFCFMS for the year 1911, 2 May 1910, pB55. 297 FMS Theatres Enactment 1910, S6, ‘Withdrawal of license’. 298 The SS Cinematograph Films Ordinance No. 200 (Ordinance IV of 1924) and the FMS Cinematograph Films (Control) Enactment 1927, Cap. 82. 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culminated  in  the  Cinematograph  Films  Ordinance  1952,  which  outlawed ‘obscene and lewd’ films.299   
Fortifying ‘Secular’ Controls Over Sexuality: After British rule  The  British  left  a  deep  imprint  of  their  moral  norms  through  the  ‘secular’ legislation  they  enacted  in  colonial  Malaya.  Since  then,  many  of  these  legal provisions that regulate sexuality and gender have not only continued to remain in  place  but  in  some  instances,  have  been  revised  or  supplemented with  new legislation and policy to reinforce heteronormativity in contemporary Malaysia.   Unlike  legal  reform  initiatives  elsewhere  in  the  former British Empire,  the  law against  sodomy,  S377  of  the  Penal  Code,  remains  very  much  on  the  nation’s statute  books  today.  Against  the  largely  positive  developments  in  the  region where  other  Commonwealth  states  have  either  recognised  the  need  to modernise this law to keep up with the changing times or because it contravenes international  human  rights  standards,300  the  Malaysian  government’s retrogressive changes to S377 after Independence stand out even more.                                                          299 The change notwithstanding, this provision was number 24 out of a list of 27 sections indicating that it was still not the legislation’s main concern. As shown later, ‘obscenity’ only took centre stage in this law after Independence. 300 In Asia, the Indian experience is the most recent success story. In July 2009, the Indian Supreme Court made a groundbreaking judgment that the Penal Code’s S377 violated the country’s Constitution and international human rights obligations. Accordingly, it ruled that the law should be read down so that such relations would no longer be considered unlawful (Misra, 2009). Closer by in Singapore, attempts to review the Penal Code have led to the same S377 being repealed. This was possible because the provision was narrowly defined as anal and oral sex between consenting heterosexual couples. The same sexual activity between two men was deemed as falling under the ‘gross indecency’ provision of S377A, and this was left unchanged. See ‘Big changes to Penal Code reflect crime’s changing nature’, Straits Times, 18 Sept 2007, Accessed: 30 May 2008. 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The  first major post‐colonial  amendments  to  this  law occurred  in 1989.301 The impetus  appears  to  have  been  indirectly  sparked  by  women’s  groups,  which wanted the laws relating to rape to be improved. Part of their appeal called for the  criminalisation of  anal  rape,  as  this was not  legally  recognised at  the  time. They, however, did not expect the government to incorporate this demand under S377  given  there  was  a  separate  section  for  rape  in  the  Penal  Code.  What originally  stood  as  two parts  under  the  section  ‘Unnatural  offences’  then  grew into six more detailed provisions with higher penalties overall.   The  old  S377 was  revised  and  limited  only  to  ‘Buggery with  an  animal’, more commonly known today as bestiality. The pre‐existing S377A was replaced with a  new  provision  that  gave  more  definition  to  the  phrase  ‘Carnal  intercourse against  the  order  of  nature’.  This  now  referred  to  sexual  acts  involving  the ‘introduction of the penis into the anus or mouth’ of another person. If one could previously argue that  this definition was  limited to anal sex,  the new provision made  it  clear  that  oral  sex  too  was  illegal,  regardless  of  whether  one  was homosexual  or  heterosexual.  Notably,  only  fellatio  was  criminalised  and  not cunnilingus, confirming the penis‐centric sexual lens of lawmakers.  The  next  two  sections  377B  and  377C  set  punishments  for  those  found  guilty under S377A. The former specifies the penalty for anyone who willingly partakes in such sexual acts,  the  latter,  those who compel others  to do so. The only real difference between the two offences is that there is a minimum sentence of five                                                         301 This was when the Penal Code was reviewed to update and tighten overall provisions governing sexual offences (Hansard, Seventh Parliament, Third Session, Vol. III, No. 12, Wed, 22 Mac 1989, 2158). 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years  imprisonment  for  forcing  someone  to  engage  in  anal  or  oral  sex. Consensual or otherwise, the maximum penalty is the same, i.e. twenty years in jail and whipping.   Section  377D  ‘Outrages  on  decency’  is  the  former  S377A  that  punished  men involved  in  acts  of  ‘gross  indecency’  with  other  men.302  The  proposed amendment replaced the phrase  ‘man’ with  ‘person’, and  in one fell swoop,  the law which previously had ignored the capacity of women to proactively engage in  ‘unnatural’ sex, was extended to them as well. The idea that sex  is not really sex unless it involves penile penetration, however, continues to hold. Under this provision,  women  who  have  sex  with  women,  just  like  men  who  have  non‐penetrative penile sex with other men or women, face a lesser charge.303  The final addition, S377E, was to punish a person for involving a child under 14 in acts of ‘gross indecency’. The bias against ‘unnatural’ sex is again apparent as this crime only elicits a maximum five‐year  jail  term and whipping sentence as opposed to twenty years in jail and whipping for adults who consent to anal or oral sex. On a scale of unacceptable sexual acts then, sex with a minor is ranked lower  than  consensual  adult  sex  because  the  law  locates  criminality  in  the ‘unnaturalness’ of an act rather than whether or not choice was involved.  In  2004,  an  exercise  to  overhaul  the  Penal  and  Criminal  Procedure  codes resulted in the creation of yet another ‘unnatural’ offence: ‘sexual connection by                                                         302 This ‘gross indecency’ provision has since also been applied to punish men who are on the receiving end of anal penetration. More on this is discussed below. 303 Compared to a 20‐year prison sentence and whipping for sodomy, those caught for ‘gross indecency’ were jailed for a maximum of two years. 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object’.  The  new  S377CA  imposed  a maximum  prison  sentence  of  20  years  as well  as  lashes  with  a  cane.  Different  to  how  the  other  ‘unnatural’  offences provisions were conceived, however,  the new amendment excluded consensual sexual relations as grounds for conviction. This signified an important shift in the mentality  of  lawmakers who  as  noted  earlier,  did  little  to  distinguish  between consensual and non‐consensual sexual activity.304   The colonial precedent of policing entertainment to filter out ‘sexually offensive’ content has also continued in post‐colonial Malaysia. There were two significant changes  when  the  Film  Censorship  Act  2002  replaced  the  fifty‐year  old Cinematograph  Films  Ordinance  1952.  One  was  the  importance  it  placed  on regulating  ‘obscene’  or  ‘indecent’  film  content  –  this became  the  law’s primary goal;  and  the  other,  its  harsher  penalty  for  possessing,  producing  or disseminating such material.305   The  Film  Censorship  Act  2002  was  given  greater  definition  through  the  Film Censorship  Guidelines  2010.306  To  preserve  societal  harmony  and  prevent  the 
                                                        304 It is unlikely that this change would have materialised without the intervention of women’s groups. In 2004, when the Select Committee tasked to study the amendments to the Penal Code first shared its preliminary findings, these groups made a strong case why consensual sex should not be criminalised (See ‘JAG Welcomes Special Committee in Parliament’, Press Statement by the Joint Action Group for Gender Equality (JAG), issued by the Women’s Centre for Change (WCC), 21 Jul 2004 and Hansard, Parlimen Kesebelas, Penggal Ketiga, Mesyuarat Kedua Bil. 45, Rabu, 12 Jul 2006, 99‐100). 305 From RM1,000 and/or six months jail time, it was raised to a maximum of RM50,000 and/or a jail term of up to five years (See S5(2)). 306 Another set of guidelines predated this, but its contents were never made public. Issued in 1993, there is anecdotal evidence supporting the existence of this policy. For instance, a study conducted by the Australian Film Commission into the benefits of an Australia‐Malaysia Free Trade Agreement spelt‐out the following criteria for local Malaysian productions:’(1) Male artists should not have hair below the collar; (2) Female artists whose background may be deemed ‘immoral’ will be banned; (3) Male and female artists involved in immoral behaviour will have films banned’ (See Australian Film Commission, 2004). In general, the film industry took its cue of what the government wanted it to do through arbitrary rulings that were usually issued by the 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spread of ‘vice’ (the latter framed as anything that goes against local culture and values), it calls for strict monitoring of content ranging from sexual gestures and language  to  suggestive  dressing  and  sex  scenes.307  For  example,  images  that expose  or  draw  attention  to  male  or  female  genitalia  are  off‐limits.308  Where ‘deviant’ sexualities are concerned, scenes of homosexual sex – including kissing, caressing  or  embracing  in  a  ‘sexually  arousing’  manner  –  as  well  as  shots depicting effeminate men, men behaving as women or vice‐versa are prohibited. Homosexuality  can  be  featured  ‘only  if  the  characters  repent  at  the  end of  the film or meet a fate [i.e. death] that will repel viewers from emulating them’.309  The  heavier  punishment  for  offenders  under  the  Film  Censorship  Act  2002 copied  the  standard  set  by  the  earlier  Communications  and  Multimedia  Act 1998.310  Despite  official  pronouncements  of  adopting  a  hands‐off  approach towards  those  in  the broadcast,  telecommunications and  Internet  industry311 – 
                                                                                                                                                              Minister in charge. Otherwise filmmakers would simply try to second‐guess what was (or not) acceptable or exercised self‐censorship in the hope of avoiding their films from being rejected or subjected to further cuts (Private communication with ‘Jubu’, local film producer, 24 May 2010). 307 See Government of Malaysia (2010), ‘Garis Panduan Penapisan Filem (Film Censorship Guidelines)’, Putrajaya: Ministry of Home Affairs. The four broad areas for censorship are security and public order, religion, socio‐cultural issues, and moral and ethical concerns. 308 This applies to heterosexual sex scenes too. The guidelines are extremely detailed with at least 20 rules pertaining to sexual content alone. They also include examples of ‘obscene’ language by enumerating choice words and phrases in all the vernacular languages (See ibid., Part Four). 309 ‘Uncensored: Film guidelines end era of shooting blind’, NST, 21 Mac 2010, <http://www.nst. com.my/Current_News/NST/articles/2sore/Article/index_html>, Accessed: 21 Mac 2010. 310 This law fines offenders a maximum of RM50,000 and/or a year in jail, and an additional penalty of RM1,000 for every day that an offence continues after conviction (Part IX Social Regulation, Chapter 2 Content Requirements, S211, Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (Act 588)). 311 The official website of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission states ‘[The Act] is based on the basic principles of transparency and clarity; more competition and less regu‐lation; flexibility; bias towards generic rules; regulatory forbearance; emphasis on process rather than content; administrative and sector transparency; and industry self‐regulation (See <http:// www. skmm.gov.my/index.php?c=public&v=art_view&art_id=30>, Acc: 13 May 2010). 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including  leaving  the  Internet  alone312  –  the  Act  has  a  clause  prohibiting  the provision of ‘offensive’ material, defined amongst other things as content that is ‘indecent’  or  ‘obscene’.  As  is  the  case with  the  film  censorship  law,  this  Act  is vague about what these terms mean.313 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public Unnatural sex  (Seks di luar tabii)  • Penal Code (Act 574) S377: Bestiality; S377A: Oral sex;  S377D: Outrages on decency Public 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modesty of a person • Minor Offences Act (Act 336) S21: Disorderly behaviour in public; 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In  others,  the  degree  of  similarity  varies  depending  on  how  the  law  has  been framed  and  worded.  For  example,  the  Penal  Code  defines  illegal  acts  of penetration  as  both  anal  and  oral  sex  involving  a  man  and  another  man  or woman. Under  ‘Syariah’,  the  liwat provision  limits  its ambit  to  ‘sexual relations between two men’. Further,  though the SCO  legislation  is not explicit  in stating what this means, its intention of criminalising sodomy is generally accepted. The provisions  addressing  lesbian  sex  are  equally,  if  not  more,  ambiguous. 
Musahaqah  is  simply  termed  ‘sexual  relations  between  two  women’.  What constitutes  an  actual  lesbian  sexual  act  is  not  explained.  Similarly,  the  clarity with  which  the  Penal  Code  defines  the  offence  of  sodomy  is  not  as distinguishable when it comes to lesbian sex. At worst, it is categorised as an act of ‘gross indecency’ (S377D).  One  of  the  more  obvious  reasons  for  the  intersecting  ‘Syariah’  and  ‘secular’ standards  of  sexual  morality  is  their  religious  origins,  one  Islamic,  the  other Christian. Like many religious  traditions globally,  the  two have come to  inherit certain positions about sexual propriety, which are not necessarily grounded in the  sacred  texts but  yet have  come  to be  embedded  in  their discourses. Under various conditions – in this instance, the politicisation of Islam – these have been pushed to the forefront, taking precedence over the broader guiding principles of these faiths (e.g. love, justice, equality, peace, compassion, dignity).   How then have these  laws – and their sexual values – come to be portrayed as vastly dissimilar? The answer lies in a deliberate state effort to project ‘Syariah’ 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as the authoritative reference on threats to social and moral order.315 Taking the Film Censorship Guidelines 2010, as an example, apart from a list of prohibitions relating to sexuality, what stands‐out are  its strong Islamic undercurrents even though this  is not a religious document.  In  fact,  its overall  thrust  is  in  line with what the Federal state dictates as official Islam, which in turn reinforces a very narrow view of how Muslims should understand their faith.316 This includes how sexuality should be experienced.   These film guidelines also bear close resemblance to JAKIM’s Islamic Guidelines for Entertainment 2009,317 a policy based on a National Fatwa Council decree in 1981 that declared as haram (prohibited), the mingling of sexes as well as songs and  performances  that  are  ‘obscene’  or  lead  to  maksiat  (vice).  Though  the religious guidelines focuses on non‐cinematographic entertainment, the striking parallels with its ‘secular’ equivalent raise questions about their relationship.   Some JAKIM officials have even claimed state agencies like the Film Censorship Board as products of an Islamic value system.318 History tells a different story. If at  all,  the  constant  across  time  has  been  the  objective  of  regulating  morality, whether this has been under British rule or Independence. In fact, one of the first 
                                                        315 This, however, is not the Federal state’s first attempt at imposing Islamic moral standards for the entire population. In 1982, the Religious Division in the Prime Minister’s Department was commissioned to look into ‘a law of humanities, a sort of moral code along Islamic lines’. The main difference was the instruction that this be done taking into account the other religions. Nothing came of this initiative, possibly because it was too politically sensitive (‘Government may scrap plan for Morals Law’, The Star, 14 Dec 1982). 316 For details, see Section 2.2 ‘Keagamaan’ (Religion). 317 JAKIM (2009), ‘Garis Panduan Hiburan Dalam Islam (Islamic Entertainment Guidelines)’, <http://www.islam.gov.my/portal/lihat.php?jakim=3710>, Accessed: 11 Feb 2009. 318 Md Zaki Abd Manan, Hasnan Kasan and Mohd Zamir Bahall (1999), ‘Pembangunan Islam di Malaysia’, JAKIM website, <http://www.islam.gov.my/portal/lihat.php?jakim=464>, Accessed: 11 May 2010 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‘protectors’ of local moral sensibilities was a British administrator, T.M. Hussey. Serving  as  the Official  Censor  in 1925,  his  decree  that Western  films depicting ‘dress  immodesty’  were  ‘harmful  to  Eastern  audiences’  (Stevenson,  1974:215) may  easily  be  mistaken  today  as  coming  from  the  Syariah  lobby.  Indeed, attempts  to  give  the  Film  Censorship  Board  and  its  guidelines  –  or  any  other sexual  regulations  for  that matter  –  an  ‘Islamic’  façade  standout when  viewed against the colonial origins of moral statutes.  




musahaqah or cross‐dressing were considered sinful at the time.   Instead,  the  draft  contained  a  number  of  provisions  that  bore  an  uncanny resemblance to those in the Indian Penal Code that had been adopted earlier in 1871.320 Among them, ‘Taking away a married woman’ (S498 of the Penal Code), ‘Inducing  women  to  have  improper  intercourse’  (S493),  and  ‘Outraging  the modesty of a woman by words or otherwise’ (S509). Bearing in mind that some of these provisions have remained under present day SCO legislation – which in turn  are  portrayed  as  God‐given  and  hence  immutable  –  it  is  instructive  to consider how else this overlap happened.   Although this publication was officially credited to Raja Suleiman Raja Muda of Selangor – he later became its ruler – it is plausible that it was also inspired by Christian ideas through others who were either directly or indirectly involved in its  production.  Raja  Suleiman  was  reputedly  a  pious  man  who  wrote  Islamic textbooks  for  schools.  As  well,  he  gained  fame  later  in  life  for  his  efforts  at promoting religious education in Selangor and for introducing the appointment of a State kadi  and assistant.321 While not discounting  these achievements,  it  is worth highlighting that if he were responsible for compiling this draft legislation,                                                         319 Zina was possibly omitted because this was dealt with under a separate law against adultery among Muslims, also passed in 1894. On the other hand, khalwat was a creation only in the early 20th century, as pointed out in Chapter 3. 320 It is unclear when work on this draft began but the year it was published (1894) was the same year that the earliest ‘Muhammadan’ moral law on adultery was adopted. Several of its provisions on women and morality later appeared in the Muhammadan Laws Enactment 1904 – the first ‘full‐fledged’ Islamic offences statute in the colony. These continue to exist, although in different variations, up till today. 321 He also opened the first Malay girls school in Bandar Langat in 1895 (Gullick, 1998:131‐133). 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the prince would only have been in his late‐20s at the time, a remarkable feat for someone his age.  It  is perhaps more conceivable  that others around him could have influenced his thinking.  One person likely to have had a bearing on his views was his English teacher, a clergyman.322  Although  the  extent  to  which  the  prince  and  the  chaplain exchanged ideas about religious standards of decency cannot be confirmed, the former would have been exposed to some amount of Christian moral  teachings studying under the reverend. After all, one of the expressed aims of the British in facilitating such classes for sons of the royalty was character building according to Victorian values.323 Moreover, the draft had the stamp of another English man, W.C. Kemp, an Assistant Magistrate in Kuala Lumpur, who was responsible for its translation. His involvement might explain how some of the proposed provisions appeared with near identical wording to the equivalent in the Penal Code.   In the same manner, other British officials had varying degrees of influence over what eventually passed as ‘Islamic’ law during their administration. Roff (1974) notes the role of W.A. Graham, British Adviser to Kelantan,  in shaping religious regulations  there.  As  well,  though  the  FMS  rulers  spent  two  years  jointly deliberating  the  first  Muslim  offence  bill  with  British  officials,  this  had  to  go 
                                                        322 Raja Suleiman was said to be keen to learn English when he was in his early twenties. Having seen what the British had done in Perak, he pushed them to set‐up a similar school for the ‘Raja class’ in Selangor. This ran from December 1890 to January 1894 (Watson Andaya and Andaya, 2001:232). See also Gullick, 1998:132. 323 Watson Andaya and Andaya, 2001:232. 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through the hands of the British Legal Adviser before it was finalised and passed as legislation.324  More  than a  century  later,  there  continues  to be  little  to  separate  ‘Islamic’  and ‘secular’ moral legislation. Besides common ‘religious’ motivations and historical origins, one other explanation for the likeness between these laws lies with those responsible for their passage. Whether Muslim or non‐Muslim, operating at the Federal  or  State  legislature,  representing  the  ruling  party  or  opposition,  few lawmakers have dared to venture away from what is generally believed to be the public  hierarchy of moral  evils.  This  includes  adhering  to  rhetoric  that  stricter sexual  regulation,  which  will  preserve  traditional  or  ‘Islamic’  values,  are  a prerequisite to curb negative Western influence.   A comparison of Parliamentary debates over S377 and the SCO legislation makes this  point.325  Although  there  are  some  differences  in  how  these  debates transpired  –  for  example,  the  latter  involved more  religious  justifications  and were  coated with  UMNO‐PAS  type  accusations  –  there were  also  a  number  of commonalities.   
                                                        324 While notices of FMS enactments were seldom issued unless the laws went through the State Legal Adviser, the practice was more lax in the Unfederated Malay States (Willer, 1975:102‐103). Worth noting here, as the FMS British Legal Adviser pointed out, far from being Islamic, laws like the 1904 Muhammadan Offences Enactment ‘contain[ed] only what the native Rulers have practically agreed about and desire’ (ibid.:98). 325 Although S377 was amended in 1989 and 2006, there was less debate about ‘unnatural’ offences in Parliament in the latter year. The bulk of attention on sexual offences focused on the issue of marital rape. Members of the House appeared to take their cue from the Select Committee which had set the tone by not criminalising consensual ‘sexual connection by object’, and prioritised the discussion of other matters as well. 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For example, during  the 1989 House question  time,  the Member of Parliament from Arau (Shahidan Kassim)326 argued for bestiality to be struck off the statute books, joking that the act could never be proven because the ‘victim’, an animal, could  not  provide  evidence.  He  was  chastised  for  his  comments  by  a  fellow representative  but  not  for mocking  the  proceedings.  Rather,  he was  told  to  be more  discreet  given  the  ‘easily  corruptible minds’  of  schoolchildren  observing from the gallery, a refrain more reminiscent of pre‐19th century England.327   This incident is reflective of how uncomfortable (or disinterested) many Federal legislators were with the subject of sex, just as they and their State counterparts appeared to be when the ‘Syariah’ sexual offences provisions were debated. The support  for  the  proposal  to  criminalise  ‘unnatural’  sex  cut  across  the  religious divide. When the Muslim MP from Arau implored the House to leave out oral sex from the bill, it was his non‐Muslim female colleague who stood up to challenge him.  After  she  questioned  his  defence  of  ‘unnatural’  sex  and  cited  the  bill  as necessary to protect local values from Western ones, he very quickly apologised and changed his tune.328   There  was  no  break  in  the  ranks,  however,  when  it  came  to  what  these politicians  thought  of  sexual  marginals.  The  openness  the  Arau  MP  showed towards oral sex for heterosexuals, for example, did not extend to the desires of 
                                                        326 He later served for many years as Chief Minister of Perlis. 327 See Hansard, Seventh Parliament, Third Session, Vol. III, No. 13, Thurs 23 Mac 1989, 2290. 328 He initially argued that banning non‐consensual oral sex was unnecessary because no man would take the risk of having his penis bitten off by forcing it into the mouth of an unwilling recipient. In a consensual relationship, his concern was to avoid a situation where an unhappy partner who had willingly engaged in oral sex could later use this law to blackmail his or her partner. ibid., 2297‐98. 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those with heterodox sexualities. Just like other State lawmakers had done when debating  the SCO enactments, he had no qualms berating  the pondan  (male‐to‐female trans) community, and called for the law to punish them for their part in the spread of AIDS.329   
When politics trumps ‘Syariah’ The Ninth Schedule (Article 74) of the Federal Constitution empowers States to enact a separate set of laws for Muslims, including the ‘creation and punishment of  offences  by  persons  professing  the  religion  of  Islam  against  the  precepts  of that religion’. However, it also limits these powers to matters falling outside the Federal  list.330  In  recent  years,  it  has  become  increasingly  apparent  that  a number of  sexual offences, which should  fall within  the  jurisdiction of  ‘secular’ law and courts, have been duplicated under  ‘Syariah’. All  the new sexual acts – and  many  of  the  older  ones  –  prohibited  by  the  SCO  laws  are  thus unconstitutional because they are already under the purview of the Penal Code or other Federal criminal statutes.331  A  situation of  overlapping  jurisdiction  for offences  like  incest,  prostitution and pimping  had  already  surfaced  much  earlier  through  the  original  AMLE. Nevertheless,  since  there was  little dispute over which  legal  or  judicial  system had  jurisdiction over  these offences  –  they were overwhelmingly  addressed as ‘secular’  crimes  –  they  went  by  unnoticed  by  most.  In  large  part,  this  has continued to be the case even after the adoption of the SCO legislation. Though                                                         329 Hansard, Seventh Parliament, Third Session, Vol. III, No. 14, Fri, 24 Mac 1989, 2520‐21. 330 The Constitution qualifies the jurisdiction of Syariah courts by confining it to offences involving Muslims that are not already dealt with by Federal law. 331 Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 2002:9. 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this law introduced even more sanctions against sexual transgressions that were already  criminalised  under  Federal  law,  the  creation  of  these  new  ‘Islamic’ offences  has  remained  non‐contentious  because  they  have  mainly  existed  on paper. Few have recognised this discrepancy332 much less challenge it in court.  In 1998, a case was filed against the government for allegedly contravening the constitutionally guaranteed powers of the Syariah court.333 Better known as one of several men implicated in the first sodomy trial of Malaysia’s  former Deputy Prime  Minister  Anwar  Ibrahim,  Sukma  Darmawan  Sasmitaat  Madja  had  been sentenced to six months imprisonment by the Sessions Court for his role in this episode.334  Sukma  later  contested  this  decision  stating  that  as  a  Muslim,  he should have been tried under a Syariah court.   The High Court dismissed his application – a decision upheld later by the Court of  Appeal  and  the  Federal  Court335  –  on  two  grounds.  Firstly,  that  the  Syariah court  did  not  have  ‘inherent  jurisdiction’  in  matters  where  an  offence  was covered by both civil and ‘Islamic law’,336 and secondly, that despite being found 
                                                        332 One of the few notable exceptions is Abdul Hamid Mohamad, the former Chief Justice. Besides recognising this problem, he supports merging Syariah and Civil courts so that all disputes will be heard before a Syariah and Civil court judge (2002:10‐12). 333 Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 742 (HC). It needs remembering that ten years earlier, the Constitution had been amended through Article 121(1A) to prohibit Civil courts from exercising ‘jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts’. This was deemed necessary to prevent aggrieved parties from turning to the High Court whenever a Syariah court decision was not in their favour. 334 See the next chapter for more details of this case, and the second sodomy trial that Anwar is currently facing. The latter is largely seen as a ploy to skittle Anwar’s chances of contesting again in the 13th General Election, after his party and the PR coalition enjoyed tremendous gains in the 2008 polls. 335 See Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (CA); and 2 MLJ 241 (FC). 336 It argued that Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution did not apply in this case because a Syariah Court only had jurisdiction over Muslims for offences that Federal law conferred upon it 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guilty of engaging in anal sex, Sukma was ultimately charged for allowing himself to be sodomised,  i.e.  an act of  ‘gross  indecency’ under  the Penal Code’s S377D. This  charge,  it  was  argued,  was  different  to  and  thus  incomparable  with  the provision of the SCOA that governs the crime of liwat (S25). As such, the Sessions Court was judged to have acted within its jurisdictional boundaries.  This  case holds  significance on  several  grounds.  For  one,  it  represented  a  rare occasion where a layperson questioned the civil court’s authority over a criminal case involving a Muslim. Importantly too, the judges at all three courts he turned to – the High Court, Court of Appeal and Federal Court – concurred that a Syariah court’s  jurisdiction  over  criminal  matters  is  restricted  to  offences  that  do  not overlap with  Federal  law.  Their  decision  confirmed  that with  the  exception  of 
zina, muqaddimah zina and khalwat, all  the other  ‘Offences relating to decency’ listed under  the SCO  legislation can be regarded as unconstitutional and hence unenforceable.337   Even more striking, this decision went against a national trend of supporting the advancement of Syariah. In particular, it contradicts efforts to empower Syariah courts  including  through  Article  121(1A)  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  which sought  to  give  them  the  last  say  in  judicial  matters  affecting  Muslims. Considering also that jurisdictional tensions are fraught whenever there is a legal 
                                                                                                                                                              (Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 742 (HC)). See also Farid Sufian et.al, 2001; Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 2002; Ahmad Fairuz, 2006. 337 Besides zina, muqaddimah zina and khalwat, the other religious offences that legitimately fall under Syariah court jurisdiction include drinking alcohol, not fasting during Ramadhan, and not attending Friday prayers. 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case involving a Muslim and non‐Muslim,338 it  is striking that the Federal Court bench  had  ruled  that  if  two  such  men  were  caught  for  liwat,  they  should  be charged  under  the  Penal  Code.  This  was  further  rationalised  by  saying  that Syariah officers only have the authority to  investigate offences where everyone involved, including the witnesses, are Muslim.339  The fact that the case appeared to have been lost on a technicality – i.e. that no conflict of jurisdiction was deemed to have occurred because the civil offence of ‘gross  indecency’ was  not  the  same  as  the  ‘Islamic’  crime  of  liwat  –  is  equally baffling.  After  being  publicly maligned  for  his  supposed  homosexual  activities, Sukma was not convicted under the provisions that dealt directly with anal sex (i.e. S377A and S377B of the Penal Code) because regardless of whether or not the act was consensual, the law only punishes the perpetrator.340   This, as argued earlier,  is  the result of  the colonial  legacy. But  it also has  to do with how lawmakers today continue to understand sexual relations between two men  the  same way  that  they  perceive  heterosexual  sex,  i.e.  that  one  has  to  be dominant and the other submissive. Perhaps too, this outcome was influenced by the  implications  it  potentially  had  on  the  larger  proceedings  out  of  which  the case began, Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy trial. Had Sukma succeeded, his case would have opened up Pandora’s box for Anwar’s trial. Whichever the reason, one thing                                                         338 As indicated earlier, there is a long history behind the conflict of jurisdiction between Syariah and civil courts. This was initially contained to civil matters such as apostasy and child custody, but in recent times, under pressure of ‘Syariahtisation’, the contestations have grown even louder and also spilt over into the criminal realm (see for example Abdul Hamid Mohamad, 2002). 339 [2004] CLJ, (ISL). 340 In 1989, an opposition Member of Parliament (P. Patto, Ipoh) had asked the Deputy Minister tabling the bill on amendments to S377 about this. She claimed that it was clear that the law treated both perpetrator and perpetrated the same (See Hansard, Seventh Parliament, Third Session, Vol. III, No. 14, Fri, 24 Mac 1989, 2524‐25, 2529). 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certain was the way  in which this court challenge – and  its  implications on the question  of  legal  jurisdiction  of  Syariah  criminal  laws  and  courts  –  was noticeably played down by the local media.341  









Regulated Sexualities: ‘Unnatural’ encounters with the law  Any  analysis  of  the  regime  that  regulates  sexuality  in  Malaysia  is  incomplete without  knowing  how  the  rules  it  produces  for  this  purpose  translate  and impinge  on  people’s  daily  lives.  It  may  be  that  the  laws  and  state‐generated discourses  promote  and  impose  a  narrow  definition  of  sexuality  in  order  to compel  heteronormativity.  But  how  has  this  impacted  on  those  who  are seemingly targeted for regulation? Specifically, how have sexual marginals been affected? And how have they responded?  This chapter will contend that rather than resembling a well thought‐out plan of control, much less a concerted morals campaign, the instances in which the state has flexed its muscles over sexuality have been varied. This is true particularly in the  case  of  sexual  marginals  where  the  pattern  is  selective  and  haphazard. Determined by many  factors,  of which Syariahtisation plays  an  important  role, such encounters are shown to be more frequent and painful for some but not for others. The chapter will also argue that despite the irregular enforcement of the law,  its  tentacles  of  control  have  been  persuasive  –  even  more  so  backed  by ‘Islamic’  credentials  –  resulting  in many,  especially within  the  gay  and  lesbian community, regulating their own sexualities out of fear of persecution.  There are two main parts to this chapter. The first will establish how efforts to prosecute  ‘unnatural’  sex have unfolded  for men  and women who  engage  –  or 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The ‘gay’ experience Without a doubt, the most high profile court case in Malaysia involving a charge of  ‘unnatural’  sex was  the  first  ‘sodomy’  trial  of  former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.344 Lasting  for almost  two years (Nov 1998 to Aug 2000),  there were  two different  but  related parts  to  his  trial,  the  first  for  corruption which resulted  in him being sentenced  to six years  imprisonment, and  the second  for sodomy,  which  added  another  nine  years  to  his  jail  time.345  Many  Malaysians may  have  expected  Anwar’s  dismissal  given  the  months  of  public  acrimony leading  up  to  this  incident  between  him  and  then  Prime  Minister  Mahathir Mohamad,  ostensibly  over  economic  policy  differences.  Few,  however,  were prepared  for  the  vehement  onslaught  of  allegations  of  sexual misconduct  that were  hurled  at  the  man  previously  hailed  as  Mahathir’s  hand‐picked successor,346 much less the ferocious attack on homosexuality.347                                                          344 Anwar is currently undergoing another hearing, nicknamed Sodomy II for its close resemblance to his first court case. See below for details. 345 In the first part of this trial (Nov 1998 to Apr 1999), Anwar was found guilty on four counts of corruption, each about him supposedly abusing his powers as the then Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister to conceal allegations of sodomy and sexual impropriety. In the second (Jun 1999 to Aug 2000), he was sentenced for sodomising Azizan Abu Bakar, his former family driver, an act he allegedly committed with his adopted brother, Sukma Darmawan Samaastit Madja (Anwar in the dock: A crisis unfolds: Timeline’, BBC News, 8 Aug 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/asia‐pacific/521608.stm>, Accessed: 10 Aug 2000). In the lead‐up to this trial, Sukma and another man, Munawar Anees, an ex‐speechwriter for Anwar, were tried separately and given a six‐month jail term after admitting that they allowed Anwar to sodomise them.  346 At the height of the witch‐hunt, Anwar was looking at five counts of sodomy. Besides Sukma, Munawar and Azizan, the other two men implicated were fashion designer Mior Abdul Razak Yahya and Azmin Ali, Anwar’s private secretary. Except for Azizan, all the other men later claimed that their confessions had been coerced during under duress (‘Anwar’s ‘confessors’ charged’, BBC News, 23 Apr 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐pacific/326584.stm>, Accessed: 24 Apr 1999). 347 Amongst others, the fanning of homophobia resulted in the formation of PASRAH (Pergerakan 
Sukarela Rakyat Anti­Homoseksual, the People’s Anti‐Homosexual Volunteers Movement), which vowed to stamp‐out homosexuals in Malaysia. A founding member, Ibrahim Ali, then UMNO supreme council member – who is better known today as the leader of Perkasa, an ultra‐right Malay nationalist outfit that is also a critical part of the Syariah lobby – stepped down from the 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Anwar  maintained  his  innocence  throughout  but  the  prosecution  and  media went  to  town  about  his  sex  life.348  The  irregularities  of  his  court  trials notwithstanding,  the  point  here  is  the  significance  of  the  grounds  for  his indictment, i.e. committing ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’. This had much greater impact because the view that homosexuality was an abhorrent and  ‘abnormal’ practice adopted from the West had already been promoted for some time through the Asian values rhetoric. By manipulating  the homophobic sentiments that this discourse had help sow, attempts to discredit him as a sex offender and defend his removal from office were more persuasive. As Mahathir was  to  justify  his  actions  years  later:  ‘Imagine  a  gay  prime  minister.  Nobody would be safe.’349  Though  Malaysians  are  currently  being  subjected  to  another  ‘sodomy’  trial featuring  Anwar  –  this  time  involving  his  former  political  aide  Saiful  Bukhari Azlan350 – the  impact of having such a charge  levelled at him for a second time appears  more  subdued.  A  saga  of  epic  proportions,  the  first  trial  produced                                                                                                                                                               organisation’s leadership not long after. He declined to say why but it is likely that Mahathir’s lukewarm response to PASRAH was one reason. See ‘Anti‐gay campaign raises fears’, BBC News, World: Asia‐Pacific, 30 Oct 1998, <http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐pacific/204934.stm>, Accessed: 31 Oct 1998, and ‘Ibrahim backs out of anti‐gay group’, The Sun, 25 Oct 1998. 348 Anwar believed he was sacked for disagreeing with Mahathir on how to deal with the fall‐out of the Asian financial crisis. He also alleged he was the victim of a smear campaign to cover‐up and prevent him from exposing the trail of cronyism and corruption within the government (Trowell, 2005:15). 349 September 2005, cited in ‘Mahathir in his own words’, BBC News, 27 Jan 2006, <http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐pacific/3198105.stm>, Accessed: 26 Aug 2008. During the trial period, he had accused Anwar of having ‘hoodwinked the whole nation’ with his semblance of religiosity, and that he could never lead the nation because he displayed ‘strange behaviour’ and had no control over his libido (cited in Trowell, 2005:17). 350 Twenty‐three at the time of the alleged incident, Saiful made this accusation at the end of June 2008. The timing was uncanny, coming just a few months after the historic victory of opposition parties at the 12th General Election in Malaysia, and Anwar’s subsequent announcement that he had garnered sufficient support from BN MPs to form a new government. 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tremendous public discourse on sex and sexuality, and gave sodomy a visibility unprecedented in the country’s history. Similar heights of infamy are missing in the  second  trial.  This  is  perhaps  due  also  to  the  fact  that  Anwar  had  his  first sodomy conviction overturned by a three‐member bench of the Federal Court in 2004.351 Two years later, state prosecutors abruptly dropped the charge against Sukma  Darmawan  as  well,  jailed  for  allegedly  letting  Anwar  sodomise  him.352 These two decisions reinforced suspicions that the charges in 1998 – regardless of whether there was any element of truth in them – were politically motivated to facilitate Anwar’s removal from power.353   The  trials  of Anwar  (Part  I  and  II)  and Sukma have been  significant  in making even  more  public,  state‐sanctioned  homophobia  and  heterosexism.  However, perhaps of greater importance as argued in Chapter 4, Sukma’s also exposed how despite  all  that  is  said and done  to promote  ‘Syariah’  as  supreme, both he and Anwar  were  tried  under  the  ‘secular’  Penal  Code.  In  his  current  court  case, Anwar was allowed to seek recourse through the Syariah legal system, but only 
                                                        351 After serving six years in jail, the country’s apex court exonerated Anwar of sodomising Azizan Abu Bakar following a 2‐1 ruling in favour of his appeal. It reached this decision after finding the latter – whose testimony resulted in Anwar’s conviction – to be an unreliable witness. Amongst others, Azizan had claimed that he was Anwar’s ‘homosexual slave’ in court only to recant his statement several days later (‘Witness throws Anwar trial into confusion’, BBC News, 7 Dec 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐pacific/229342.stm>, Accessed: 10 Dec 1998). Importantly, though Anwar’s sodomy charges were dropped, the corruption charges were not, despite the two being linked. Under Malaysian law, this meant that Anwar could not return to Parliament until April 2008, preventing him from contesting in the 12th General Election. 352 Sukma was scheduled to have a second trial after the Court of Appeal overturned his initial conviction for being ‘manifestly unsafe’. However, the government decided not to pursue the matter saying that ‘it was inappropriate in the public interest to proceed’ (‘Anwar vindicated as charge against brother is dropped’, Straits Times, 7 Nov 2006, p4). 353 As one ex‐Cabinet Minister put it (referring to Anwar’s first trial), ‘It [didn’t] make sense. No court of law would have accepted it [the evidence]. And because of that, I believe that one of the biggest issues that the government faces today is the issue of credibility’ (Interview with ‘Sal’, 5 Jun 2009). 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for his qadf (false accusation) complaint against Saiful to be heard.354 In the end, after  a  delay  of  almost  nine  months,  the  Syariah  High  Court  threw  out  his application,  ruling  that  it  was  ‘frivolous’  and  ‘an  abuse  of  the  Islamic  justice system’.355   None of  these were regular cases given their political context and  implications. Nevertheless, it is significant that the State with the largest number of religious enforcers, the FT, had only one case of liwat recorded for the first six months of 2008.356  Kelantan,  with  its  reputation  for  draconian  moral  laws,  has  never prosecuted any man  for  this offence either. As  a  senior official  of  the Kelantan Syariah Judiciary Department pointed out, he had never heard of a single case of 




 As  a  quick  aside,  it  bears  noting  that  in  the  application  of  S377,  the  cases highlighted in the media have largely been about non‐consensual acts of sodomy or fellatio. From 1990 to 2010, there were at least 30 such incidents reported in the press. Almost all were about adult men sodomising under‐aged children or forcing them to engage in oral sex.358 Non‐consensual acts of sodomy are in effect anal rape, and when committed on minors, deserve redress by the state. Instead they  are  misleadingly  reported  and  wrongly  treated  as  ‘unnatural’  sex  crimes because that is how the legislators – past and present – have deemed it.  While  the  application  of  the  Syariah  liwat  provision  –  or musahaqah  for  that matter  – has been  rare,  this does not mean  that Muslim men and women who have same‐sex relations do not understand or feel its presence. As a gay Muslim respondent  pointed  out,  the  dominant  state‐sanctioned  ‘Islamic’  discourse  on sexual  morality  that  frames  homosexuality  as  unacceptable,  has  kept  many people in line.359 Two lesbians who participated in this research concurred that while they did not know the details of the musahaqah provision in the SCO law, they understood that this was haram (prohibited), and accordingly, were careful not to flaunt their sexual identities. Explaining how she reconciled her sexuality and faith,  ‘Melissa’ said,  ‘It’s against my religion I acknowledge so. But it  is also who I am and I know that I’m a good person’. Where efforts to regulate sexuality 
                                                        358 Moreover, when the police noted the seriousness of the rise in the rate of sexual crimes ‘against the order of nature’, they acknowledged that this was not due to its numbers – it was nowhere close to the thousands of rape cases that have been reported – but in the age of its victims, the bulk of whom were under‐18 (‘Unnatural sex crimes rise’, The Sun, 17 Jun 2009). 359 With the state’s backing, this discourse has also encouraged non‐state actors to help police morality, often with disastrous consequences as shown later (Interview with ‘Bobby’, 12 Aug 2009). 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were  concerned,  she added,  ‘[I]t’s  really between  the person and God, because they  will  be  judged  by  God.  Under  no  circumstances  are  these  people  [the authorities] suppose to judge us and penalise us…’ 360  
The ‘lesbian’ experience When another round of allegations of ‘unnatural’ sex hit the Malaysian public in 2002,  this  time  implicating  another  rising  star  in UMNO, Azalina Othman Said, some wondered if she too would suffer the same fate as Anwar. Head of its new women’s  youth  wing,  Puteri  UMNO,  and  a  member  of  the  party’s  Supreme Council, rumours of Azalina being a lesbian had been in circulation for some time before the pro‐establishment Malay daily, Berita Harian, confronted her about it in 2001 interview. She denied this outright361 but the allegations returned a year later, this time supposedly with proof.  Like  Anwar,  Azalina  had  been  chosen  by  Mahathir  to  rise  to  greater  heights within  the party.  Like Anwar  too, Khalid  Jeffri,  the man who had  authored  the book  that  subsequently  led  to  the politician’s  downfall, 50 Dalil Kenapa Anwar 
Tidak Boleh Menjadi Perdana Menteri  (50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister), was  responsible  for exposing Azalina as a  lesbian  through his weekly  tabloid  Perdana  Sari.362  Another  common  denominator  was  Ummi Hafilda Ali, one of the primary prosecution witnesses in Anwar’s first trial. Just as                                                         360 Interview on 14 Nov 2009. 361 When asked, Azalina replied that these suspicions arose because she refused to conform to the stereotype of an ideal woman, i.e. married and feminine (‘Tuduhan lesbian tidak berasas: Azalina’, Berita Harian, 24 Apr 2001). 362 Apart from exposing Azalina’s sexual orientation, the tabloid reported that the former had used Puteri UMNO funds to buy a RM300,000 luxury car for her partner (‘Perdana Sari: Kami ada bukti dakwaan Azalina lesbian’, Malaysiakini, 27 Apr 2002, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news /11237>, Accessed: 20 Aug 2008). 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she had made Anwar’s  conviction her personal mission,  she vowed  to  see  that Azalina would  be  charged  in  court.363  The  similarities  between  the  two  cases, however, ended there.  Unlike Anwar, Azalina still had the benefit of Mahathir’s patronage when news of her  sexual  preference  broke.364  Initially,  Mahathir  responded  by  reiterating UMNO’s  stand on homosexuality:  ‘We do not accept  this kind of  culture.  If  you are  involved  in  that  kind  of  thing  –  out  you  go.’365  Speaking  at  the  inaugural General Assembly of Puteri UMNO over a month later, however, he also issued a veiled warning to those who had accused his protégée of sexual impropriety and corruption,  instructing  them  to  cease  their attacks.366 The  tabloid Perdana Sari never resumed production again after its publication permit was suspended for three months.367 As well,  there were no  further exposés about Azalina’s  sexual life368  right  up  till  she  fell  from  grace  following  Abdullah  Ahmad  Badawi’s departure from office.369                                                          363 ‘Ummi wants ‘justice’ for Anwar, no double standard in Azalina case’, Malaysiakini, 29 Sept 2002, <www.malaysiakini.com/news/13159>, Accessed: 30 Oct 2002. 364 These attacks were said to have come from within UMNO, by those unhappy with her sudden rise to power (‘UMNO rising star fights smear campaign’, Straits Times, 27 Apr 2001). 365 ‘Ummi wants ‘justice’ for Anwar, no double standard in Azalina case’, Malaysiakini, 29 Sept 2002, <www.malaysiakini.com/news/13159>, Accessed: 30 Oct 2002. 366 ‘UMNO chief tells dissidents in Puteri to cease fire’, Malaysiakini, 2 Nov 2002, <www.malaysiakini.com /news/13543>, Accessed: 4 Nov 2002. 367 The tabloid’s suspension was not attributed to the pieces it ran on Azalina but blamed on another story it had published titled ‘Sex on Campus’ (‘Déjà vu, Azalina?’ Thinking Allowed, 
Aliran Monthly, Issue 4, 2002). 368 Rumours continued to circulate, however, and there was even a blog titled ‘Azalina Wild Wild World’ set up just before the 2008 General Election, complete with stories and photos of her partner and various corruption allegations aimed at preventing her re‐election. This failed. She was returned to the parliamentary seat of Pengerang (Johor) unopposed. 369 After Mahathir stepped down as Prime Minister, Azalina had the backing of his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The same cannot be said of her relationship with the present Prime Minister, Najib Razak, who very quickly ejected her out of Cabinet once he assumed power. Her exclusion from the Executive body is more commonly attributed to her connection to graft charges (‘Azalina prepared to be called by MACC’, The Nutgraph, 12 Mac 2009, <http://www.the nutgraph.com/azalina‐prepared‐to‐be‐called‐by‐macc/>, Accessed: 12 Mac 2009). 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The fate of other heterodox ‘women’ and ‘men’ The authorities have not been as tolerant of other ‘women’ who are perceived as explicitly  challenging  dominant  sexual  and  gender  norms.  At  the  end  of  1996, against a backdrop of the Asian values discourse and its homophobic messages, and  the  moral  panics  about  delinquent  youth  and  societal  chaos,  the  nation discovered  a  story  about  ‘the  woman  who  shook  the  nation’  (tan,  1999:289). This  was  about  a  23  year‐old  ‘woman’,  ‘Azizah’,  who  had  been  arrested  and charged for impersonating as a man.370  As  the news unfurled,  it became apparent  that  ‘Azizah’s’ real  crime was  that of crossing  over  into  the  realm  of  heterosexual  male  privilege  by marrying  ‘her’ girlfriend Rohana. As I have argued elsewhere, the aspersions that were cast on ‘her’  character  in various news reports went a  long way  in painting  ‘Azizah’ as the demonic Other.371 Even after being convicted, the press continued to pursue ‘her’  story  to  give  it  the  fitting  finale,  one which  captured  ‘her’  as  a  reformed 
                                                        370 When detained, ‘Azizah’ was using the moniker ‘Man’, an abbreviated Malay male name that ‘she’ had adopted after switching gender identities some years earlier. Despite this, the authorities and the media chose to refer to ‘her’ as a woman, and called ‘her’ ‘Azizah’ rather than ‘Man’. For this reason, I refer to Man here as ‘Azizah’ even though I recognise that he is not a woman but a female‐to‐male trans. 371 See tan, 1999. Over a series of news reports, readers were told how ‘Azizah’, hailing from southern Thailand (i.e. ‘she’ was not a real Malay), and raised by an aunt, was a working class ‘woman’ with a troubled youth. Still, ‘she’ was ‘normal’ until ‘she’ suffered a broken marriage to a man who left ‘her’ with a child (whom ‘she’ subsequently abandoned). ‘She’ was untrustworthy because ‘she’ had duped the kadi and two male witnesses into solemnising ‘her’ marriage. Statements by Rohana, ‘her’ wife, asserting that she had no idea ‘Azizah’ was not a real man, together with evidence of condoms, a dildo and lubricant found in their home, were all shared to portray ‘Azizah’, as a deviant pseudo‐man. Significantly, ‘Azizah’ was never given a chance to rebut any of this. If ‘she’ had, readers would have heard about the couple’s eight‐year relationship, and how it was Rohana’s idea to get married. ‘Azizah’ had only agreed to prevent Rohana’s family from marrying her off to someone else. 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woman  –  read:  heterosexual  and normal  –  since  ‘she’  had  repented  in  jail  and had asked for God’s forgiveness.372   Years  later,  in  January 2005, another story  like  ‘Azizah’ and Rohana’s appeared in  a  daily Malay  tabloid.  The marriage  between  Zaiton  and Mohd  Sofian  (who previously went  by  the  female  name  of Mazinah)  came  to  the  attention  of  the Melaka  religious  department  after  disgruntled  family  members  had  lodged  a complaint.373  Nothing more was  heard  about  this  until March  2007, when  the couple  was  compelled  to  appear  in  a  Syariah  Lower  Court  in  Melaka  and arraigned  under  S11  of  the  State’s  Islamic  Family  Law  Enactment,  2002  for having  contracted  an  illegal  marriage.374  Six  months  later,  after  investigations into  Sofian’s  gender  identity  were  over,  the  court  nullified  the  marriage  and ordered the couple to separate.375   Appearing almost a decade apart, a comparison of the two marriages –  ‘Azizah’ and  Rohana  versus  Sofian  and  Zaiton  –  is  helpful  in  showing  what  aspects  of same‐sex marriages  the authorities (and the media)  find objectionable. Beyond the  focus  on  their  ‘deviance’,376  the  portrayal  of  the  two  stories  diverged  in                                                         372 ‘Azizah mengharapkan keampunan dari keluarga’, Utusan Online, 5 May 1998, <http://www. utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=1998&dt=0505&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=gaya%5Fhidup&pg=ls_04.htm&arc=hive>, Accessed: 12 Dec 2007. 373 This was also the case with ‘Azizah ‘and Rohana where the latter’s father was the one who alerted the religious authorities about his daughter’s marriage. 374 The over two‐year delay was attributed to the authorities being unable to track down the couple’s whereabouts (‘Suami isteri sama jantina hadir dibicara’, Berita Harian, 13 Mac 2007). 375 Sofian had claimed to be born as intersex, i.e. with ambiguous female and male genitalia. A court‐ordered medical examination claimed that this was not the case (‘Couple in same‐sex marriage ordered to part’, NST, 4 Sept 2007, <http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/ Tuesday/National/2007090 4082913/Article/index_html>, Accessed: 4 Sept 2007). 376 Besides referring to Sofian’s manliness in the same derogatory manner as with ‘Azizah’, his first marriage in 1999 to another woman, which ended in a divorce four years later, was also raised as proof of his bad character (‘Jaim akan dakwa wanita lagak lelaki’, Harian Metro, 27 Jan 2005, p2). 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several  ways.  Although  both  wives  claimed  that  they  did  not  suspect  their respective  partners  to  be  women,  Zaiton  and  Sofian  continued  to  appear  in public as an amicable  couple,  including  turning up  for  their  final  court hearing together,  decked  in  matching  outfits.  Rohana,  on  the  other  hand,  distanced herself from ‘Azizah’ after publically denouncing the latter almost as soon as that story  broke.  The  papers  refused  to  call  ‘Azizah’  by  ‘her’  preferred male  name, ‘Man’; Sofian never had this problem though readers were occasionally reminded that he was previously a woman, Mazinah. ‘Azizah’ was sentenced within days of ‘her’  story  turning  into national news;  the attention on Sofian was spread over several months, hence reducing the intensity of attention on him. Although both had crossed‐dressed and were castigated for assuming male identities and roles, ‘Azizah’ encountered greater pressure to conform and return to womanhood.   It  is  uncertain why  ‘Azizah’  and  Sofian’s  stories were  differently  treated  but  a number  of  explanations  are  possible.  The  spotlight  on  the  former  could  have been due to the novel value that ‘her’ marriage presented at the time, it being the first  public  encounter  that  the  majority  of  Malaysians  would  have  had  with lesbianism,  what  more  an  alleged  lesbian  marriage.  As  noted,  ‘Azizah’  and Rohana’s  story  had  also  broken  in  a  period  of  great  anxiety  about  ‘social  ills’, particularly  those  involving  the younger generation.  ‘Azizah’s’  youth –  she was only in her early 20s, Sofian was already 40 – could have been another reason for the different intensity of attention ‘she’ received.  Though both  ‘Azizah’ and Sofian’s marriages were annulled,  the  latter  faced no additional  charges,  neither  in  the  Syariah  nor  the  civil  court.  Having  made  a 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ruling  on  the  grounds  that  Sofian was  technically  not  a man,  it  is  odd  that  the Islamic  authorities  did  not  re‐arrest  the  couple  and  charge  them  instead  for 
musahaqah,  as  provided  for  under  Melaka’s  SCO  enactment.  This  is  more remarkable considering the presiding judge had acknowledged this as a case of same‐sex marriage. For reasons that are unknown, the State Prosecutor said that whether  or  not  Sofian  and  Zaiton were  a  lesbian  couple was  ‘speculation’  and that the question had not arisen in court.377   Here  it  is  worth  recalling  that  ‘Azizah’  too  was  not  charged  under  ‘Syariah’ criminal law – her two‐year jail sentence was for impersonation and possession of  a  false  identity  card.378  Only  after  the  Sessions  Court  had  pronounced  its verdict did the Chief Kadi of Kelantan threaten to punish ‘Azizah’ under ‘Islamic’ law  as  well.  However,  rather  than  employing  the  musahaqah  provision  as provided for in the State’s SCO law, he wanted ‘her’ charged for impersonating as a  man  and  engaging  in  a  false  marriage.  In  the  end,  no  action  was  taken  in relation  to  the  former,  maybe  because  there  was  no  such  prohibition  against women who cross‐dressed in Kelantan’s religious laws. Nevertheless, the Syariah court  declared  the  marriage  null  and  void,379  just  as  it  did  with  Sofian  and Zaiton’s years later.                                                           377 Yet the judge had specifically pointed out that he had declared their marriage as haram to set a precedent and prevent such cases being repeated (‘Malaysia annuls marriage of two women’, 
Associated Press, 4 Sept 2007). 378 The first charge carried a maximum prison sentence of seven years so it is noteworthy that despite the adverse publicity around the case, the judge did not opt for a higher penalty. Further, although ‘Azizah’ could have had another two years added on to her jail sentence for the second charge, ‘she’ only received a three‐month penalty. Since both sentences were to be served concurrently, ‘she’ only had to spend two years in jail as opposed to potentially ten (Tan, 1999:302). 379 ‘Kadi Court annuls marriage of woman who posed as man’, The Star, 6 Mac 1997. 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Likewise,  the authorities  could have used S377D of  the Penal Code,  the  law on gross  indecency,  on  these  women.  As  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  this provision is phrased widely (and vaguely) enough to be a catchall for any or all other  forms of  ‘unnatural’  sex  that do not  fall under S377A. Significantly again, they did not choose to employ this approach.  There are a few ways to interpret these decisions. In the case of ‘Syariah’ law, the offence  of  musahaqah  requires  at  least  two  persons  to  come  forward  as witnesses  of  the  said  crime.380  This  evidentiary  requirement  could  have  been deemed as  too difficult  to meet  in both cases. On  the other hand,  some  Islamic officials feel that  in such instances,  it  is better to provide religious education to avert enforcement from being turned into a mockery. Others believe that simply passing a law – even if its enforcement is hard – is ‘good enough’ as it serves as a reminder of what is prohibited.381 Nevertheless, set at a maximum jail sentence of  four  months  and/or  a  fine  of  RM500  in  Kelantan  and  six  months  and/or RM1,000 in Melaka, the penalty for musahaqah could also have been regarded as too small to have a deterrent effect.382 This, however, does not really explain why S377D  of  the  Penal  Code which  imposes  a  prison  term  of  up  to  two  years  for ‘gross indecency’, was not invoked.   
                                                        380 It is even harder in the case of liwat where the testimony of four men is necessary. This sheds further light as to why the liwat provision has been undersubscribed to date. 381 Interview with ‘Rafidah’, law academic and high‐level religious official, 1 Jul 2009. 382 The punishment under the Melaka equivalent of this provision is only slightly higher capped at a six‐month jail sentence and/or a fine of RM1,000. 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It  is quite  instructive how  in  the country’s  two most public court cases  to date involving  sexually  transgressive  ‘women’,383  the authorities have chosen not  to utilise  legal  provisions  prohibiting  lesbian  sex  acts, whether  under  ‘secular’  or ‘Syariah’  law. Against  the uproar around  the pengkid  fatwa  towards  the end of 2008,384 it is even more significant that the court register of cases of women and ‘gross  indecency’  or  musahaqah  have  continued  to  remain  blank  till  today. Indeed, though there was a general  impression among the  lesbian and bisexual women  interviewed  for  this  study385  that  same‐sex  female  relations  was outlawed in Malaysia, none reported ever being detained or prosecuted for their sexual preferences or knowing anyone else who had been treated this way.386   While  this  may  be  so,  it  is  helpful  to  point  out  that  the  majority  of  those interviewed  were  fearful  of  what  would  happen  if  they  were  caught  for  their transgressive  behaviour.387  This  is  why  most,  particularly  among  the  middle class, prefer to keep their sexual  identities  to themselves or to a small circle of friends  or  supportive  family members.  Blending  in  by  appearing  ‘like  straight women’, e.g. not having  their hair short or not dressing and acting  ‘butch’, was one way they had been able to avoid encounters with the authorities. To them, 
                                                        383 The only other ‘memorable’ court hearing about a lesbian relationship occurred at the end of 1994. I have not included it here because this was a criminal case about a lesbian who was killed by her housemate/’lover’, rather than a case about ‘unnatural’ sex per se. A seven‐person jury eventually found the accused not guilty, believing that she had acted out of self‐defence to ward off the advances of the victim (See ‘Lesbian tried to rape me: Accused’, The Star, 15 Dec 1994, p17 and ‘Mate accused of killing lesbian freed’, Sunday Star, 18 Dec 1994, p6). 384 Details of this will be dealt with under Chapter 7. 385 The information here is drawn from my interviews with nine local lesbian/bisexual women, all Malay, middle class and urban‐based. 386 A few interviewees concurred that sex workers and transsexuals were more popular targets of the religious authorities. 387 Their main concern was how this would expose their sexual identity, which they believed would upset or offend their families, or jeopardise their careers. The few interviewees who were less concerned about the law tended to be those already open about being gay to their families. 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being  discreet was  key  to  societal  acceptance.388  As  one  female Muslim  sexual marginal put  it,  ‘As  long as we don’t rub it  in their  face,  they’re ok’,  though she also  admitted  that  people  were  even  more  comfortable  if  lesbians  kept  their sexual preferences to themselves (i.e. not mention it at all) or if they were going to  be  open  about  it,  to  ‘do  so  gradually’.389  Another  interviewee,  however, pointed out that as a Muslim woman, it was simply impossible for her to be ‘out’. This, she believed, would not be tolerated.   The  interest  sparked  by  the  ‘Azizah’  incident  barely  had  a  chance  to  simmer when a similar story appeared in the papers again. This involved a young male‐to‐female cross‐dresser, ‘Fauzi’ or Mek Zaimah. ‘Fauzi’ was allegedly only 15 and had  been  apprehended  because  ‘he’  was  about  to  marry  another  man.390 Different  to  ‘Azizah’,  ‘Fauzi’s’  actions attracted much  less media condemnation, especially in the Malay press. Despite the same sensational angle of their stories, the coverage about ‘Fauzi’ was shorter, less intense and no one was ever told its conclusion,  just  that  ‘he’  too  was  detained  under  S468  of  the  Penal  Code  for impersonation.391 Informing the reader if he ended up in court, what penalty he incurred and whether or not he had  reformed,  seemed not  as  crucial  as  it  had been with ‘Azizah’.  
                                                        388 This may also explain why, unlike the West, pressing for the right to get married is not a priority for many homosexuals here. 389 One interviewee gave the example of first getting her parents used to her partner as a good friend before introducing her as her girlfriend. 390 ‘His’ identity card bore the name ‘Mek Zaimah’ which the authorities later discovered was not ‘his’ own (‘Polis tahan pemuda cuba nikah lelaki’, Berita Minggu, 16 Feb 1997, <http://www.jaring.my:80/bharian/sun/news/story2.html>, Accessed: 16 Feb 1997). 391 ‘Polis tahan Mek Zaimah’, Berita Harian, 19 Feb 1997. 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How  is  it  that  ‘Fauzi’  who  like  ‘Azizah’  had  impersonated  as  the  opposite  sex, escaped  ‘her’  fate?  Presumably  ‘he’  was  not  charged  for  cross‐dressing  under ‘Syariah’ law because at the time Terengganu, where ‘he’ was arrested, had yet to incorporate this provision as part of its religious laws.392 Quite plausibly too, the different treatment was because ‘he’ had not yet contracted a same‐sex marriage, which ‘Azizah’ had.   This makes intriguing, the response of the state and the media to the marriage of Jessie  Chung,  a male‐to‐female  transsexual who wedded her male  partner  in  a public and lavish ceremony in Kuching, Sarawak in 2005.393 Though the marriage eventually  suffered  the  same  fate  as  ‘Azizah’  and  Sofian’s  (i.e.  the  government declared  it  illegal),  this  only  happened  after  the media  had  given  the  story  an unusually  positive  coverage  over  several  days,  with  a  leading  daily  even describing  it  as  ‘a  fairy‐tale  wedding’.394  Certainly,  the  contrast  between  how ‘Azizah’ was  treated next  to  Jessie – or  ‘Fauzi’  for  that matter – could not have been greater.395   The  argument  here  is  not  that  male‐to‐female  transsexuals  have  it  easier  and better  than  female‐to‐male  transsexuals. On the whole and all  things equal,  the 
                                                        392 The Syariah Criminal Offences (Takzir) (Terengganu) Enactment was only adopted in 2001. 393 Located in East Malaysia, Sarawak – like its neighbour Sabah – has a very different ethnic composition and political history to the other States in West Malaysia. It is also the only State in the country where Islam has not been adopted as the official religion. 394 ‘Million‐ringgit fairy tale wedding the talk of town’, The Star, 14 Nov 2005, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/11/14/nation/12586038&sec=nation>, Accessed: 14 Nov 2005. 395 The papers not only reported how Jessie’s marriage had the blessings of her parents but also portrayed Jessie as being very accomplished, possessing a doctorate degree, running a successful business, and with two music albums to her name. She had money – she was also a generous philanthropist – and beauty. It seemed fitting then that the chorus that had condemned ‘Azizah’s’ marriage to Rohana was considerably muted in this instance. 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Exploiting Gender Ambiguity: The mak nyah experience  Local  newspapers  have  been  reporting  about men who  cross‐dress  as women from  at  least  the  late  1980s  onwards.399  Although  court  indictments  involving this group of sexual marginals did not feature in a big way as news in this period, a number of reports highlighted growing calls to punish those who contravened gender norms. This  in  turn,  reflects  the overall push  then  for  the enactment of more  stringent  ‘Islamic’  criminal  provisions.  The  frequency  of  stories  about ‘Syariah’  law  being  used  to  prosecute  the  trans  community  showed  a marked increase  from  the  late  1990s  and  throughout  the  first  decade  of  the  new millennium,  following  the phase of  ‘Syariahtisation’  i.e.  the assertion of Syariah in all aspects of public life.  Preferring to call  themselves mak nyah,400 members of  this community  identify as women  ‘born  in a man’s body… also  [in  terms of]  thinking,  emotionally and mentally… 100 per cent woman’.401 The label encompasses both those who have had a sex change operation or otherwise.402 Mak nyah are distinct to the group                                                         399 Earlier accounts, though less frequent, were not unheard of. For instance, I discovered a report from the early ‘60s about a pair of transsexuals sentenced by the Magistrate Court (See ‘Two men in dresses told: You’re a disgrace’, Straits Times, 19 Oct 1963, p7). 400 This term was coined in the early 1980s when a group of mak nyah wanted to distinguish themselves from gay men. Until then, the derogatory terms pondan or bapok had been used on both (Teh, 2002:17). 401 The majority also identify as heterosexual. As well, they prefer to be known as ‘transsexual’ rather than ‘transgender’ (Interview with ‘Sri’ and ‘Dani’, mak nyah community organisers, 23 Aug 2009). In this study, however, the terms mak nyah, transsexual and transgender are used interchangeably. 402 The desire to be a woman is what counts. Some mak nyah have not undergone sex reassignment surgery (SRS) due for example, to financial, legal or religious reasons but they still identify as women. Since the 1982 fatwa by the National Fatwa Council prohibiting SRS for mak 
nyah, all public hospitals have seized to perform these operations causing even greater hardship to the community. 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called  lelaki  lembut  (effeminate men) who  can be homosexual or heterosexual, but also cross‐dress or display feminine behaviour.403 As well, they differentiate themselves  from  transvestites  who  are  mainly  heterosexual  men  who  cross‐dress as a form of fetishism.404  Although  not  reported  daily  (or  weekly  or  monthly  for  that  matter),  news  of transsexuals  being  arrested  or  charged  under  SCO  laws  have  appeared  often enough  to  send  out  reminders  of  their  potential  to  be  invoked.  Accounts  of individual Muslims picked up by the authorities are the most common, but there have  also  been  a  few  well‐publicised  raids  of mak  nyah  beauty  pageants  by religious  enforcement  officers  where  dozens  of  male‐to‐female  cross‐dressers have been arrested nationwide.405   Accounts of transsexuals being detained and charged under the Minor Offences Act  have  also  appeared  from  time‐to‐time.  However,  as  two  community organisers of the mak nyah programme of PT Foundation406 point out, since the enactment  of  ‘Islamic’  criminal  legislation,  the  tendency  has  been  for  Malay 
                                                        403 Lelaki lembut, especially those who are youth, have also been targets of moral regulation (See for example, ‘Outrage over bootcamps for effeminate schoolboys’, The Star, 20 Apr 2011, <http://thestar. com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/4/20/nation/8514839&sec=nation>, Accessed:, and ‘Lelaki lembut tidak boleh jadi pendidik’, Berita Harian, 20 and 21 Jul 2007, <http://www.bharian.com.my/m/ BHarian/Sunday/Nasional/ 20070721235933/Article/>, Accessed: 21 Jul 2007). 404 Interview with ‘Sri’ and ‘Dani’, community organisers, 23 Aug 2009. 405 ‘16 sertai ratu cantik mak nyah ditahan’, Utusan Online, 27 Jul 2008, <http://www.utusan.com .my/utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=0727&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Jenayah&pg=je_02.htm>, Accessed: 27 Jul 2008; ‘Pondan beauty contestants rounded up’, Daily Express News, 19 Sept 2005, <http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=37204>, Accessed: 13 Jan 2008; ‘Authorities bust transvestite beauty pageant’, The Star, 30 Oct 2002, <http://thestar.com.my/ news/story.asp?file=/2002/10/30/nation/jhpondan&sec=nation>, Accessed: 13 Jan 2008. 406 Previously Pink Triangle, this local non‐governmental organisation has been working on HIV/AIDS and sexuality issues since the 1980s. It runs four other programmes besides the one for mak nyah: men‐who‐have‐sex‐with‐men, drug users, people living with HIV/AIDS, and sex workers. It also had a programme for women/lesbians in the 1990s but that has ceased to exist. 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transsexuals  to  be  swept  up  by  the  Syariah  dragnet.  Today,  it  is  routine  for religious  enforcement  officers  to  collaborate  with  other  agencies  (e.g.  police, local  council,  immigration,  anti‐narcotics,  etc.)  in  their  anti‐vice  operations  so that  if  any Muslim  is  caught  in  these  sweeps,  s/he will  be  handed  over  to  the Islamic  authorities.407 This  is  in  contrast  to past practice where all  transsexual offenders,  regardless  of  religion, would  be  prosecuted  under  S21  of  the Minor Offences Act for ‘disorderly behaviour’ in public.408   There  are  a  number  of  reasons why  the  authorities may prefer  using  ‘Syariah’ law  to  detain  Malay  transsexuals.  Recalling  that  one  grievance  of  the  Syariah lobby is the inferiority of  ‘secular’ legislation, this is an opportunity for them to demonstrate how ‘Islamic’ laws are better than ‘secular’ ones. It allows them to show their seriousness in combating mungkar (bad deeds) perpetrated by those with heterodox sexualities, especially given how rarely the liwat and musahaqah provisions have been invoked in the 25‐year history of SCO laws. It could also be that utilising the Syariah cross‐dressing prohibition on Muslims – as opposed to the Minor Offences Act – is seen as a better deterrent since the former allows for higher  penalties,  i.e.  capped  at  RM1,000  and/or  six  months  in  jail  versus  a maximum of RM25 or 14 days in jail for first time offenders under the latter.409  
                                                        407 For instance, in 2007, the FT religious department, JAWI, conducted 17 joint operations with the police and another 121 with the Kuala Lumpur City Council (DBKL) (Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Laporan Tahunan 2007, p26). 408 The Minor Offences Act still gets used on Muslim mak nyah but more as an exception than the norm. Another community organiser interviewee shared that over the last five years, there has also been a shift towards charging mak nyah for prostitution under S372(b) of the Penal Code (Interview with ‘Sheila’, 14 Nov 2009). 409 Repeat offenders receive a higher penalty but their punishment is still capped at RM100 and/or imprisonment for three months (S21). 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Although it  is evident that compared to gays and lesbians, the mak nyah bear a disproportionate  burden  of  regulation,  the  significance  of  this  can  be  better gauged against  the application of  ‘Syariah’  criminal provisions  for other  sexual offences.  Table  5.1,  which  enumerates  cases  of  selected  religious  offences presented at Syariah courts nationwide, shows that from 2005‐2009, there were 346 cases of  ‘men behaving like women’,410 an average of just under 70 cases a year  for  the  last  five  years.  This  pales  in  comparison  to  the  27,277  cases  of 








(2005­2009) Men behaving like women  346  69 Khalwat  27,277  5,455 Prostitution  41  8 Sex outside marriage   3,820  764 Indecent behaviour  5,489  1,093 Drinking  384  77 Gambling  2,967  593 Not fasting  855  617  
                                                        410 As noted in Chapter 3, with the exception of Perlis where it is also a crime for Muslim women to impersonate as men, all the other States only prohibit men from impersonating as women. 411 This is most likely because the bulk of such cases, Muslims included, continue to be dealt with under ‘secular’ legal provisions. 412 I am grateful to Michael Peletz for sharing these statistics with me. 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Joh  Ked  Kel  Mel  NS  Pk  Perl  Pg  Sgor  Tgnu  FT 63  1  9  84  14  28  15  18  10  23  81 
Joh:  Johore; Ked: Kedah; Mel: Melaka; NS: Negeri Sembilan; Pk: Perak; Pg: Penang; Sgor: 
Selangor; Tgnu: Terengganu; FT: Federal Territory  On  the  other  hand,  as  expected,  the  high  number  of  cases  recorded  for  FT  – which  besides  having  a  larger  enforcement  unit  than  Melaka,  appears  most influenced  by  Federal  ‘Syariah’  directives  –  matched  the  size  of  the  State’s Muslim population. What  is unusual  then are  the  figures  for Selangor, which  is equally populous and has  the  resources  to apply  the  law, but which  registered only ten such cases for 2005‐2009. Further, for all the concern around Kelantan’s conservative  rule  under  PAS,  there were  only  nine  recorded  instances  of mak 
nyah brought before the Syariah courts there.  It is arguable that these numbers merely correspond to the actual level of cross‐dressing  activity  occurring  in  a  particular  State.  However,  the  interviews conducted for this research as well media reports and public testimonies suggest far  more  encounters  between  members  of  this  community  and  the  religious police than these figures indicate.418 However, as the following narrative shows, official  and  unofficial  stories  tell  of  mak  nyah  who  are  regularly  ridiculed, 
                                                        417 There is no prohibition against male‐to‐female cross‐dressing in Pahang. 418 As well, a study by academic Teh Yik Koon found that ‘50 percent of Mak Nyah had been caught by the police and religious authorities for indecent behaviour and cross‐dressing’ (cited in ‘Looking at the other side of mak nyah’, NST, 10 Feb 2011, <http://www.nst.com.my/nst/ articles/10trnsx /Article>, Accessed: 11 Feb 2011). 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harassed  and  assaulted  by  law  enforcers  including  those  from  the  Islamic bureaucracy.   Most  of  the  time,  the  mainstream  media’s  coverage  of  mak  nyah  serves  to reinforce  public  perception  of  their  queerness.  Occasionally  though,  there  are reports  exposing  their  abuse  in  the  hands  of  the  authorities.  For  example,  in August  2007,  readers  learnt  about  Ayu,  a  male‐to‐female mak  nyah  who  was physically  assaulted  by  officers  of  JAIM  (Jabatan  Agama  Islam  Melaka),  the Melaka  religious  affairs  department.  For  the  ‘crime’  of  passing  as  a woman  in public (S72 of the Melaka SCO Enactment), she ended up in hospital and had to undergo an emergency hernia operation.419   Sometimes too, readers are required to draw their own conclusions from news stories,  like  once  when  a  local  English  daily  reported  that  the  Kuala  Lumpur Syariah Lower Court had meted out the maximum penalty of RM1,000 on a man who admitted  to dressing  like a woman. At  the end of  the article  it  also  stated that  the  victim had  ‘lost  three  teeth  and  suffered minor  injuries when  he  [sic] was arrested’.420 There were no details provided as to how this transpired. Nor was  there  any  reference  to  action  taken  against  the  perpetrators,  presumably because there was none.                                                           419 According to the victim, she was approached by two officers while walking with some friends along a street in town. Without warning or reason, they proceeded to beat her before she was handcuffed, bundled into a van and brought in for questioning. Her case only came to light after the NGO PT Foundation intervened to provide assistance (‘Transsexual: I was treated like a hardcore criminal’, Malaysiakini, 10Aug 2007, <www.malaysiakini.com/news/71034>, Accessed: 10 Aug 2007).  420 ‘Bitter pill for ‘Candy’ at Syariah Court’, The Star, 11 Dec 2009, <http://thestar.com.my/news/ story.asp?file=/2009/12/11/nation/5280321&sec=nation>, Accessed: 6 Feb 2009. 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also  far  from  exemplary  in  their  encounters  with  transsexuals.  Even  so,  ‘Sri’ noted, not all mak nyah activity receives the same official scrutiny. For example, in Kuala Lumpur alone, there are at least three to four events a year organised by transsexuals but these have taken place without incident. Mak nyah who are sex workers, especially those servicing a poorer clientele, have not been so lucky.424   Some of the religious lobby actors interviewed believed that the mak nyah were victims of their own visibility. As one official from the Syariah lobby argued, it is:  ‘[o]kay if you want to do it [cross‐dress] at home and put on your kebaya and  sarong.  [It’s]  ok  if  you  feel  like  it.  But  not  in  public.  Not  in  public impersonating as [a] woman’.425  The idea of such moral transgressions posing a problem only if it becomes public appears to have traction among many Malays. If this were true though, how does one  account  for  traditional  Malay  society’s  acceptance  of  the mak  nyah?  Put differently, why are  they policed and prosecuted  today when  they were not  in the past?426 The evidence also does not bear out the argument that immoral acts are tolerable as long as they remain hidden because the reality is that religious enforcers  have  been  known  to  barge  into  people’s  homes  in  search  of  alleged wrongdoings.427  
                                                        424 Interview on 23 Aug 2009.  425 Interview with ‘Aishah’, 6 Mac 2009. 426 See Peletz (1996) for an account of how mak nyah were regarded in Malay villages till the 1980s. 427 Such action is in violation of the law which specifically says that ‘immoral behaviour’ is only an offence if it takes place in public. Interestingly, following heavy criticism about Syariah enforcement, there have been fewer reported cases of the authorities doing this in recent times. 
 152 
Like  several  other  sexual marginals  queried,  one mak  nyah  community  leader blamed the worsening situation on ‘orang politikkan ugama’ (people politicising religion). If not, she said,  ‘people out there don’t give a damn’428 about the mak 
nyah.  Indeed, as  some  interviewees –  including  those  from the Syariah  lobby – agreed, morality was not such a huge concern. As one member of  the religious establishment put it, ‘the state has more and important challenges to face rather than policing  the  society on moral  issues’.429 Yet  others  recognised  that  sexual marginals, like the subject of morality in general, ‘were utilised when necessary, for political gain’.430 Two respondents also mentioned the state’s role in fuelling growing intolerance towards the gay, lesbian and trans communities since ‘they are the ones who make all these [‘Islamic’] rules that weren’t there before’, hence creating ‘issues which should not be issues’.431   
Other encounters with moral policing Before  concluding,  it  is  pertinent  to  contextualise  the  experiences  of  the mak 
nyah  with  law  enforcement  by  comparing  this  to  how  others,  namely  those caught  in  operations  involving  entertainment  outlets  and  khalwat,  have  been treated.  Where  the  former  is  concerned,  raids  on  bars  and  clubs  have  been especially  controversial.  In  2001,  for  example,  in  one  of  the  earliest  reported cases of its kind, JAIS used the SCO law in Selangor to charge a female singer with ‘insulting  Islam’,  simply because she had performed at  the  restaurant‐cum‐pub 
                                                        428 Interview with ‘Sri’, 23 Aug 2009. 429 Interview with ‘Rafidah’, 1 Jul 2009. 430 Interview with ‘Jubu’, former human rights and gay rights activist, 20 May 2009. ‘In the long term’, he said, ‘the goal is not moral policing but for those in power to use this to achieve what they want’. 431 Interview with ‘Roberta’ and ‘Samantha’, female sexual marginals, 14 Nov 2009. 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that was raided.432 The 2005 operation by JAWI officials on Zouk, a popular club in the capital frequented by the young and upwardly mobile, drew even greater attention to the alleged high‐handed actions of religious officials.433  It  is  their  khalwat‐related  operations,  however,  that  have  gained  the  Islamic departments greatest  infamy.434 Procedurally,  the religious authorities are only meant to conduct a raid when they have received a complaint or been tipped off by  a member  of  public.  They  also  have  to  conduct  a  thorough  investigation  to ascertain  the  legitimacy of  the complaint before proceeding.435 Whether or not religious  departments  abide  by  these  guidelines  is  questionable.  ‘Sheila’.  a community  organiser,  claimed  that  raids  are  known  to  happen  even  without complaints  being  lodged.  She  and  another  sexual  marginal  interviewed  also believed  that  arrests occur  so  that  the authorities  can  ‘meet  their  annual KPIs’ (key performance indicators).436                                                          432 ‘That’s showbiz, Malaysian style’, Asiaweek, 2 Mac 2001, p52. See also ‘Perak Religious Department drops case against nightclub singer’, The Star, 6 Sept 2007, <http://thestar.com.my/ news/story.asp? file=/2007/8/6/nation/2007080620 2147&secnation>, Accessed: 7 Sept 2007. 433 Young female Muslim patrons among the 100 or so people hauled up and held overnight at the JAWI headquarters complained of being repeatedly photographed in their allegedly ‘indecent’ outfits, kept in interrogation rooms where the air‐conditioning had deliberately been turned up, and denied use of the toilets. (‘Malaysia club raid sparks row’, BBC News, 18 Feb 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia‐pacific/4276077.stm>, Accessed 19 Feb 2005; and ‘Polis nasihati anggota penguatkuasa agama bersedia sebelum serbu’, Bernama, 2 Feb 2005).  434 As noted, the argument that khalwat is only one step away from zina is commonly used to justify all kinds of action to prevent unmarried Muslim heterosexual couples being intimate. 
Khalwat has also been cited as the ‘starting point of moral decay’, since leaving it uncurbed will lead to other social ills like teenage pregnancies (Siti Zubaidah Ismail, 2010). 435 For details of the duties and powers of Syariah enforcement officers, see Shamrahayu A. Aziz (2006). 436 Interviews with ‘Sheila’ and ‘Melissa’, 14 Nov 2009. Indeed, towards the end of the1990s, JAWI annual reports started to include statistics of enforcement operations. For example, one report showed that the department conducted 950 such operations in 1997. This target was raised to 1000 for 1998 and 1150 for 1999. Although it is not possible to ascertain to what extent they focused on enforcing Syariah criminal law (as opposed to family law, for example), the point here is that greater attention was paid to setting and monitoring enforcement targets from this period onwards. See Malaysia (1998), Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 1999, KL: PNM. 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Despite this, there have been numerous reports of khalwat raids gone wrong. For example,  in  2006,  a  faux  pax  of  international  proportions  transpired when  an older  American  couple  on  holiday  in  Malaysia  ended  up  traumatised  after religious  officers  forced  themselves  into  their  apartment  in  the  middle  of  the night, insisting that the couple had committed khalwat.437   More disconcerting are the  fatal cases where alleged khalwat offenders –  likely petrified at the shame they may bring upon their families if exposed – have died trying  to  avoid  being  caught  during  a  raid.  Several  people  interviewed commented on  the  significance of  the element of malu  (shame) among Malays. ‘Siti’, a Muslim feminist activist and well‐known social commentator, pointed out that  it was  this,  the  fear of bringing  shame  to one’s  family  if  caught, was  a big consideration why few take action against wayward religious enforcers.438   Smaller  khalwat  patrols  in  public  places  have  also  been  criticised  for encouraging  bribery,  since many  couples  prefer  to  ‘settle’  the matter  this way rather than deal with a prolonged legal case. From those interviewed, it appears to  be  common  practice  for  the  authorities  to  initiate  such  transactions.  ‘Nina’ who was apprehended with her non‐Muslim boyfriend in his car that was parked in  an  isolated  road  said  that  he was  coerced  into  paying  a  bribe  after  she had made it clear that she would not. The incident cost him RM500.439 Likewise with another  interviewee,  ‘Hani’  who  was  brought  in  for  interrogation  after  the authorities  found  her  in  her  Chinese  boyfriend’s  apartment.  She  was  released                                                         437 The pair was married and both were not Muslims (‘Anti‐khalwat men terrify elderly foreign couple’, NST, 22 Oct 2006, p16). 438 Interview on 22 Jun 2009. 439 Interview on 30 Oct 2009. 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after an hour and a half of questioning and insults, but the officers who sent her home first asked for ‘petrol money’ saying that it was ‘procedure’.440  Part of  the problem ensuring  that  religious enforcement  is properly  conducted has to do with the authorities farming out this job to non‐state parties. The Mat 
Skodeng  squad  mentioned  earlier  is  a  typical  example  where  volunteers  are recruited and rewarded  for policing  the morality of  their  fellow citizens.  In  the mid‐2000s,  the  country  had  at  least  three  such  bodies.441  Although  their members were supposedly only meant to tip‐off the authorities of wrongdoings by fellow Muslims, Cabinet objected to the idea of setting loose private actors – some who were very young – to pry into people’s private lives and ordered the groups to disband.442   Around  the  time  that  the  Melaka  Pasukan  Gerak  Khas  Belia  4B  started operations, there was an incident involving a group of young men who violently assaulted  a mak nyah.  It  later  emerged  that  not  only were  the men volunteers with  JAIM,  but  that  they  were  also  offered  RM30  for  each  mak  nyah  they apprehended.443 Most  likely,  the Cabinet’s decision was influenced by examples like this as well as the experience with a similar outfit in the mid‐1990s. BADAR, 
                                                        440 Interview on 14 Feb 2011. 441 Besides the Pasukan Gerak Khas Belia 4B in Melaka, the second was the Amal Makruf Nahi Mungkar brigade of the Terengganu State Executive Council, while the third was a product of the Putrajaya arm of JAWI ( ‘Mat skodeng kesan dua kes maksiat’, Berita Harian, 23 Feb 2005, p4; ‘Skuad sukarelawan MAIWP Putrajaya dilancar’, Harian Metro, 17 Jan 2006; ‘They will snoop but not peep’, NST, 21 Feb 2007, <http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/nst/Wednesday/National /20070221090402/Article/ local1_ html>, Accessed: 21 Feb 2007). 442 ‘PM says no to snoop squad’, NST, 23 Feb 2007, <http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/nst/ Friday/Frontpage/20070223080327/Article/index_ html>, Accessed: 23 Feb 2007.  443 Interview with ‘Sri’ and ‘Dani’, mak nyah community organisers, 23 Aug 2009. 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Badan  Amal  Maaruf  Nahi  Mungkar,444  had  gained  ill  repute  as  a  vigilante‐like group  with  its  dubious  methods  to  discourage  Muslims  from  ‘un‐Islamic’ activities.445  Cabinet  also  possibly  considered  the  repercussions  of  formalising these  volunteer  squads  given  the  pre‐existing  problems  with  non‐state  moral crusaders.446  The  foregoing  account  gives  greater  credence  to  the  grievances  that  the mak 
nyah  community  has  shared  about  the  religious  bureaucracy.  Moreover,  from time to time, sporadic news reports of rogue officials who have been arrested or charged in court have reinforced the veracity of their claims.447 For example, in 2006, the Sessions Court indicted a JAIS enforcement officer on two counts, one, for  forcing  a woman  he  had  detained  to  have  oral  sex with  him;  and  two,  for ‘outraging’ her ‘modesty’.448   Such recourse to justice, however, is seldom seen as an option by the majority of 
mak  nyah  and  others  like  them  who  are  more  vulnerable  to  the  vagaries  of                                                         444 The slogan amar maaruf, nahi mungkar was popularised at the State‐level by the central Islamic machinery in the 1990s, ostensibly to encourage Muslims to perform good deeds and avoid bad ones. For instance, during this time the Selangor religious department sought to institute Amar Maaruf Nahi Mungkar units in every mosque and surau in the State (Anggaran Bajet Negeri Selangor, 1995, p88). Volunteer moral police bodies like BADAR were also formed with names that approximated this catchphrase. See as well, Chapter 6. 445 BADAR’s members used to break into homes to apprehend suspected khalwat offenders, harass Muslim and non‐Muslim couples out in public, and extort money from migrant workers. It is believed that this body, with almost 1,000 members at its peak, was an auxiliary of JAIS, under the command of its head at the time (Interview with ‘Rafidah’, law academic and religious official, 1Jul 2009). Following public outcry, the Selangor government shut down BADAR’s operations by recalling the authority cards that it had issued to its members (‘Voluntary body banned from enforcing Syariah laws’, Straits Times, 17 Feb 1995, p26). 446 There have been numerous reports of imposters at work. See ‘Moral crusaders turned molesters’, The Star, 8 Feb 2006; and ‘Bogus JAIS officers fleecing courting couples’, NST, 16 Oct 2001, p12. 447 In 2000, the Anti‐Corruption Agency of the country highlighted that there had been 44 cases in the last ten years involving ‘sex for favours officers’ from anti‐vice squads (‘KL anti‐graft agency probes ‘sex for favours officers’’’, Straits Times, 28 May 2000, p24. 448 ‘JAIS officer charged with sex offences’, NST, 10 Aug 2006, p8. 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official power. Most end up not pressing charges out of  fear of stirring up even more  trouble.  This  was  the  experience  of  Ayu,  the  transsexual  in  Melaka discussed  earlier.  Rather  than  take  action  against  those  who  abused  her,  she chose  to  remain  silent  out  of  fear  of  retaliation.  These  fears  are  not unsubstantiated.  Another  time when  a mak nyah  accompanied her  transsexual friend to the police station to lodge a report about a man threatening her, both ended up being arrested instead. No reason was given and they were locked‐up and harassed for six days before being released.449  
Conclusion  Since  the mid‐  to  late‐1990s,  official  discourses on  sexual morality  in Malaysia have  given  a  stronger  impression  that  deviations  from  heteronormativity  are considered  strictly  unacceptable.  Both  ‘secular’  and  Syariah  legal  provisions confirm  the  state’s  intolerance  towards  those  who  do  not  comply  with  its dictates, prescribing a range of corrective measures for behaviours and identities that are viewed as  ‘unnatural’ or  ‘indecent’. The weight of these discourses and laws  on  those  criminalised,  however,  has  been  unequally  applied  and  felt. Dependent  on  factors  such  as  religion,  class,  gender,  age,  etc.  the  impact  of regulation  differs  both  across  and  within  the  categories  of  sexual  marginals. Similarly, the reactions of those being regulated also differ.  As this chapter has shown, the government’s homophobic rhetoric that became more  pronounced  in  the  1990s  had more  to  do with  politics  than  a  desire  to                                                         449 Interview with ‘Sri’ and ‘Dani’, mak nyah community organisers, 23 Aug 2009. 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eradicate homosexuality. Indeed, cases of consensual homosexual relations being tried in a civil or Syariah court are practically non‐existent suggesting that where these  are  concerned,  the  official  anti‐gay  bark  is  worse  than  its  bite.  The transsexual  community,  namely  the mak  nyah,  has  not  been  as  fortunate.  In  a context  where  ‘Syariah’  criminal  legislation  gives  greater  legitimacy  to transphobia,  they  have  become  easier  preys  to  unscrupulous  enforcement officials, including those from the religious bureaucracy. Though far more cases of  heterosexual  transgressions  have  landed  up  in  the  Syariah  court,  the stigmatisation of the mak nyah – like gays and lesbians – means that unlike their heterosexual counterparts, they rarely have recourse to justice.   Despite  their  sporadic  and  unsystematic  application,  this  chapter  has  also illustrated how the nature of law is such where its mere enactment has helped to reiterate  the  message  that  those  with  heterodox  sexualities  are  unacceptable, most especially if they challenge heterosexual privilege by entering the realm of marriage. With  its divine claims,  ‘Syariah’  law has been an even more effective deterrent, instilling just enough shame and fear so that the majority of Muslims from  sexually  marginalised  communities  regulate  themselves  and  keep  a significant dimension of  their  lives behind  closed doors. The  following  chapter continues  this  discussion  about  the  regulation  of  sexual marginals  by  probing into the state’s heteronormative intentions. 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Chapter 6 
Enforcing Morality: The Federal state agenda  The previous chapter discussed and analysed the encounters of sexual marginals with  the  law  in  Malaysia.  It  suggested  that  besides  being  determined  by  the intersection  of  one’s  multiple  identities,  the  outcome  of  efforts  to  impose heteronormativity  can  be  affected  by  her  or  his  interactions  with  law enforcement  authorities,  in  particular  those  from  the  religious  bureaucracy.  It also  illustrated  that  there were  problems with  the  implementation  of  the  law, and  implied  that  this was  because  the  objective  of  regulating  gays,  lesbians  or transgenders, may not be as important to the state as is sometimes made out to be, especially during periods of moral panic.  Taking  off  from  this  observation,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  uncover exactly what the state’s agenda is when it comes to controlling sexual behaviours and  gender  identities.  What  considerations  lie  behind  the  moral  policing  of sexual  marginals,  beyond  the  slogan  of  Syariah  lobbyists,  amar  maaruf,  nahi 
mungkar (commanding right, forbidding wrong)? The chapter will make the case that despite the introduction of greater ‘Islamic’ sexual prohibitions through the SCO laws, their overall execution has been poor because it lacked a well thought‐out plan. Instead, their enforcement has historically been assigned a low priority in the larger scheme of Islamic administration; certainly not commensurate with the attention that ‘Syariahtisation’ has shone on religious laws. 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Though this line of  inquiry may help account for why anti‐vice operations have tended  to  go wrong,  the  chapter  also  proposes  that  an  alternative  explanation lies in how it is impossible to impose ‘Syariah’ law to regulate moral behaviour, a point that neither the state nor the Syariah lobby concedes. More importantly, by querying  the  latest  national  solution  to  the  poor  track  record  of  religious enforcement authorities,  it will show how this  is motivated not by altruism but rather, the larger Federal state project of centralising control over Islam.  The  chapter  starts with  a query  into how much of  a  State’s  religious budget  is channelled  into  implementing  ‘Islamic’  law.  It  does  this  by  looking  at  the structural  growth of  the  Islamic bureaucracy  since  Independence,  and  tracking the allocation for law enforcement over time. Next, it details the official take on challenges  impeding  the  law’s  effective  application.  It  shows  how  religious functionaries are  themselves critical about  the present  state of affairs, but  that their  apprehension  stems  from  a  concern  to  defend  the  image  of  Islam,  not necessarily  the  dispensation  of  justice.  The  final  part  critiques  this rationalisation  about  the  poor  enforcement  of  ‘Syariah’  criminal  provisions  by the religious authorities. It analyses the Federal government’s response which is to  set  up  a new national Department  of  Syariah Enforcement  and Prosecution, and offers an alternative  theory  for  this proposal. At  the same time,  it will also offer a counterview on why religious enforcement continues to be a challenge.  Before  proceeding,  an  explanation  about  the methodology  behind  the  story  of Syariah enforcement  is  required. This account will  largely be constructed  from the experience of the FT Islamic Affairs Department (JAWI, Jabatan Agama Islam 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complete  data  on  the  functioning  of  its  religious  bureaucracy.  It  also  enjoys  a greater percentage of media coverage. The benefits of this aside, one cannot rely on  these  alone  for  an  accurate  indication of what  else  is  going on  in  the other States.  Precisely  because  there  is  an  uneven  balance  of  power  between  the Federal  and State  governments,  this  also means  that  the  centre’s  experience  is not necessarily typical.   For  instance,  endowed  with  greater  resources,  the  FT  is  better  positioned  to direct  larger  funds  into  its  religious  programmes,  a  privilege  that  not  many States  share.  Therefore,  where  data  permits,  the  experiences  of  Kelantan  and Selangor, as well as the other States, have been included to help produce a more complete  national  picture.  Due  to  the  approach  chosen,  the  story  obtained  is necessarily  limited  to  painting  in  broad  strokes,  the  context  (i.e.  ‘Syariah’  law enforcement  in  general)451  in  which  measures  to  regulate  those  with  non‐normative sexualities and genders take place. The conclusions drawn here about the  heteronormative  intentions  of  the  state  towards  sexual marginals  are  thus extrapolated from this big picture.   
The Evolution of the Religious Enforcement Machinery   In Malaysia,  the earliest  traceable practice of entrusting  individuals  to  regulate Muslim  piety  goes  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century.  Roff  (1974) mentions  the  likely  existence  of  an  institution  in  Kelantan  known  as  the                                                         451 The enforcement of ‘Syariah’ law covers many areas, not just those regulating sexual morality, much less that of sexual marginals. These range from religious offences like drinking alcohol and not fasting in Ramadan, to adhering to deviant teachings. A list of these offences as codified under the SCOA (FT) 1997, can be found in Chapter 3. 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Pemereksa  Jumaat  (or  Jemaah)  comprising  inspectors  whose  job  included ensuring regular attendance at Friday prayers  in  the surau.452 Although British rule  facilitated  the  spread  of  religious  councils  and  departments  across  the colony,  no  body  or  person(s)  was  specifically  assigned  the  task  of  enforcing religious  laws  that  were  also  codified  and  introduced  across  the  Malay peninsular during this period.   Shortly after Independence, news reports highlighted that Selangor had created three ‘investigator’453 posts within its religious bureaucracy to counter growing concerns about immorality among Muslims.454 In the 1970s, few States dedicated more than one or two officials, if at all, for this job.455 JAWI, for example, set up upon  the  creation  of  the  Federal  Territory  of  Kuala  Lumpur  in  1974,  records 
                                                        452 1974:109. This idea of having inspectors – and their equivalent today which are religious enforcers – appears to have been inspired by the practice during the Umayyad regime, of appointing officials known as muhtasib. Originally, these referred to Byzantine market inspectors (agoronomos or in Arabic, ail as suq) but later these officials also assumed the role of upholding religious morality (hisba). Their duties included enforcing dress codes and rules on gender segregation in public, monitoring brothels, as well as adherence to fasting during Ramadhan and observance of Friday prayers (Watt, 1968; Mottahedeh and Stilt, 2003; Peters, 2005). 453 The choice of this term ‘investigator’ is interesting. Unlike what their contemporary counterparts are called today (i.e. ‘enforcement and prosecution’ officers), it suggests that early measures at promoting good morality among Muslims leaned more towards probing and examining a situation of alleged vice rather than aiming at taking punitive action against it. 454 In response to the problem of prostitution, two investigators were sought for Kuala Lumpur and Klang in 1958 (‘Selangor has jobs for two anti‐vice sleuths’, Straits Times, 29 Aug 1958, p7.). The third investigator post was introduced four years later but this time focusing on khalwat prevention (‘Fifty seek job of inspector of morality’, Straits Times, 26 Jul 1962, p11).  455 An expert on the history of the religious bureaucracy in Kedah notes that even in the late 1970s, a ‘very small unit only’ was responsible for anti‐vice work in the State. This too focused predominantly on khalwat (Interview with Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, 20 Feb 2009). See also ‘Those khalwat cases’, Straits Times, 24 Apr 1975, p8. 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having only nine staff at its inception456 including one official who was in charge of enforcement and prosecution.457   As noted previously,  the religious bureaucracy  in Malaysia expanded under the influence  of  Mahathir’s  Islamisation  policies  of  the  1980s.  Among  other developments, JAWI – which had grown substantially when it was transferred to the newly  created FT Ministry  in 1978458  –  doubled  the  size  of  its  staff  to  just over 400 personnel by the mid‐1980s.459  JAIS was even larger, with over 1,000 employees  by  1985.460  This  was  also  when  the  functions  of  the  religious department  were  organised  into  different  operational  units  for  the  first  time. Enforcement  and  prosecution  were  recognised  as  one  area  of  work,  but  they were not  deemed  important  enough  to  command an  independent unit  of  their own. Within  JAWI,  for  example,  it  was  subsumed  under  the  Administration  of Syariah Law section whose primary focus was Islamic family law (e.g. marriage, 
                                                        456 The smallness of this new body did not reflect the size of some older religious departments like Perak’s which already had over 450 staff by the 1950s. However, the vast majority of these (almost 400) were religious schoolteachers. It is noteworthy that even with this large number of personnel, the State did not have anyone assigned to the task of policing Muslims (Mohamed Khalil Hussein, 1958:60).  457 The other religious functionaries were the State mufti, the Chief Kadi and two kadi to assist him, a Principal Assistant Secretary, a mosque administration officer, and two officers in charge of zakat and baitulmal. See ‘Sejarah penubuhan’, Official Website of the Federal Territory Islamic Affairs Department, <http://www.jawi.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=section& layout=blog&id=93&Itemid=136&lang=bm>, Accessed: 5 Dec 2010. 458 From a secretariat with nine staff in 1974, it was upgraded into a department with almost 200 employees in 1978 (Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan 1979, KP38/78, p218). During this time, JAWI serviced only the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Branches were later set‐up for Labuan and Putrajaya when these became part of the FT in April 1984 and August 2001 respectively. 459 Malaysia, Senarai Perjawatan di Kementerian‐kementerian dan Jabatan‐jabatan dalam Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 1985, Jilid 1, KP27/84, p221. 460 Selangor, Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1985, p212. 
 165 
divorce,  etc.).461  In  JAIS,  this work was  part  of  the  ‘Judiciary’  section  that  also handled matters to do with family law and the Syariah courts.462   When official Islam underwent further reorganisation in the 1990s, a standalone section for the enforcement of ‘Syariah’ laws was eventually created in Selangor. This  separated  the  administration  of  family  law  from  other  ‘Islamic’  laws including those governing religious offences. In 1990, this new unit offered five permanent  posts.  By  1995,  this  figure  had  increased  to  11,  and  this  remained unchanged till the 2000s.463 During this time, the idea of enforcement in the FT continued to remain primarily associated with the implementation of family law, not religious offences per se. It was only after JAWI was placed directly under the jurisdiction of JAKIM – the revamped Islamic centre of the Federal government – in 1997, that  it gained a new section called  ‘Law and Enforcement’ which came with  almost  40  personnel.464  Even  so,  this  section’s  stated  objective  was  not Syariah enforcement but rather, the promotion of uniform religious laws across the nation.465   
                                                        461 See for example, Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 1983, KP22/82, p598, and Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 1985, KP26/84, p603. 462 Besides the ‘Judiciary’, JAIS had sections dealing with religious education, dakwah, baitulmal and zakat, mosque and wakaf administration, as well as research and publications (Selangor (1983), Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1984, p193). 463 See Selangor, Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1991, p278 and Selangor, Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1995, p87. The actual number of enforcers was actually higher given that additional personnel were hired after the disbanding of BADAR (See Chapter 5). However, these were only hired on a contractual basis (‘Badar authority cards withdrawn’, NST, 16 Feb 1995, p4).  464 Senarai Perjawatan di Kementerian‐kementerian dan Jabatan‐jabatan dalam Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 1998. Up to this point, JAWI had around 20 enforcement staff (‘Memorandom Tambahan Belanjawan 1979 Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan’, submitted to facilitate the implementation of the five‐year plan of the Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan). 465 Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 2000, KP15/99, p57. 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More  crucially,  despite  the  changes  that  followed  state‐led  programmes  to expand  the  Islamic  bureaucracy,  the  implementation  of moral  laws was  never sufficiently  valued  to  command  the  resources  required  to  match  the  anti‐vice rhetoric of the authorities. In Selangor, for example, the Judiciary section of JAIS that was responsible for administering Syariah law (including its enforcement), had only 28 staff in the mid‐1980s. In contrast, the department’s largest section that  dealt  with  religious  schools  and  education  had  860  staff.466  Even  when Enforcement and Prosecution was made into a separate division in the following decade, it not only had skeletal staff but it also ran on a budget that continued to be dwarfed by the cost of the State’s religious education programme.467   This  situation was mirrored  in  JAWI where  it was  the  coordination of dakwah activities  –  then  operating  under  the  Amar  Maarof  division  –  and  not  the enforcement  of moral  laws  that was  prioritised  in  the  early  phase  of  state‐led Islamisation.  In  1985,  the  Amar Maarof  division  commanded  a  budget  of  RM3 million and over 200 staff (versus RM780,000 and 75 staff for the Administration of Syariah Law division).468 The larger portion of funds channelled into this work and  religious  education  reflected  the main  concern  of  the  Federal  state  at  the time, that is, the desire to counter the dakwah movement organised by non‐state Islamic groups like ABIM, and the perceived popularity of UMNO’s main political rival, PAS.  
                                                        466 See Selangor, Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1984, p415. By 1988, the positions for the Religious Education unit had doubled to over 1,600 while that for the Judiciary remained the same (Selangor, Belanjawan Negeri Selangor 1988, p234). 467 The budget for Enforcement and Prosecution was just over one hundredth of the cost of running religious schools and providing religious education (i.e. RM470,000 versus RM43 million) (Selangor, Anggaran Negeri Selangor 1995, p64). 468 Malaysia, Anggaran Perbelanjaan 1985. 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As  a  quick  aside,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  catchphrase  amar  maaruf,  nahi 
mungkar  (commanding  right,  forbidding  wrong)  which  started  gaining prominence in the 1990s, originally entered official parlance in the late 1970s.469 Interestingly  though,  only  the  first  half  of  this  slogan,  amar  maaruf,  was popularised at the time. This was likely because the focus then was on promoting morally  upright Muslim  citizens  through  proselytisation;470  rather  different  to the  emphasis  evident  two  decades  later,  to  punish  ‘deviant’  Muslims  through punitive ‘Syariah’ measures.   One religious official interviewed believed that this shift was brought about by a realisation  that  it  had  been  a mistake  to  only  focus  on dakwah  and  education programmes  in  the past.  Instead,  the new  thinking encouraged complementing efforts to ‘command good’ (amar maaruf) with actions to prohibit Muslims from doing wrong (nahi mungkar).471 Nonetheless, in reality, even after the enactment of SCO legislation, the number of religious crimes that were tried in court during the early phase of its implementation did not always correspond to the number of  arrests made.472  This  could  be  because  a  considerable  number  of  offenders                                                         469 Its earliest mention in government budget reports was towards the end of the 1970s. See Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan 1978, p102. 470 The activities to ‘enjoin good’ included lectures, publications, running of schools, kindergartens and fardhu ain classes, as well as the provision of welfare services. See Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 1983, KP22/82, p598. 471 Interview with ‘Aishah’, academic and senior religious official, 6 Mac 2009. Citing the example of zina, the interviewee asked how the situation would change if Muslims were warned about the consequences of committing zina on one hand, but on the other, still had access to pornography. The prohibition of both activities, she insisted, needed to happen together. 472 This pattern appears to have continued till present time. Rather than acknowledging the role of bribery, the Syariah lobby has argued that because the fines for religious offences are small, offenders rather pay up than have their case heard in court. Some see this as particularly problematic since the development of Syariah jurisprudence is believed to occur only if there are court hearings and judgements to set precedents for other cases (Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar dan Nurhidayah Muhd Hashim, 2008: 93‐96). 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were  referred  to  counselling  sessions.473  In  any  case,  following  JAWI’s incorporation  into  JAKIM  in  1997,  the  Amar Maaruf  section  –  reconfigured  as 
Dakwah, Islamic Family Development, and Mosque Management474 – grew even larger. At the turn of the new millennium, this had a projected budget of RM23 million  while  Syariah  law  enforcement  continued  to  lag  far  behind  with  an allocation of RM1.6 million.475  Today,  almost  all  State  religious  departments  have  either  physically  or administratively  separated  the  work  of  Enforcement  from  Prosecution,476 leaving  the  former  to  pursue  the  goal  of  ensuring  that  ‘Syariah’  laws  are effectively  implemented  to  curb  vice  and  ‘prevent  immoral  activities’  from occurring. In line with this, the number of staff assigned to compel adherence to official standards of Muslim morality has also been significantly upped from the early days of Islamic administration. With over 100 personnel, Selangor and FT boast having the largest number of enforcers,477 while other States each have on 
                                                        473 Syariah statistics for Selangor in the mid‐ to late‐1990s show that counselling referrals comprised over half of all criminal cases recorded (‘Statistik Kes Enakmen Jenayah Syariah Negeri Selangor’ in Selangor (2001), Rancangan Malaysia ke Lapan (2001­2005), Shah Alam: Unit Perancang dan Pembangunan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). See also Amrin Suratman (2007) and Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar and Nurhidayah Muhd Hashim (2008). 474 The association between amar maaruf and dakwah activity in JAWI had ceased earlier in the mid‐1990s as the latter was reorganised under a new section Dakwah, Education and Welfare (Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 1995, p63). 475 The largest budget line item in JAKIM at the time, however, was for the division dealing with Development of Islamic Education and Training (over RM90 million) (Malaysia, Anggaran Belanjawan Program dan Prestasi 2000, KP15/99, pp40‐41). Ten years on, the budget for ‘Syariah’ law enforcement was RM2.37 million, versus RM130 million for Dakwah, Islamic Family Development and Mosque Management work and RM236 million for Islamic education and training (Malaysia, Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 2009, p124). 476 The decision to split the Enforcement and Prosecution division into two separate units was made in August 2002 (‘Separate syariah enforcement, prosecution units’, NST, 13 Aug 2002, p3). 477 However, these numbers were increased only in the late 2000s, a move in response to a spate of bad raids and criticisms about Syariah enforcement (See ‘Hotline Jawi bendung jenayah Syariah’, Harian Metro, 22 Ogos 2008, and ‘Enforcement of Syariah law is crucial’, NST, 13 Jan 2003, p13). 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Policing Gone Wrong: The official story  One  of  the more  common official  explanations  for why  anti‐vice  operations  go astray attributes blame on those hired. Though there are now more enforcers on board  than  before,  the  attention  to  quantity  has  not  been  met  by  a  similar attention  to quality. Like others  in  the religious department, most hired  in  this division  have  a  general  background  in  Islamic  studies,  trained  in  various disciplines  not  necessarily  related  to  their  scope  of  work.  This  lack  of specialisation  is  not  the  case  with  their  counterparts  in  the  Syariah  judicial service where  the  latter are selected  from a specially created pool of officers – the  Syariah  Officers  Services  Scheme  (Skim  Perkhidmatan  Pegawai  Syariah)  – equipped  with  the  required  legal  expertise  to  ensure  that  they  have  more competence for their jobs.482   Additionally,  religious  enforcers  come with  different  levels  of  qualifications.483 Some  only  possess  a  secondary  school‐leaver’s  certificate  (SPM,  Sijil  Pelajaran Malaysia) with  a  credit  in  Islamic  Studies,  or  the  equivalent  of  this  but  from a government‐approved religious school. Successful candidates start at the bottom of  the  bureaucratic  hierarchy  as  Religious  Affairs  Assistants  (Pembantu  Hal Ehwal Islam).484 Others hold diplomas and enter at the level of Assistant Officer                                                         482 This scheme was introduced in 1985 and revised in 1991 (Sheikh Ghazali, 2001:62). 483 All, however, must pass the required Arabic and/or Bahasa Malaysia language tests. 484 This position corresponds to the salary grades S17, S22 and S26 where in 2009, monthly wages ranged from RM820 to RM3,260. There was another post created in 2002, that of Junior Religious Affairs Assistant. This was for those who were even less qualified, i.e. possessing only a lower secondary school‐leaver’s certificate (SRP, Sijil Rendah Pelajaran or PMR, Penilaian Menengah Rendah) with a credit in Islamic studies. Applicants who had been through a government‐approved religious school with the required language skills could also apply for this post. Following an upgrading exercise in 2009, this designation was dissolved and existing staff had the option of being promoted to Religious Affairs Assistants or remaining as Junior 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for Religious Affairs (Penolong Pegawai Hal Ehwal Islam).485 The highest ranked are  those with  tertiary  credentials,  either  from  a  local  university  or  one  from overseas,  usually  the  Middle  East.486  Entering  the  service  as  Religious  Affairs Officers  (Pegawai  Hal  Ehwal  Islam),  these  graduates  end  up  in  the  top  posts within  a  division  of  the  Islamic  Department,487  mostly  as  Principal  Assistant Directors or Assistant Directors.  Going  by  the  experience  of  JAWI,  the  vast  majority  of  those  employed  by  the Enforcement  division  come  from  the  first  category,  i.e.  the  Religious  Affairs Assistants.488 For example, out of 34 posts in the JAWI section dealing with anti‐vice  operations  in  2009,489  21  were  filled  by  those  hired  as  Religious  Affairs Assistants.  Only  five  were  Religious  Affairs  Officers.490  Given  their  low educational qualifications, religious personnel from this category are sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                              Assistants till their contracts expired. See Government of Malaysia (2009), Penjumudan Skim Perkhidmatan Pembantu Rendah Hal Ehwal Islam, Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 13 Tahun 2009, JPA(S)(BPO)324/14/1‐10 Klt.5 (63). 485 Those taking up this post can enter at three salary grades: S27, S32, or S38.  486 In the past, these have included the following universities: Al‐Azhar, Cairo, Alexandria, Ain Shams, and Assiut (all in Egypt) and Omm Al‐Qura, Al‐Malek Saud, Al‐Malek Feisal, Al‐Malek Abdul Aziz, Iman Mohamad bin Saud, Madinah (all in Saudi Arabia). See Government of Malaysia, Penetapan Semula Nilai Taraf Baru Bagi Kelayakan‐Kelayakan Ijazah Sarjana Muda dalam Bidang Sastera dan Sains Kemasyarakatan dari Universiti‐Universiti di Mesir dan Arab Saudi, Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 10 Tahun 2006. There are also graduates from other Middle Eastern universities in countries like Jordan and Morocco.  487 Their salary grades are S41 and S44. As indicated earlier, each religious department is broken down into different sections or divisions. In 2009, for example, JAWI had seven divisions, each with numerous subdivisions. 488 A high‐level Syariah official in Terengganu confirmed that this too was the practice there. Apart from the Head of the Enforcement unit, there were three other officers, while the remaining 28 personnel were SPM certificate holders with only a ‘basic’ understanding of Islam (Interview with ‘Hassan’, 2 Jun 2009).  489 The Enforcement Division comprises different units. Besides the Prevention and Operations unit, the other units provide training to the enforcement officers, disseminate information, handle enquiries and complaints, conduct surveillance and investigations, compile data and coordinate counselling services for offenders. 490 The remaining eight positions were for photographers and drivers (Malaysia, Senarai Perjawatan di Kementerian‐kementerian dan Jabatan‐jabatan dalam Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 2010, Jilid 1, pB6‐248. 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judged as the weak link in Syariah enforcement.491 Yet, it is possible for them to end up heading the Enforcement unit of a District Religious Affairs Office (PAID, Pejabat Agama Islam Daerah) provided they have Grade S22 credentials, which can be obtained with some years of work experience.492  Another frequently cited problem relates to the training and exposure offered to the religious enforcers. According  to some officials, unlike agencies such as  the police  that  provide  regular  physical  and  skills  training  over  one’s  years  of service,  a  programme  of  this  nature  is  not  accorded  to  staff  in  the  religious department.493 Presumably, this is a bigger problem when it involves personnel who are hired on a casual or contract basis. Often drawn from mosque officials (i.e. imam, bilal, nazir, siak, etc.)494 and RELA (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia), a volunteer corps set up to maintain law and order, most of these recruits have minimal  knowledge  about  the  law,  the  rights  of  those  detained,  or  the procedures for arrest.495  Rather than due to a lack of opportunities – there are ample government training programmes nationwide  –  some authorities  believe  that  the problem  is  one of 
                                                        491 Interview with ‘Suraya’, Syariah lawyer and academic, 5 Feb 2010. 492 Malaysia (2009), Penjumudan Skim Perkhidmatan Pembantu Rendah Hal Ehwal Islam, Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 13 Tahun 2009, JPA(S)(BPO)324/14/1‐10 Klt.5 (63). 493‘Penguatkuasa agama profesional kurang’, Berita Harian, 4 Nov 2009, p32. This suggestion to give Syariah enforcement officials the same kind of training as the police is not new. The idea has been in circulation since the late 1970s, but there remains no change four decades on (‘Kertas Kerja Rancangan Lima Tahun (1978‐1983) bagi Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan’, in Jabatan Perdana Menteri Pentadbiran Ugama Islam (1980), Anggaran Belanja Mengurus 1979). 494 Under ‘Syariah’ law, mosque officials are empowered to detain offenders without a warrant. When this happens, however, they are required to immediately bring those detained to the nearest religious enforcement officer or the nearest police station so that the person(s) can be formally rearrested (See for example, the Syariah Criminal Procedure (Federal Territories) Act, 1997 (Act 560), S18 and S20). 495 Siti Zubaidah Ismail, 2007:3. 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poor coordination between the existing training centres.496 Specifically,  the fact that  there  is  no  common  national  programme  that  is  mandatory  for  Syariah enforcers  across  all  States,  so  that  they  can  be  subjected  to  the  same modules and exposed  to  the  same knowledge, has been viewed as a  stumbling block.497 Consequently,  where  a  lack  of  appropriate  knowledge  about  the  laws  and techniques  to  conduct  investigations  and  arrests  could  be  rectified  through systematic  and  specialised  training programmes,  this  option does not  exist  for most religious enforcers.   Also cited, was how, different to police personnel who are dedicated to the task of  upholding  the  law,  employees  of  religious  departments  –  including  those  in the Enforcement division –  are  subjected  to  changing portfolios. Depending on what vacancies are available and the priority assigned to filling these, someone who is an experienced enforcement officer one day, can find him/herself sitting at  the  desk  of  a  dakwah  or  welfare  officer  the  next,  especially  if  this  is  an opportunity for a promotion.   The reverse is also true when new enforcers are transferred from other divisions of the religious bureaucracy. These officials may enter their new positions with many years of experience, but this is not necessarily related to the post available. In this system of  frequent transfers,  there are even less  incentives to specialise or  increase  one’s  experience  in  a  particular  area  of  Islamic  administration.                                                         496 There are various training programmes offered both at the State (e.g. Institut Latihan dan Dakwah Selangor, ILDAS) and national level (Institut Latihan Islam Malaysia, ILIM). These cover a broad spectrum of subjects on Islamic administration (family, finance, dakwah, mosque, etc.) but also include non‐religious skills like language and computer courses (See for example, the Institut Latihan Islam Malaysia website <www.ilim.gov.my>). 497 Abdul Latif Ibrahim, 2007:10. 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Finally,  when  an  influx  of  new  staff  outnumbers  existing  personnel,  this  can cause  temporary  disruptions  in  enforcement  activities  until  the  former  have reoriented themselves to their new responsibilities.498   The  poor  performance  of  enforcement  agents  has  been  attributed  to  other factors as well. One Syariah official reduced this to four deficiencies, or the four ‘Ks’  –  kurang  sabar  (impatience),  kurang  toleransi  (intolerance),  kurang 
berwajah  manis  (an  unhappy  demeanour)  and  kurang  bertanggungjawab (irresponsible).499 On top of this, some recruits are said to be too young and lack maturity for the job,500 others not physically or psychologically up to the mark.501   There  are  also  those  who  are  unmotivated,  amongst  other  reasons,  due  to  a heavy workload. This  includes being  forced  to  take on overtime work due  to a shortage in staff, and yet because of a budget cap, cannot claim payment for the full  number  of  extra  hours  put  in.502  In  some  cases,  this  has  caused  low  staff morale and refusal to take on additional shifts.   
                                                        498 Siti Zubaidah Ismail, 2007:3. 499 Amrin A. Suratman, 2007:4. 500 Assuming age as a problem, in 2007, JAIS announced that it would set 35 as the minimum age for religious enforcers after a Bangladeshi man was robbed by two Syariah officials, both in their twenties. In fact, the authorities had made a similar promise less than a year earlier – but did not act on this – when a sex extortion case involving a 21‐year old enforcement officer came to light (‘Jais tetapkan pegawai 35 tahun ke atas buat operasi cegah maksiat’, Bernama, 11 Aug 2006; ‘Jais tightens recruitment requirement’, Bernama, 5 May 2007). 501 In a 2003 interview with some JAWI officials, they complained that enforcement problems were compounded by recruits who were not ‘manly’ enough, either because they were too effeminate or their build too small (Zulfikri Yasoa, 2006:56).  502 For example, in 2002‐2003, the approved overtime budget in JAWI was only RM56,000 but the actual claims amounted to more than RM90,000 (Zulfikri Yasoa, 2006:58). This may also explain why soliciting bribes, as the previous chapter noted, is not uncommon among religious enforcers. 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Dissatisfied with being ill equipped for their  job,503 others  insist that they need arms  to  perform  their  duties  effectively.504  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also those who lack self‐confidence and fear being sued or reported to the police for doing  their  jobs.505  All  these  help  extend  one  version  of  why  religious enforcement remains a huge challenge.  
Strengthening ‘Syariah’ Enforcement from the Centre  In December 2009, a Deputy Minister  from the Prime Minister’s Department506 declared  that  the  Federal  government  would  set  up  a  Department  of  Syariah Enforcement  and  Prosecution  to  streamline  all  related  activity  across  the thirteen States in the country.507 This, she said, would ‘stabilise and strengthen’ the  institution  of  Syariah  law  and  order  just  as  the  creation  of  the  Syariah 
                                                        503 For example, religious officials claimed that the 2005 Zouk raid (see Chapter 5) was severely impeded because they had only one breathalyser and insufficient handcuffs for those arrested. Several others have claimed that this is what gives rise to criticism of Islamic enforcers (Amrin A. Suratman, 2007:7). 504 In 1995, Terengganu announced that its Syariah officers would be trained in martial arts and using firearms, as well as start carrying guns (‘Syariah officers to be armed’, Straits Times, 22 May 1995, p28). To date, however, no religious enforcer has been allowed to bear arms (Siti Zubaidah, 2007:4). 505 Interview with ‘Nik’, local town council official in charge of Islamic affairs, 6 May 2009. Such episodes have also left Syariah enforcers feeling disempowered (Interview with ‘Hassan’, senior Syariah judge, 2 Jun 2009). 506 This was the de facto Deputy Minister of Islamic Religious Affairs, Mashitah Ibrahim. 507 She was speaking at the Fifth National Conference of Religious Enforcement Officers and Syariah Prosecutors in Melaka. In a rather odd move, her boss, the Minister, appeared in the news almost six months later, professing his support for this proposal, almost as if he had nothing to do with it even though the idea had been announced by his deputy (‘Minister supports federal syariah enforcement and prosecution’, 18 May 2010, TMI, <http://www.themalaysianinsider. com/malaysia/article/minister‐supports‐federal‐syariah‐enforcement‐and‐prosecution/>, Accessed: 18 May 2010). This disconnect stands out because it suggests that either there was a lack of communication between the two – which seems unlikely – or the national Islamic authorities were taking every opportunity to reiterate the importance of the Federal project. 
 176 
Judiciary Department  of Malaysia  and  the mufti  departments  in  the  late 1990s had done.508   With  only  1,114  Syariah  enforcers  and  400  Syariah  prosecutors  for  the  entire nation, she claimed that these numbers were not only extremely inadequate but also  small  compared  to  other  civil  enforcement  agencies.  The  proposed Department would come with more personnel to ensure better implementation of  the  law.  It would  also  help  clear  the  backlog  of  cases  at  the  Syariah  courts, which  though  improving  since  setting‐up  the  Syariah  Judiciary  Department, continues to be constrained by a shortage of good prosecutors.509   In many ways,  this announcement came as a  surprise. After all,  the complaints about Syariah enforcement – from its inadequate numbers to the unprofessional and poorly equipped staff – have been expressed for some time. Why, after years of neglect – bearing in mind that right up to 2008 the Federal budget for ‘Islamic’ Enforcement  and  Prosecution was  the  smallest  out  of  all  its  divisions510  –  did enforcement and prosecution become worthy of Federal attention?   
                                                        508 Prior to this, Syariah courts and mufti offices operated as units within the State religious departments. When the Federal government introduced the Syariah Judiciary Department of Malaysia (JKSM, Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia) in March 1998, supposedly to streamline operations across all States, it gained control over matters like remuneration, promotions, training and transfers of legal and judicial officers (JAKIM, 2003:10; ‘Syariah court staff to be placed under Federal List’, NST, 15 Mac 1997, p14). There is no equivalent body like the JKSM for the various State mufti offices. Instead, like with the religious departments, JAKIM takes the lead at the national level. For example, it coordinates the national conference of muftis, the official national fatwa website, etc. 509  ‘Peranan jabatan agama Islam negeri diambil alih’, Berita Harian, 9 Dec 2009, p6. 510 This stood at RM2.3 million versus RM236 million for religious education and training (Malaysia, Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 2009, p124). 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On  one  hand,  it  is  possible  that  after  repeatedly  bemoaning  the  matter  and speaking of its intentions to improve the enforcement of and prosecution under ‘Syariah’  law,  the  central  authorities  finally  decided  to  walk  the  talk.  Their decision  would  also  have  been  influenced  by  the  increasingly  frequent  news reports  of  problematic  religious  moral  policing  initiatives,511  and  a  desire  to correct this picture which cast Islam in a negative light.  On  the  other  hand,  though  the  announcement may  have  appeared  abrupt,  the intention  to  set‐up  another  national‐level  Syariah  department  was  not.512  As already  noted,  the  Federal  mission  to  streamline  and  standardise  Islam, ostensibly to make its administration easier and better for all Muslims, pre‐dates Islamisation of the 1980s. From the late 1990s onwards, however, these efforts increased in intensity as the Federal state became more acutely conscious of the importance  in centralising control over Muslims and their  faith. Syariahtisation became  the main  vehicle  to  eliminate  any other understanding  and practice of Islam, save what the UMNO‐led BN national government deemed appropriate.   The  idea  that  a  true  believer  has  to  express  his  or  her  sexuality  within  the heteronormative framework sits comfortably within this state version of  Islam. Better  known as Ahli  Sunnah Wal  Jamaah,  this  has  been promoted  as  the  only legitimate brand of Islam in the country.513 It has little tolerance for any one or 
                                                        511 See below for some examples. 512 Closer observation of the 2010 Malaysian budget tabled a month before the announcement of the new Department was made (October 2009), reveals that unlike past years, there was no expenditure projected under the line item for Islamic ‘enforcement and prosecution’. It suggests that plans to improve this programme, though not made public, were well in place by then. 513 This term was officially introduced by way of a fatwa banning the practice of Shia Islam in Malaysia. The decree issued by the National Fatwa Council in May 1996 instead stated that all 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group who questions or contravenes its dictates, including those with heterodox sexualities. One interviewee aptly summed up this situation:  [N]owadays so [much] kacau bilau [confusion], because the problem with the  religion  is  you  cannot  question.  Jadi  kelam  kabut  [So  it  becomes chaotic] because cannot question. [Yet Muslims] have their own thinking, their own perception about religion…514   




 There  is  little  consensus  about  these  laws  that  aim  at  regulating  morality because they were poorly conceived, drafted and passed with hardly any public involvement.517 This  is another reason why  their application has been difficult. Though hard  to generalise about enforcement officers –  they  range  from  those who are sincere and apologetic to those who are opportunistic and obnoxious518 –  vaguely  defined  provisions  have  compounded matters  by making  these  laws even more susceptible to abuse by errant members of the religious bureaucracy. Indeed, 25 years after the first SCO law was passed, its ability to foster a morally upright Muslim populace remains doubtful.  The  former head of  the dakwah  group  Jamaah  Islah Malaysia  (JIM)  is  similarly critical  about  state  attempts  at  correcting  Muslim  morality  through  coercive means.  He  points  out  that  the  original  objective  of  Syariah  was  not  aimed  at punishment but prevention and education, ‘to make Muslims bertaqwa’ (be God‐fearing). Islam, he said, is ‘very reluctant’ about using ‘authority’ and regulation to secure compliance among its believers, preferring instead that this come from one’s conscience.519 Despite this, today’s Islamic enforcers demonstrate none of this restraint where Muslims – and their morality – are concerned. ‘Just because they  have  the  authority  to  arrest’,  he  summed,  ‘they  flout  their  powers, worse 
                                                        517 The argument here is that matters of public morality need to be discussed and defined by all Malaysians rather than a small group of religious ‘experts’, and that such process must be transparent and democratic. 518 Interview with ‘Jubu’, former human rights and gay rights activist, 20 May 2009.  519 He also pointed out that just like during the time of Caliph Omar, the introduction of Islamic laws can be postponed (‘moratorium’) if the process of educating society to fully understand and embrace Islam is incomplete. Unsurprisingly, this position is seldom heard in public (Interview with ‘Mohamad’, 24 Dec 2009). 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than  the  SB  [Special Branch]’.520  Sharing  these  sentiments,  a  Syariah  lawyer  in Kelantan  said  that  law  enforcement  was  difficult  because  the  authorities  had failed to educate the people: You cannot tell people what to do. Instead you need to berhikmah, advise in a friendly manner… Enforcement [should be] the last resort.521 Ironically,  the reality  is  that enforcement has been the  last resort, at  least  from the viewpoint of budget allocations of religious departments as indicated earlier.   After the spate of misadventures and subsequent criticisms of religious enforcers that peaked in the mid‐2000s, the authorities look to be treading more carefully in  their  quest  to  uphold  Islamic  morality.  The  previously  mentioned  Zouk incident, and the high‐profile case of a Malay woman who sued the government after being publically humiliated during a JAWI raid,522 appear to have been the turning  point.  Since  then,  there  have  scarcely  been  any  more  media  reports about anti‐vice operations of the same scale or manner that have gone awry.523  
                                                        520 The Special Branch is the Malaysian secret police, infamous for their covert tactics against those the government labels as security threats to the nation. The interviewee also confessed that when the Zouk raid happened in 2005, he had doubts whether or not the religious enforcers had been as heavy‐handed as reported. After witnessing first‐hand how JAIS officials arrested the former Perlis mufti, Muhd Asri Zainul Abidin, for giving a sermon without a permit (tauliah) in late 2009, he realised that these allegations were true (Interview with ‘Mohamad’, 24 Dec 2009). 521 Interview with ‘Rosli’, 6 May 2009. 522 The woman was refused use of the toilet while waiting to be taken away to the religious department to be charged. Forced to urinate at the back of the truck instead, a RELA volunteer took advantage of the situation and photographed her in the act (‘”Humiliation” case: Eight give statements’, NST, 8 Apr 2003, p5). A Syariah official confirmed that the episode had embarrassed JAWI and given it a ‘bad name’ (Personal communication with JL, researcher, 10 Jan 2009). Since then, the religious authorities have been a lot more cautious about including RELA in their enforcement operations. 523 This does not indicate that moral policing has stopped or that they are conducted with greater propriety. Rather, it means that the Syariah lobby is more conscious of the repercussions of bad publicity and have taken steps to minimise its exposure (ibid.). As recent random investigations also show, the authorities are still conducting patrols and raids where human rights violations occur but these are rarely publicly exposed in the media. 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According to one religious bureaucrat, rather than arrests, bodies like JAWI have reverted  to  the  ‘soft  approach’ which  focuses  on  ‘motivating’  and  ‘counselling’ offenders.524  There  is  also  an  apparently  renewed  belief  among  other  Islamic functionaries  and  experts  about  the  value  of  families  and  communities  in promoting  good morality.  As  one  such  interviewee  put  it:  ‘[I]f  each  family  [is] empowered  to  take  care  of  their members  and  use  religion  to  educate…  there would not be all  this  improper sexualities’.525 However,  she believed as well  in the  benefits  of  self‐regulation  which  she  claimed  would  happen  if  people  had religious  education.  The  notion  that  ‘Syariah’  law  alone  is  not  enough  to safeguard Malays from maksiat (vice) has certainly become more popular of late. For example, in June 2010, the majority of panellists at a government seminar on Islamic  law  and  social  ills  concurred  that  everyone  had  to  pitch  in  to  police morality rather than leaving it to the religious authorities alone.526  Against these developments, the question of why the Federal state has proposed a  Syariah  Department  for  Enforcement  and  Prosecution  begs  to  be  asked. Instead, few have questioned why there is a need for more religious enforcement staff, or considered the  likelihood that extending the  long arm of  the state may increase problems with implementation rather than help alleviate it. Sold as an exercise to improve the administration of Islamic law, some may feel that this is a positive move. Further, after years of being told to accept official Islam without any questions, the public’s ambivalence on this matter can also be expected.                                                          524 According to this JAWI official, there has since been more awareness of how ‘[f]orcing is not a good solution’ (ibid.). 525 Interview with ‘Rafidah’, religious official, 1 Jul 2009.  526 ‘Seminar Pendekatan Undang‐Undang Islam di Malaysia dalam Menangani Gejala Sosial’, 29 Jun 2010, Putrajaya, Organised by the Syariah Section, Advisory Department, Attorney General’s Chambers. 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If  anything,  the  frequent  claims  about  Syariah  enforcement being handicapped due  to  the  small  size  of  its  personnel  needs  to  be  teased  out  further.  Firstly, though  it  is  true  that  the  actual  number  of  permanent  staff  of  a  religious enforcement unit may be small, as explained, the authorities have had the means to bolster this workforce by hiring additional staff on a contract basis. Secondly, they also have the option of using the provision under  ‘Islamic’  law that allows them  to  tap  into  the  pool  of mosque  officials  whenever moral  policing  efforts require more human resources. Thirdly, religious officers are often part of joint anti‐vice operations with other law enforcement agencies. All things considered, there  are  a  lot  more  enforcers  available  to  uphold  Islamic  law  than  official workforce statistics suggest.  That  an  emboldened  Islamic  enforcement  agency will  intrude  further  into  the lives of Muslims in Malaysia is almost a foregone conclusion. What though will its impact  be  on  non‐Muslims? Despite  the  jurisdiction  of  Syariah  laws  limited  to Muslims,  there has  been  constant  pressure  over  the  years  to  extend  it  to  non‐Muslim partners of offending Muslims as well.527 Perhaps due  to  sheer apathy, ignorance or fear of offending religious sensitivities, the majority of non‐Muslims who have developed a standard response of silence whenever it comes to Islamic matters, have not seen it necessary to question the latest proposal either.                                                          527 This discussion has usually arisen in relation to penalising non‐Muslim partners of Muslims, when both are caught for khalwat. As some have argued, the law needs to apply equally to prevent public order and morality from being undermined, a possible result if only one party (Muslims) is punished but not the other (non‐Muslims) (Mohamed Salleh Abas, 1972:lxxiii). Thus far, each time this suggestion has been made, the government, for political reasons, has reassured its non‐Muslim constituents that this will not happen. 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Conclusion  This  chapter has  argued  that  the  enforcement  of  ‘Syariah’  criminal  law – what more  corrective measures  for  sexual marginals  – has never been a priority  for the  authorities.  Looking  at  the  experiences  of  JAWI  and  JAIS,  two  prominent religious departments, has shown how up till very recently,  the hard sell about ‘Islamic’ moral standards has not been reflected in their annual budgets. Instead, these  have  privileged  matters  to  do  with  religious  education  and  dakwah. Deprived of better  resources,  this  is one  reason why  the  law’s  implementation has been challenging.  Of  even  greater  concern  is  how  enforcement  has  been made  difficult  because there is no public consensus on the objective behind the moral provisions of the law,  that  is,  to  force obedience to God. Put differently, unlike  the Syariah  lobby which believes  that complaints about religious enforcement can be rectified by plugging the gaps in implementation of the law, there are those who argue that the imposition of ‘Islamic’ law is, in and of itself, the problem, particularly when believers are not allowed to question what is held up as official Islam.  At the same time, the chapter has highlighted and critiqued the Federal proposal for a new Department of Syariah Enforcement and Prosecution. Given that both areas  have  long  been  assigned  a  second  fiddle  status  within  Islamic 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around Regulating Sexual Marginals   The preceding chapters have made  three main claims:  (i)  the enactment of  the SCO laws introduced heteronormative controls which made sexual marginality a state‐sanctioned religious crime for the first time; (ii) though ‘Islamic’ standards are upheld by the Syariah lobby as definitive of acceptable sexuality and gender in Malaysia,  the SCO provisions concerning sexual marginals have seldom been enforced;  and  (iii)  despite  the  poorly  implemented  ‘Syariah’  criminal  laws,  the observation made at the outset of this study – that today, there exists a powerful meta‐narrative which upholds heteronormativity and its rejection of those with heterodox sexualities and genders – still holds.   The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  reconcile  the  inconsistencies  arising  out  of these  observations.  It  seeks  to  explain  how  the  lives  of  gays,  lesbians  and transgenders have come to be affected by ‘Syariah’ moral dictates when religious criminal  laws  governing  their  transgressions  are  so  irregularly  implemented. What  other  factors  have  contributed  towards  the  generation  of  a  conservative and  narrow  discourse  on  sexuality  and  gender?  How  stable  and  effective  are state‐sanctioned efforts at promoting heteronormativity?  With  this  in mind,  the discussion  in  this chapter  is divided  into  four parts. The first will demonstrate the media’s role in amplifying the ‘threat’ posed by those who  do  not  conform  to  heterosexual  bounds.  Following  from  this,  part  two 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details how the greater visibility such media coverage accords sexual marginals has also spurred different levels of contestation involving ‘secular’ human rights defenders on one hand and  the Syariah  lobby on  the other.  It utilises as a case study,  the  fatwa against pengkid  (tomboys),530  to show what exactly  is at stake when moral maelstroms erupt.   The next section probes further into these contestations, and proposes that they be  understood  as  a  product  of  the  Federal  state’s  attempts  at  centralising  the control of  Islam. However, while  the convergence of different  forces under one umbrella gives the Syariah lobby added strength, the final part of this chapter is a reminder that the project of promoting a singular Islam is far from predictable, fraught  as  it  is  with  tensions  among  the  very  same  actors  its  success  is dependent upon.  
Sensational Media and ‘Perverse’ Sexualities  One of the by‐products of Malaysia’s quest for modernity has been the opening of new  spaces  and  opportunities  that  have  allowed  for  more  prominent  public articulations of sexuality. The visibility of these expressions, however, has been significantly  enhanced  by  the  role  of  the media.  Its  coverage,  for  example,  has brought greater awareness of developments such as gay and lesbian rights,  the HIV/AIDS  pandemic,  and  the  homophobic  dimension  of  the  Asian  values discourse. By the same token, it can also be argued that besides being a channel of  information,  media  agencies  in  Malaysia  have  often  overstepped  the                                                         530 A detailed account of this is provided below. 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boundaries of ethical journalism in their sensationalising of stories involving sex and sexuality.   For  instance,  a  sample  of  the  news  headlines  of  leading  dailies  –  ‘Tudung‐clad teens who are hooked on sex’  (The Star, 5  Jan 2009);  ‘Sex party broken up, 34 rounded up at  shoplot’  (The Star, 6 Nov 2007);  ‘Moral decay at alarming  level’ (NST, 20 Aug 2005); ‘Student’s lesbian sex romp video makes the rounds’, (NST, 23 Sept 2003);  ‘Authorities bust  transvestite beauty pageant’  (The Star, 30 Oct 2002) – reveal that they are little different to those of tabloids (e.g. ‘Homosexual activity, masturbation  heighten  risk  of  infections  (Kegiatan  homoseksual,  onani 
mudah  terdedah  jangkitan)’,  (Harian Metro, 10 Aug 2008);  ‘60 gay vice centres traced  (60  pusat maksiat  gay  dikesan)’,  (Harian Metro,  13 Oct  2000)).  They  all rely on projecting the most sordid and salacious of angles to capture the interest of their audience and boost sales.531  In  so  doing,  more  often  than  not  the  local  media  has  helped  to  prop  up stereotypes  and  fuel  the  stigmatisation of  those who do not  conform  to  sexual and  gender  norms,  or  worse,  are  perceived  as  imitating  the  West.532  The combined effect of exaggerating the immoral, indecent or unnatural dimensions of  stories  with  sexual  angles  is  the  generation  of  moral  panics;  and  following from this, fear and disgust towards any sexual or gender identity that falls out of the  heteronormative  framework.  In  short,  the  media  has  drawn  far  greater attention to sexual marginals than they themselves may otherwise have elicited. 
                                                        531 On the portrayal of homosexuality in the local media, see Kaur and Alagappar (2005).  532 Interview with ‘Siti’, Muslim feminist activist and prominent social commentator, 22 Jun 2009.  
 190 
 Particularly dubious  is  their  coverage of anti‐gay operations. Reports are often presented  in  a  manner  which  deliberately  creates  the  impression  that  those apprehended  in  these raids are guilty of engaging  in homosexual activities. For such stories to work, they follow a formula where first, suspicion is cast at these men by  locating  them  in  clubs, massage parlours  or  spas,  i.e.  places which  are reputedly  ‘gay’  hangouts.  Next,  the  discovery  of  drugs  and  condoms  at  these premises is cited – in the case of the former, to add a sinister angle to the story, and  the  latter,  as  proof  that  ‘gay  activity’  has  taken  place.  As  well,  the  news headlines  that accompany  these accounts should  include  the word  ‘gay’ or  ‘sex party’ in it. This gives a raid greater legitimacy.   The  truth,  however,  is  quite  different.  Very  rarely  are  these  operations  about using  S377  of  the  Penal  Code,  much  less  the  liwat  provision  of  ‘Syariah’  law. Rather than being apprehended for engaging in ‘unnatural’ sex, it is more likely that  those  detained  are  indicted  for  the  possession  or  use  of  drugs,  or  end  up being  released  without  any  charges.  In  November  2007,  for  example, newspapers  reported  that  acting  on  a  tip‐off,  the  authorities  in  Penang  had busted into a fitness centre to stop a gay sex party which was in progress. Thirty‐seven men were arrested and the police were reported as having seized  ‘seven tubes  of  lubrication  jelly,  20  gay  magazines,  four  pornographic  VCDs  and  six boxes of condoms’.533   
                                                        533 ‘Sex party broken up, 34 rounded up at shoplot’, The Star, 6 Nov 2007, <http://thestar.com.my /news/story.asp?file=/2007/11/6/nation/19385785&sec=nation>, Accessed: 6 Nov 2007. 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Far from the picture painted by the media, first‐hand witnesses insisted that no ‘sex  party’  had  taken  place.534  One  informant  who  was  among  those apprehended,  confirmed  that  the  patrons  of  the  centre were  hauled  off  to  the police  station  –  over  an  hour  after  they  had  been  rounded  up  –  and  harshly treated  only  after  the  owner  failed  to  show  up,  presumably  to  work  out  an ‘arrangement’ (read: bribe) with the authorities.535 After being remanded in the police lock‐up for two nights, all were released, humiliated but never charged.  More  importantly,  the  informant  highlighted  how  the  media  colludes  to demonise  those  who  are  caught  in  such  operations.  Though  there  were  no reporters  present  during  the  raid  –  instead  they  were  at  the  police  station waiting  to photograph  those  arrested when  they  arrived – news write‐ups  the next  day  carried  all  kinds  of  allegations  about what  had  transpired during  the raid.  Without  being  there,  one  press  was  able  to  report  that  the  police  had stumbled upon two towel‐clad men getting ready for sex. The same respondent also  claimed  that  it  is  common  for  the  media  to  write  their  stories  based  on official  press  statements  issued  by  the  authorities.  Their  presence  during  an operation is thus not required for a news story to appear the next day. Reusing file photos from previous operations is also done, as he himself  found out after 
                                                        534 ‘No sex party going on at Penang fitness centre, say those arrested’, Fridae, 22 Nov 2007, <http://www.fridae.com/newsfeatures/2007/11/22/1946.no‐sex‐party‐going‐on‐at‐penang‐fitness‐centre‐say‐those‐arrested>, Accessed: 1 Dec 2010. 535 According to the informant, only then did the police start to search the premises. This was also when they supposedly found the gay paraphernalia and condoms. The authorities even claimed that they had discovered a wall and floor full of semen upstairs as if to justify treating those detained as suspects (Personal email communication with EG, 3 Jul 2011). 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seeing picture with his face accompany a report about an entirely different ‘sex party’ raid in 2008, one which he did not attend.536  Another  interviewee  believed  that  the  manner  in  which  the  media  featured stories  about  ‘gay’  raids was  deliberately  to  shame  and  degrade  those  caught. This,  she argued, was a more effective  tool  to warn others about  staying away from such outlawed activity. Especially  for  those who are not open about  their sexual  identity,  the danger  comes not only  from  the  threat of being charged  in court  but  from  news  write‐ups  and/or  accompanying  photographs  which insinuate that they are gay.537 Not only is the latter a form of harassment, it can result  in  certain  individuals  being  fired  from  their  jobs  as  well,  or  worse, disowned by their families.538   
Contestations to the Fore  In recent years, the expansion and assertion of Islam has been met with greater resistance. This has largely occurred in relation to disputes around matters such as  conversion539  and  interreligious marriages.540 More  intense  fights  have  also                                                         536 Other unscrupulous tactics include going undercover to obtain exclusive stories about gay and lesbian transgressions. See for example ‘Pesta lesbian’, Harian Metro, 12 Aug 2009, <http://www. hmetro.com.my/Thursday/BeritaUtama/20090812234547/Article>, Accessed: 14 Aug 2010. 537 Interview with ‘Sheila’, sex workers community organiser, 14 Nov 2009. 538 Because these raids are very seldom about charging these men in court for their ‘gay’ activities, there has been at least one known incident where a man implicated through the photos of a ‘gay’ raid successfully sued the offending newspaper for defamation. Understandably, however, such victories are rare with most victims preferring to avoid further limelight (Interview with ‘Jubu’, former human rights and gay rights activist, 20 May 2009). 539 Possibly the most infamous conversion case in contemporary Malaysia is that of Lina Joy, a Malay woman who became a Christian only to have her decision later revoked by the state. Around the mid‐ to late‐2000s, there were also a series of ‘body snatching’ cases where the religious authorities had incurred the wrath of non‐Muslims by denying several families the right to claim the remains of their family members, insisting that the latter had embraced Islam before dying (See Saravanamuttu, 2010). 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surfaced  around  the  issue  of  moral  policing.  As  the  Syariah  system  becomes more institutionalised and regularised, so too have the contestations around its moral dictates. The earliest encounter of  this kind occurred  in  July 1997, when three Malay women were arrested for participating in a local beauty pageant in Selangor.  For  many  women’s  rights  advocates  especially,  this  incident  was  a shock as it was the first time they were learning not only about the SCO law but also, its extensive controls over women’s bodies.541 They objected to the charge that these three women had behaved ‘indecently’, the manner that they had been detained, as well as the double standards in the law’s application.542  The  chorus  against  the  moral  provisions  of  SCO  laws  grew  louder  in  the  late 1990s  and  early  2000s  each  time  other  high‐handed  actions  of  the  religious authorities came to light. Ironically, the flipside of the media’s biased coverage of sexual  marginals  and  non‐conforming  heterosexuals  has  been  greater  public awareness of law enforcement operations that have gone wrong. Combined with a  stronger  and  more  outspoken  civil  society  since  the  mid‐1990s,543  this  has produced visible objections to state‐sanctioned  incursions  into people’s private lives.  In  2005,  for  example,  the  initiative  known  as  Malaysians  Against  Moral Policing  organised  itself  around  the  Zouk  raid  and  violations  against  the mak                                                                                                                                                               540 On this, see Maznah Mohamad et al. (2009). 541 The law in Selangor was adopted in 1995. Much earlier in the late 1980s, the media had also highlighted the law’s application in Kelantan but only about the offence of consuming alcohol. Significantly, public outrage then was practically non‐existent. Most, it would seem, were unaware at the time about the potential consequences of it passage. 542 Women’s groups questioned why the law on indecency did not apply to the male participants of a bodybuilding contest held at the same time. See Norani Othman (1998).  543 Though not without shortcomings, the rise of a globally led discourse on human rights and women’s rights from the 1990s onwards has contributed to a more vibrant civil society in Malaysia. For example, it facilitated the inclusion of a chapter on sexuality in a NGO manifesto for the 1999 general election. This in turn paved the way for women’s groups to adopt a rights‐based approach to such issues (Ng, et al., 2006). However, these efforts have mostly been ad‐hoc and not sustained. 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nyah  community  discussed  earlier.  Similar  protests  have  taken  place  against extending ‘religious’ standards of morality to non‐Muslims.544  These agitations in defence of sexual and bodily rights, however, have not gone unchallenged.  In  a  climate  where  Islam  is  highly  politicised,  it  has  become common for acts of resistance to moral policing by the religious authorities to be met by counter‐protests.545 These are backed by the same social forces, referred to  earlier  as  the  Syariah  lobby,  which  justify  their  actions  in  the  name  of upholding the good name and position of Islam in the country.   
The pengkid fatwa Examining the clash that erupted at the end of 2008 over the  fatwa on pengkid can help show how contestations of this nature have tended to unfold, and who exactly are the actors who form this entity called the Syariah  lobby.  In October that year, news of the National Fatwa Council’s decision to pronounce pengkid as 
haram  (forbidden)  was  widely  reported  in  both  the  local  and  international media. Some English language news agencies concluded that this meant lesbian sex  had  been  criminalised;  others  understood  it  as  prohibiting  women  from dressing like men or behaving like tomboys.546 The confusion around what was 
                                                        544 Involving a young Chinese couple, the ‘handholding’ case as it came to be known, is a good example of this kind of protest. News of their arrest for behaving ‘indecently’ in a local park in August 2003 appeared after they had gone to the media. They claimed that they had been slapped with summonses because they had refused to settle the matter with a bribe (‘No kissing please, we are Malaysians!’, The Sun, 4 Apr 2006). The incident sparked much debate in the English press, with many speaking out against the actions of the authorities. 545 Apart from the experience with the Zouk raid, there was another hotly contested incident around the arrest of a Muslim woman, Kartika Dewi Shukarno, punished with a fine of RM5,000 and six strokes of the cane for drinking alcohol in public. See below for details. 546 ‘Fatwa on tomboys’, The Star, 24 Oct 2008, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file= /2008/10/24/nation/2362908&sec=nation>, Accessed: 25 Oct 2008 and ‘Fatwa council bans lesbian sex’, Malaysiakini, 24 Oct 2008, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/91861>, Accessed: 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which  oppresses  women’.549  Separately,  other  civil  society  actors  joined  in  to criticise  the  fatwa  –  some whose  opinions were  solicited  by  the media,  others who  spoke  out  on  their  own  initiative.  Among  these  were  Sisters  in  Islam,  a Muslim  women’s  NGO  but  branded  a  ‘liberal’  Islam  organisation  by  its detractors,  and  the  Women’s  Aid  Organisation,  a  prominent  women’s  rights group.550 It bears repeating that these dissenting groups were given substantial media coverage.  The  Syariah  lobby  reacted  to  these  widely  publicised  criticisms  but  these responses  varied  according  to  its  different  stakeholders.  One  discernible grouping  consisted  of  state  religious  functionaries  i.e.  Federal  government leaders and Islamic bureaucrats.551 One of the first off the mark was the then de 








the  Internal  Security Act556  to  be  used  on  non‐Muslims who  questioned  Islam. This,  a member  of  its  Supreme Council  argued, would  ensure  that  no  one  else would dare to challenge decisions of the nation’s Islamic institutions in future.557 Another  body,  Majlis  Amal  Islami  Malaysia,  attempted  to  rally  other  Muslim NGOs to prevent what it deemed as attempts to lead people astray from Islam.558 Also  incensed  was  the  Persatuan  Peguam  Syarie  Malaysia  (PGSM,  Malaysian Syariah  Lawyers  Association),  which  wanted  the  government  to  use  the provisions under Syariah law to prosecute those who challenged the sanctity of Islam by questioning the credibility of the fatwa council.559   The  pengkid  fatwa  episode  continued  to  play  out  in  the  print  and  electronic media  well  over  a  month  after  the  story  broke,  an  unusually  long  duration considering the media’s usual attention span. The extended coverage, however, was  also  due  to  the  additional  impetus  the  story  received  following  the announcement of another controversial fatwa,  this time on the issue of yoga.560 The  debates  around  this  fatwa  confirmed  that  the  countermovement  to  those who objected to the earlier pengkid decree was not particularly motivated by a desire  to  prop‐up  Islamic  standards  of  morality.  Rather,  they  were  aimed  at                                                         556 This draconian legislation allows the government to detain anyone indefinitely without trial. 557 ‘NGO pertikai fatwa perlu dikenakan ISA’, Utusan Malaysia, 15 Nov 2008, <http://www. utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=1115&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_10.htm&arc=hive>, Accessed: 25 Nov 2008. 558 ‘Pengkid: MAIM gesa NGO Islam bersatu’, Utusan Malaysia, 17 Nov 2008, <http://www. utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=1117&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_14.htm&arc=hive>, Accessed: 25 Nov 2008. 559 ‘Fatwa: Ambil tindakan’, Utusan Malaysia, 24 Nov 2008, <http://www.utusan.com.my/ utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=1124&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Muka_Hadapan&pg=mh_01.htm>, Accessed: 24 Nov 2008. 560 Coming less than one month after the pengkid fatwa, this edict was even more contentious given its enforcement would have affected far more affluent and influential people (‘Fatwa Council says yoga with chanting, worshipping is prohibited’, The Star, 22 Nov 2008, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/22/nation/20081122111842&sec=nation>, Accessed: 22 Nov 2008). 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warding off criticism of the institutions that have been created to forward official Islam.  The  threats  to  those who  challenged  the  dictates  of  the National  Fatwa Council need to be seen as part of a larger goal of ensuring that no one questions what the central authorities define as authentic Islam.   This point came through even more explicitly  in the conflict around the case of Kartika  Sari  Dewi  Shukarno  that  broke  in  2009.  Though  not  about  sexual morality – Kartika was fined and given a caning sentence for consuming alcohol in public561  –  the episode once again brought home  the great  lengths  to which the  Syariah  lobby  will  go  to  guard  the  domain  of  official  Islam.  The  same ultimatums heard during the furore over the pengkid and yoga fatwa resurfaced after some civil society groups again questioned the Syariah court’s actions.562  At  the  heart  of  the matter was  a  belief  that  since  this  case  involved  a Muslim woman charged under the Syariah, only those knowledgeable about this law (i.e. the religious court and other Islamic authorities) had a right to speak and decide on  it.  The  counter  to  this,  however, was  that  though permitted  under  ‘Islamic’ law, the caning of women is prohibited by Federal legislation.563 This also meant that  the  Pahang  Syariah  court  involved  had  no  jurisdiction  to  impose  such  a                                                         561 Although not the only Muslim woman to be sentenced in the State of Pahang for this offence, she was the first who chose not to appeal against it. 562 See for example ‘Usah pertikai keputusan mahkamah tinggi syariah’, Berita Harian, 25 Aug 2009, <http://www.bharian.com.my/Current_News/bh/Tuesday/Nasional/20090825010704/ Article/index_html>, Accessed: 25 Aug 2009; ‘PAS backs caning, rejects Bar’s premise’, 
Malaysiakini, 26 Aug 2009, <www.malaysiakini.com/news/111433>, Accessed: 26 Aug 2009; ‘Kartika caning undermines ‘moderate Islam’ image: Sis’, The Star, 30 Sept 2009, <http://thestar. com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/9/30/nation/20090930175135&sec=nation>, Accessed: 30 Sept 2009; ‘Muslim NGOs ask Sis, non‐Muslims to back‐off’, TMI, 3 Oct 2009, <http://www. themalaysianinsider.com/Malaysia/article/Muslim‐NGOs‐ask‐SIS‐non‐Muslims‐to‐back‐off‐/>, Accessed: 3 Oct 2009. 563 See the Criminal Procedure Code, S231. Also exempted are men above 50 years of age and those sentenced to death. 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sentence  on  Kartika.  This  detail  regarding  the  limits  of  State  powers  was acknowledged  by  the  Syarie  Chief  Judge  of  Kelantan  just  months  before  the Kartika story emerged,564 but this viewpoint was drowned out in the subsequent public debate.   Although the case was officially closed after the Sultan of Pahang – who is legally empowered  to  pardon  Muslim  offenders  –  intervened  to  commute  Kartika’s caning  sentence  to  three  weeks  of  community  service,565  it  epitomised  the difficulties  in  contesting  official  Islam  in Malaysia.  Suffice  to  say here,  the pro‐caning  lobby  was  extremely  loud  but  how  much  of  this  was  fuelled  by  those wanting her punished for committing an Islamic offence and how much of it was linked to those wanting to make a point about the supremacy of the Syariah,  is worth considering.   Though the answer most likely lies somewhere in between, not enough attention has  been  given  to  the  latter.  As  with  Syariah  offences  of  a  sexual  nature,  the Kartika affair is a reminder that the impetus to control and punish transgressors is not always about upholding morality. Instead, it can follow a larger narrative where reclaiming the position of the Syariah as law of the land is paramount, or if not that, ensuring that it is at least equal in status to English common law.566  
                                                        564 Daud Muhammad, 2009. 565 Importantly, this decision was only taken after the Home Minister unexpectedly announced some weeks earlier that three other Muslim women had already been caned for engaging in pre‐marital sex. The combination of doing this but averting the same fate for Kartika was possibly the ‘best’ solution for the Najib administration. This way, it could show the UMNO‐led government’s seriousness in upholding ‘Islamic’ law at the same time preserve Malaysia’s ‘moderate’ Muslim nation tag which was perceived as key in wooing foreign investors (Tan, 2010). 566 This is why early agitations to widen the scope of the Muslim Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965 – even before it was amended in 1984 – contemplated giving religious judges the power to hand out sentences of up to 24 lashes of the cane which is the limit of civil courts 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When  ‘secular’  and  ‘religious’  forces  collide,  the  former  has  sometimes  been accused of attacking Malay rights. This too is the work of the Syariah lobby but traceable to another camp, one whose members are ultra‐ethnonationalists and usually  pro‐establishment  (i.e.  pro‐UMNO).  Their  modus  operandi  to  push  a Malay  supremacy  agenda  involves  deliberately  conflating  the  defence  of  Islam with a defence of Malay rights. This movement grew louder after the outcome of the 13th general election in March 2008 changed the nation’s political landscape. As traditional beneficiaries of ethnic‐based politics, its members are fearful that the gains made by  the opposition PR coalition will put an end to  the privileges they used to enjoy under UMNO’s rule.   It  is  important  to differentiate  this subgroup of Syariah  lobbyists  from another faction which can be as vociferous about religious rights but sticks to pushing for an Islamic system of governance. Believing that this will yield a better outcome than  that  currently  prevailing  under  the  ‘secular’  set‐up,  its  members  mostly steer  clear  of  ‘ethnicising’  religion.  Since  it  publically  turned  its  back  on 
assabiyah (i.e. tribalism but in this context chauvinistic Malay nationalism) in the early 1980s, PAS  is  a prime example of  this grouping within  the Syariah  lobby that favours Islamic nationalism.567  
                                                                                                                                                              (‘Caning in jails not according to the laws of Islam’, Straits Times, 3 May 1978, p11), a goal that continues to be pursued till today. 567 This switch was made after it lost badly in the 1982 general election. 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Figure 1: This photograph captures what the Syariah lobby found offensive about the pengkid fatwa protests.  Given  their  opportunistic  tendencies,  it  was  not  surprising when  one  of  these ultra  ethnonationalist  organisations,  Pewaris,  emerged  during  the pengkid and yoga  fatwa  controversies,  claiming  that  Islam  and  Malay  rights  had  to  be defended  –  despite  the  latter  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  issue  at  hand.568 Among the banners the group displayed at a gathering it organised in Melaka569 was  one  about  the pengkid  fatwa  (see  Figure  1).  Alongside  other  banners  that day  –  with  captions  like  ‘Jangan  sentuh  ketuanan  Melayu  (Don’t  touch  Malay rights)’, ‘Hapuskan sekolah Cina dan Tamil (Abolish Chinese and Tamil schools)’, ‘Melayu banyak bertolak ansur dan sekarang tiada  lagi (Malays have been very accommodating but now no more)’,  and  ‘Dasar Ekonomi Baru 30%, Kita mahu                                                         568 ‘Pewaris anjur jelajah pertahan hak bumiputera’, Utusan Malaysia, 24 Nov 2008, <http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=1124&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_01.htm>, Accessed: 24 Nov 2008. 569 Capturing the overall sentiments of the organisers, the banner advertising the event in December 2008 read: ‘Babi berleluasa, Melayu sibuk merebut kuasa, Tuan menjadi hamba, Melayu yang semakin menderita – semua orang Melayu (Islam) dijemput hadir hari bebas politik demi perpaduan Melayu’ (‘Pigs are everywhere, Malays are busy fighting for power, Master becomes slave, (the ordinary) Malays are increasingly suffering – Calling all Malays (Muslims) to attend a day free of party politics for Malay unity’) (my translation). 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70% (New Economic Policy 30%, We want 70%)’ – it is evident that the pengkid 
fatwa  banner  was  more  a  warning  to  non‐Malays  to  steer  clear  of  Muslim matters  –  and  by  implication,  Malay  privilege  –  rather  than  being  about  the unlawfulness of pengkid per se.  
Centralisation and Control  Having  highlighted  how  moral  clashes  in  Malaysia  can  very  quickly  descend down  the path of  debate  about  religious  and  ethnic  rights,  this  section  takes  a closer  look  at  the  different  encounters  between  ‘secular’  and  Syariah  forces  – including but not limited to the subject of morality. In so doing, it hopes to make it  apparent  that  often,  religious  functionaries  at  the  centre  can  been  found helping to stir the pot of controversy.   For  instance,  just  like  the  pengkid  and  yoga  fatwa,  the  counter‐protesters  to human  rights  defenders  during  the  Kartika  episode  were  given  greater legitimacy  by  the  official  voice  lent  by  JAKIM.  No  sooner  had  criticisms  of Kartika’s  sentence  been  aired,  the  JAKIM  head  branded  those who  questioned the  Syariah  court’s  decision  to  mete  out  caning  sentences  as  ‘extremists’.  He argued that they were barking up the wrong tree because  ‘it was clear that the [Syariah] Court was acting in accordance to the law’.570 He omitted the fact that 
                                                        570 He was responding in particular to a press statement by Sisters in Islam criticising the Prisons Department for surreptitiously caning three Muslim women sentenced under Syariah for allegedly having unlawful sex (‘KP Jakim: Pihak pertikai hukuman sebat pelampau’, TMI, 21 Feb 2010, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/bahasa/53859‐kp‐jakim‐pihak‐pertikai‐hukuman‐sebat‐pelampau>, Accessed: 23 Mac 2010). 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the  SCO  legislation  itself  was  contentious  because  of  the  non‐transparent  and covert manner in which it had been passed.   As  well,  Jamil  Khir  Baharom,  the  de  facto  Minister  of  Islamic  Affairs  whose auspices JAKIM falls under, seized the opportunity to warn non‐Muslims not to dispute  the  constitutionally  guaranteed  rights  of Muslims. More  disconcerting, rather  than  diffuse  an  already  tense  situation,  he  flamed  further  discord  by calling  on  Islamic  NGOs  to  collectively  safeguard  the  dignity  of  Islam  and Muslims  from  these  ‘attacks’  on  their  faith.571 Religious officials  in Pahang,  the State  where  the  offence  was  committed,  also  defended  the  Syariah  court’s decision.  However,  in  the  national  media,  these  interventions  appeared  less authoritative against the voices from the centre.572  Given  that  Islam  falls  under  the  jurisdiction  of  individual  States,  an  obvious question at this juncture would be: how is it that the Federal religious authorities have managed to  take on or be assigned with such a prominent role whenever official  Islam  is  put  to  the  test?  How  did  JAKIM  come  to  be  entrusted with  so much power and clout?  The  answer  to  these  questions  can  partly  be  located  by  deconstructing  the confusion  that  has  accompanied  the  creation  of  an  overinflated  and  unwieldy                                                         571 ‘Jangan melampaui batas pertikai hak agama Islam’, Utusan Malaysia, 21 Dis 2009, <http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2009&dt=1221&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_13.htm>, Accessed: 21 Dec 2009. 572 The one time when Pahang’s Syariah authorities spoke out, it seemed more of a reaction to the comments of the neighbouring State’s Chief Syariah Judge who had publicly opined that the caning sentence was unlawful (‘Respect court’s decision on caning Kartika’, NST, 24 Aug 2009, <http://www. nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/articles/5kativ/Article/index_html>, Accessed: 24 Aug 2009). 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Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU).576 This has  been  done  in  two  ways  –  firstly  through  the  use  of  Federal  coffers  and secondly, through state control of the media.   
Table 7.1:  National Islamic Expenditure as % of Prime Minister’s Department 
Expenditure 
Source: Compiled from Malaysia, Federal Budget Expenditure Estimates and Budget, Programmes and Performance (various years)  Strategically  placed  under  the  Prime Minister’s  Department,  national  religious programmes  for  Muslims  take  up  a  sizeable  portion  of  the  department’s operational  expenditure,  especially  considering  that  Islam  is  a  matter  for  the States  to  administer,  not  the  Federal  government.577  From  a  share  of  2.42  per cent of what the Prime Minister’s Department spent in 1975, the cost of running the federal Islamic programme grew to 9.58 per cent of this total in 1985 before peaking  at  close  to  27  per  cent  in  1995.578  Though  this  figure  fell  in  2000  to 16.42 per cent, and then to 13.34 per cent in 2005, it had climbed back to 17.64 per  cent  in  2009  –  i.e.  still  more  than  seven  times  its  portion  when  national                                                         576 Sanusi et. al, p47. At Rm402.1 million, JAKIM’s operating expenditure (estimate) for 2010 was the third largest in the Prime Minister’s Department (Government of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance Statement of the Federal Expenditure Estimates for 2010, Command Paper 11 of 2009). 577 The ‘Islamic’ budget also includes ‘One‐Off’ expenses and ‘New Policies’ announced on an annual basis. Besides these, a considerable amount has been channelled into ‘development’, i.e. the construction of Islamic buildings and infrastructure (e.g. mosques, surau, schools, religious offices, etc) too. In 2009, the sum total of operations and development for the Federal government’s Islamic programme stood at just under RM750 million.  578 It is beyond the scope here to examine the reasons for the variation in Islamic expenditure at the centre. Suffice to say, one reason for the huge jump witnessed in 1995 was likely to have been in response to a perceived shortage of State‐level staff with expertise on the Islamic legal system. The idea was to provide better incentives to attract quality staff thereby creating a pool of Syariah officers who could move around freely and fill vacancies that were available (‘More posts, incentives for syariah law officers’, NST, 16 Mac 1995, p6). 
Year  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2009 %  2.42  6.88  9.58  14.12  26.69  16.42  13.34  17.64 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placement  of  staff,  and  introducing  the Skim Perkhidmatan Gunasama Pegawai 
Syariah Seluruh Malaysia (Syariah Court Officers Common Users Scheme) which puts  a  larger  pool  of  religious  functionaries  under  the  authority  of  a  central institution.582  As the body tasked with coordinating national Islamic affairs, JAKIM continues to be  the  leading  Federal  body  for  Muslims.  However,  since  2003  it  has  been supported in  its mission to elevate the standing of  ‘Islamic’  laws in the country by a new outfit placed in the Attorney General’s Chambers. The job of the Syariah Section  is  to  harmonise  religious  and  civil  laws,  a  role  previously  solely undertaken  by  the  Technical  Committee  under  JAKIM’s  authority.583  It  thus handles  issues  pertaining  to  conflict  of  jurisdiction  between  civil  and  Islamic courts  such  as  matters  of  conversion,  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  and development of the Syariah judiciary system.584 As the body that the Federal and State  governments  and  their  agencies  consult  for  advice  and  comments  on ‘Islamic’ law, it may only be a matter of time that the Syariah Section supersedes JAKIM and becomes the authority on Islamic legal matters.585  
                                                        582 See Hamayotsu, 2003. The Syariah Judiciary Department was established in 1998, and a year later, the common users scheme was introduced. It is noteworthy that despite concerted efforts to persuade everyone to come on board, in the Peninsular only six states – Selangor, Melaka, Wilayah Persekutuan, Perlis, Penang and Negeri Sembilan – have joined the scheme (Abdul Ghani Patail, 2008:5). 583 The Syariah Section’s primary advisor is Sheikh Ghazali Abd Rahman who succeeded Ahmad Ibrahim as head of the Technical Committee in 1999 (JAKIM, 2003:98). See also ‘Syariah panel set up to review inconsistencies’, NST, 19 Sept 2003, p6. It is understood that the legal personnel of the Syariah Section are higher qualified, and are assigned to work on the more contentious court challenges involving Islam (Interview with ‘Suraya’, Syariah lawyer and academic who works with the religious bureaucracy, 5 Feb 2010).  584 ‘What are the functions and roles of the Syariah Section, Attorney General’s Chambers?’ FAQ Section, Official Portal of the Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia, <http://www.agc.gov. my/index.php? option=com_content&view=category&id=73%3Aagcfaqs&layout=blog&Itemid =44&lang=en>, Accessed: 10 Nov 2010. 585 See Abdul Ghani Patail, 2007:4. In the past, officers at the AG’s Chambers lacked confidence to deal with Islamic legal matters and would take a long time to give feedback to documents sent by 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Unknown to most, besides the official institutions and bodies it has created like JAKIM and the Syariah Section of  the AG’s Chambers,  the Federal executive has other  means  to  influence  how  Islam  plays  out  in  the  country.  For  example, members of  the elite arm of  the Federal civil  service,  the Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan  Diplomatik  (PTD,  Malaysian  Administrative  and  Diplomatic  Services), occupy the most important positions in the majority of the State civil service.586 They  usually  head  State  departments  and  divisions  including  the  Religious Department,  where  though  chiefs,  they  do  not  necessarily  have  the  Islamic credentials expected of other religious bureaucrats.587   As part of  the  civil  service, PTD officers are meant  to be neutral  in  conducting their  day‐to‐day  duties.  The  extent  of  their  impartiality  is  debatable,588 something which  has  become  clearer  since  the  2008  general  election.  Prior  to this,  Federal‐State  relations  were  more  amicable  because  the  administrations                                                                                                                                                               JAKIM. According to an interviewee formerly with this office, it was also a problem then because ‘if the legislation [had] anything to do with Islam, most of the AG’s officers [were] afraid even to cross a ‘t’ or dot an ‘i', thinking they [were] not qualified to do so. So they just passed it [the draft] as is, so grammatical mistakes and spelling mistakes also get gazetted’ (Interview with ‘Lily’, 8 Nov 2008). 586 As the State Secretary, State Finance Officer, and State Legal Adviser, the top three jobs in the State civil service, they control the bureaucratic machinery, though their influence varies from State to State. Also, the former Unfederated Malay States (Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis and Johor) have their own State civil service and normally appoint their top bureaucrats out of this (Shafruddin, 1987:141). 587 The former head of JAIS, Mohd Khusrin Munawi and his successor Marzuki Hussin for example, have no religious qualifications (Official Website of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Malaysia, 27/12/2010 – Media Statement, ‘Pelantikan / Pertukaran Pegawai‐pegawai Kanan Perkhidmatan Awam Persekutuan di Pentadbiran Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor ‘, <http://www.pmo.gov.my/ ksn/?frontpage/media/detail/2163> Accessed: 8 Jan 2011). Khusrin was previously the House Secretary, having made his way up the District Office ladder. His current appointment as the Selangor State Secretary was against the wishes of the Chief Minister and is yet another example of how Federal wishes trump what States prefer. 588 At least three PTD officers appointed to head JAKIM (or Pusat Islam as it was previously known) – Yusof Mohamad Nor, Abdul Hamid Othman and Abdul Hamid Zainal Abidin – eventually assumed political office on the UMNO ticket (Interview with ‘Mohamad’, State assemblyperson, 24 Dec 2009). 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The first is with regards to decisions on model ‘Islamic’ laws or amendments to these  as  deliberated  and  agreed  upon  at  the  nationwide  consultations  held  by the Technical  Committee.  A  Syariah  expert who  sits  on  this  Committee  opined that  it  is up to the State Legal Advisers – together with the Majlis Agama Islam (State  Religious  Councils)  –  to  convince  their  respective  State  governments  to accept  these  proposals  and  get  them  tabled  for  adoption.  They  are  thus spokespersons  for  the  Technical  Committee,  which  as  shown  in  Chapter  3,  is driven  by  Federal  concerns.  In  some  cases,  these  bureaucrats  have  also undergone a stint at JAKIM prior to assuming the post of State Legal Adviser. Not only are they  in a position to  inject the centre’s political views but as the same interviewee  noted,  they  are  also  in  a  better  position  to  ensure  that  States embrace its religious agenda.592  The  second  relates  to  the  role  of  the  State Religious Councils. After  the  sultan, this body is the highest authority governing Muslim affairs in a particular State, with the exception of matters relating to ‘Syariah’ law and the administration of justice. Again in the case of Selangor where a PR government currently rules, the Majlis  Agama  Islam  Selangor  (MAIS,  State  Religious  Council  of  Selangor)  has shown that it is capable of circumventing the government to have the interests it represents reflected in the State’s religious legislation.   
                                                        592 For example, a former State Legal Adviser in Selangor used to be the Legal Adviser for JAKIM, while the present State Legal Adviser in Melaka was also the JAKIM representative servicing the Technical Committee under Ahmad Ibrahim (Interview with ‘Rafidah’, religious official,  1 Jul 2009). 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As the main body advising the sultan on Islamic affairs, MAIS has a direct line to the ruler to obtain his support for various religious matters.593 Given his position as head of Islam in Selangor, it is very difficult for the Legislative Assembly to go against  the  sultan’s  wishes  once  MAIS  obtains  his  approval  for  any  of  its proposals.  This  way,  MAIS  –  by  instructing  the  State  Legal  Adviser  on  what Islamic  bills  to  table  –  has  been  able  to  get  the  Selangor  government  to  adopt legislation it proposes. Bearing in mind that the current membership of MAIS is a mix  of  bureaucrats  whose  loyalties  lean  towards  the  Federal  government  and experts  recommended  by  the  previous  BN  State  administration,594  it  is  thus another  vehicle  to  ensure  that  Selangor  continues  to  toe  the  centre’s  religious dictates.595  This  account  of  how  Federal  religious  functionaries  like  the  JAKIM  Director General  or  de  facto  Minister  for  Islamic  Affairs  have  become  so  influential  is incomplete without  acknowledging  several  other  factors  that  have  contributed to this situation.   
                                                        593 See Section 6, Administration of Islamic Law Enactment of Selangor (2003). 594 Among the members of the Council are the State Secretary, State Treasurer and State Legal Officer, the State Mufti, the head of the State Religious Department, the chief of State police, as well as representatives from the Dewan Diraja and experts from academia and other related professions. The current head of MAIS is a bureaucrat who formerly served under the BN Federal government before being appointed to head a local council in Selangor and later, its State Financial Officer. The State Ex‐co member in charge of religious affairs (Hasan Ali), an elected representative, only comes second in the hierarchy of the organisation. 595 Traditionally concerned with the economic and social wellbeing of Muslims – it has focused on the collection of charity tithes and the management of the Islamic treasury (baitul mal), for example – MAIS has recently appeared to play a more political role by speaking out against alleged Islamic ‘wrong‐doings’ by members of the PR coalition and taking a more pro‐active stand with religious matters of the State. See for example ‘MAIS to give warning notice to Serdang MP’, The Star, 28 Aug 2010; ‘MAIS spells out who can speak on Islam in Selangor’, TMI, 30 Sept 2009, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com /malaysia/article/Mais‐spells‐out‐who‐can‐speak‐on‐Islam‐in‐Selangor/>, Accessed: 1 Oct 2010. 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At  one  point,  it  appeared  as  though  national‐level ministries  and  departments had to consult JAKIM whenever they dealt with anything related to Islam. But as an interviewee who worked with the Attorney General’s Chambers pointed out, rather than being directed, ‘people just did this on their own accord’.596 Perhaps as another respondent put it,  ‘JAKIM has become the halal chop [stamp] within the Federal government, the Syariah‐compliant approval body’ that people go to either because they are no longer confident about making decisions pertaining to Islam or to avoid being blamed if things go wrong.597  The  tendency  to  attribute  greater  prominence  to  JAKIM  is  not  limited  to officialdom.  As  stated  earlier,  an  overwhelming  number  of  ‘Islamic’  laws, institutions,  programmes  and  machinery  have  been  introduced  over  the  last three decades causing members of  the public  to be confused about  the  lines of authority  between  all  the  different  Islamic  bodies.  Under  these  circumstances, certain  non‐state  members  of  the  Syariah  lobby  have  sometimes  invoked JAKIM’s name as the trump card whenever a  ‘religious’ controversy erupts. For instance, when PAS Youth wanted an impending concert by Indonesian dangdut singer, Inul – famous for her hip‐gyrating dance routines that some have labelled as ‘pornographic’ – to be banned in 2008, they justified their demand by claiming that her performances went against the rulings of JAKIM.598 In reality, JAKIM had no  explicit  ruling  on  this matter.  It  only  issued  a  set  of  Islamic  guidelines  for                                                         596 Interview with ‘Lily’, 8 Nov 2008. She also maintained that while people may say that JAKIM has turned into a parallel government, many bureaucrats in the department are unhappy with this because in reality, it translated to more work for them, but not necessarily more pay. 597 Interview with ‘Tuti’, Muslim feminist activist, 8 Nov 2008. She also shared that when the NGO she worked for approached the Women’s Ministry to fund a booklet for Muslim women, they were told that the Ministry had to first submit their proposal to JAKIM for vetting. 598 ‘Pas youth upset over Inul concert’, NST, 27 Nov 2008, <http://www.nst.com.my/Current_ News/NST/Thursday/National/2413058/Article/index_html>, Accessed: 27 Nov 2008. 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entertainment a year later, and even then it did not have the powers to impose a ban  of  any  kind.  Whether  such  misconceptions  are  deliberately  fostered  or otherwise,  they  do  nothing  to  diminish  the  confusion,  and  more  seriously, continue to artificially inflate JAKIM’s sense of importance.  Also  to be  taken  into account  is  the role  that  the Malaysian public, Muslim and non‐Muslim, have played  in abdicating responsibility  for  Islamic matters  to  the state. One Islamic expert interviewed shared that before being appointed to the job,  a  former  de  facto  Minister  for  Islamic  Affairs  had  told  her  that  ‘he  knew nothing about Islam’. Despite this, he had no qualms ‘giving [himself] the veneer of  righteousness  and  credibility’  once  he  assumed  this  post,  a  situation  made possible by the fact that few came forward to call his bluff.599 Such hesitation and why most Malaysians  are  deferential  towards  the  Islamic  authorities  is  partly tied  to what people perceive  to be  the consequences of questioning. After over thirty years of building up  its version of  Islam as the only  legitimate one – and demonstrating what  happens  to  non‐conformists600  –  those  at  the  centre  have been quite successful at convincing the majority to remain quiet.   To reiterate this point, one only needs to look at how a body like Suhakam, the National Human Rights Commission submits to the Islamic authorities as well.601 In  trying  to  develop  a  position  on  the  rights  of  lesbians,  gays,  bisexuals  and                                                         599 Interview with ‘Tina’, 23 Feb 2009. 600 A usual tactic is to immediately pronounce a person who questions religious authority as being ‘un‐Islamic’. To date the government has reserved its harshest treatment for those it labels as religious deviationists. The banned Darul Arqam movement and the Ayah Pin following are prime examples of such official intolerance. 601 Apart from being known as a ‘toothless tiger’ for its inability to get the government to take its recommendations seriously, Suhakam has also been very cautious in approaching Islamic issues particularly to do with religious conversions or apostasy (see Thio 2009). 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transgender  (LGBT),  this  apex  human  rights  body  in  Malaysia  recently  held  a series of consultations with different stakeholders. Having already met with the Islamic  agencies  (JAWI,  MAIWP,  JKSM,  Attorney  General’s  Office  (Syariah Section)), Suhakam then called for a separate meeting with non‐Muslim religious groups. At  this meeting,  some participants were  taken aback  to  find an  Islamic functionary present and  given  the  space  to  speak at  great  length about  Islam’s position  on  the  matter  when  it  was  meant  to  be  a  gathering  of  non‐Muslim religious bodies.602  The comments of a Suhakam commissioner at a prior regional meeting organised by  the  Advisory  Council  of  Jurists  (ACJ)  of  the  Asia  Pacific  Forum  of  National Human Rights Institutions in August 2010 sheds some light on its actions above:  Suhakam is committed to all human rights and we are not ducking the issues – for instance the unfair treatment of sexual orientation and gender identity by the media. But in candor, Suhakam is not going to be able to do anything about these issues in the next three years. Mindset and values are deep seated and these have to change and who are we to do this in three years? If we push too hard we may get a fatwa and we don’t want to 
antagonize the religious establishment (emphasis added in italics).  
Complications to 1Islam  The  picture  painted  so  far  is  one  of  an  authoritative  Islamic machinery  that  is controlled  from  the  centre,  specifically,  the  Prime  Minister’s  Department.                                                         602 Personal communication with Ivy Josiah, social activist and member of the Council of Churches Malaysia, 17 Feb 2011. 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However,  its  powers,  though vast  and penetrating,  are  far  from  total. Due  to  a combination of factors ranging from a religious bureaucracy that is not only very large  but  also  a  lot more  emboldened  since  its  formative  years,  to  a  changing political  landscape  where  non‐state  actors  within  the  Syariah  lobby  have  also gained  in  strength  and  confidence  to  act  with  impunity,  there  are  now  many more open  challenges  to  official  Islam  from within.  This  section  looks  at  some examples of contestations around moral policing  that have  transpired between those who are traditionally perceived as sharing the same interests to elevate the position of Islam in the country.603  
The Federal political elite versus religious functionaries Paradoxically, though the central leadership has played a key role in facilitating the development of the Syariah lobby in the country, the latter’s members do not always see eye‐to‐eye with them when it comes to the application of ‘Islamic’ law to regulate moral offences. Their disagreements have occasionally spilt over into the public domain, and when they do, this serves as a reminder that their good ties with each other cannot be taken for granted.  One of the earliest conflicts between the two occurred over the handling of the 1997  beauty  pageant  incident  in  Selangor  mentioned  previously.  Having                                                         603 There are other actors in the Syariah lobby who have also helped to muddle the Federal state’s efforts to impose a singular Islam but it is beyond the scope here to explore this further. Suffice to say, among the more prominent contrarian actors are the ex‐Mufti of Perlis, Mohd Asri Zainal Abidin, and his successor Juanda Jaya. Both have consistently questioned the centre’s Islamic policies. JAIS officials also arrested the former in November 2009, ostensibly for giving a religious class without an official permit (tauliah) revealing one visible divide within the Syariah lobby. See ‘Perlis Mufti raps Umno‐linked scholars for promoting ‘Taliban’ culture’, TMI, <http://www.the malaysianinsider.com/malaysia /article/perlis‐mufti‐raps‐umno‐linked‐scholars‐for‐promoting‐taliban‐culture/>, Accessed: 16 Dec 2010; and ‘Former Perlis mufti detained’, The Star, 2 Nov 2009, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/11/2/ nation/5024877&sec=nation>, Accessed: 2 Nov 2009. 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Muslims who,  JAIS  had  detained  in  an  anti‐vice  operation  for  various  offences including ‘insulting Islam’ (by being on the premises where alcohol was served), 
khalwat,  consuming  liquor,  indecent  behaviour  and  cross‐dressing.  Like  the three  beauty  contestants  earlier,  the  charges  against  all  were  eventually dropped.  The  actions  of  the  religious  officers  in  arresting  31  of  them  for ‘insulting  Islam’  were  attributed  to  a  ‘mistake’  based  on  their  lack  of understanding of the law, and to make matters worse, the Chief Minister directed all  religious  enforcers  in  the  State  to  ‘undergo  intensive  training,  especially  on the Syariah laws, its procedures and implementation’.608   The  last  widely  publicised  flare‐up  between  the  Federal  leadership  and  the Syariah lobby took place in 2005 over the Zouk raid. Even though on the face of it, this also did not end well for the latter – the Islamic enforcement body (JAWI) came  under  heavy  fire  and  was  forced  to  drop  all  charges  against  those  who were  arrested609  –  the  actions  of  then  de  facto  Minister  of  Islamic  Affairs, Abdullah Md Zin, who broke ranks from his Federal counterparts to stand up for the JAWI officers, signified a departure from past practice.610 In a way, this was not surprising since little cracks in the relationship between the nation’s political and religious leaders were already visible leading up to this incident.                                                           608 Surprisingly, the JAIS director also announced that the department did not plan to enforce Section 10 (‘insulting Islam’) of the SCO Enactment, claiming that the provision was ‘ambiguous’ (‘Arrests a mistake’, NST, 29 June 2000, p1). 609 The Zouk affair taught the religious authorities, and anyone else watching, that there was a price to pay for attacking the morality of youth from wealthy or well‐connected families. The privileging of some Muslims offenders over others – though seldom as blatant as the Zouk episode – is common enough a practice that several interviewees referred to this when they commented on the unevenness of enforcement efforts. 610 In fact, he claimed that what the JAWI officers did during the raid was commendable. ‘They followed rules and procedures and I have no objections.’ (‘Guide for JAWI raids out soon’, NST, 15 Feb 2006, p6). 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For  instance, during  the handholding episode at  the KLCC park,611 Cabinet had issued a temporary order for law enforcers to stop staking‐out couples at public parks. The JAKIM Director‐General then was reported as replying:  As  the  authority  directly  in  charge  of  taking  care  of  the moral  standard and behaviour of the masses, particularly Muslims, we will follow the law in taking action against such couples, including the non‐Muslims. After all, this is our moral duty and responsibility…612 Besides the fact that he was directly challenging an order by his employers – i.e. the  Federal  government,  the  Director  General’s  actions  are  significant  in reiterating the sense of  importance JAKIM officials assign themselves as moral defenders,  more  so  since  the  Federal  body  has  no  authority  to  oversee  such standards, not of Muslims and certainly not of non‐Muslims.  Despite  ‘losing’  out  in  this  battle  with  the  Federal  executive,  some  political observers cautioned against underestimating the strength of the ulama and the religious bureaucracy. As one pointed out, even in their largely public silence,  [T]hey have a way of attacking you, of marginalising you… They don’t have to carry placards, demonstrating… They know how to undermine people, they are much more effective… Which is also why I think a lot of politicians don’t want to cross swords with them. 613 
                                                        611 See also footnote 14.  612 He eventually backed down and conceded that JAKIM had no say over the morality of non‐Muslims, but stuck to his position about Muslims (‘PBT dilarang intip pasangan di taman rekreasi’, Utusan Malaysia, 17 Apr 2006; and ‘Jakim won’t wait for decency guidelines’, NST, 19 Apr 2006). 613 Interview with ‘Annuar’, 17 Dec 2008. 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As  Mahathir  himself  learnt,  despite  his  apparent  triumph  in  the  above‐mentioned  contestations with  the  Syariah  lobby,  this  eventually  took  a  toll  on him and was one reason for him stepping down in 2001.614  
The religious bureaucracy versus State political leaders Another  visible  tension  is  that  between  the  religious  bureaucracy  and  State political  leaders.  This  has  become  more  apparent  in  States  run  by  the  PR coalition where there is a clear divide between those elected to govern the State versus those appointed to conduct its daily programmes and services. Returning to  the  example  of  Selangor,  in  August  2009,  the  local  media  reported  that mosque  officials  in  that  State  could  now  arrest  Muslims  drinking  in  public. Recalling  that  this was  around  the  time  that  the  Kartika  beer‐drinking  debate was  already heated,  this  announcement  understandably  turned  into  an  instant controversy.   Attributing the decision to the Selangor Executive Councillor for Islamic matters, Hasan Ali,615 he was not only criticised by his fellow State Executive Committee members  but  also  summoned  by  the  palace  to  explain  himself.  Subsequently MAIS  declared  that  it  had  issued  a  new  set  of  guidelines  which  had  been approved  by  the  sultan,  to  limit  the  issuance  of  all  public  statements  and                                                         614 As ‘Annuar’, a prominent social reformer who has realigned himself in support of the ruling administration in recent years, explained, Mahathir had been ‘very, very hurt’ by the ‘negative vibes’ that were circulating within the religious establishment, including the religious schools (Interview on 17 Dec 2008). 615 Hasan Ali’s full designation is Selangor Executive Council member in charge of Muslim Affairs, Malay customs, Infrastructure and Public Amenities. He was also reported as saying that the mosque officers could arrest Muslims who sold or stored alcohol, as well as those who committed offences regarded as disrespectful during Ramadan (‘Selangor mosque officers can now arrest Muslims drinking in public’, The Star, 24 Aug 2009, <http://thestar.com.my/news/ story.asp?file=/2009/8/24/nation/200908241 75017&sec =nation>, Accessed: 6 Feb 2010). 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directives pertaining to Islamic administration in the State to the following: the sultan, MAIS, the ulama, JAIS and the Syariah Court. Although the Selangor Chief Minister later clarified that Hasan Ali could still speak to the media about Islamic matters in the State – just not on behalf of either MAIS or JAIS616 – the incident pointed  clearly  to  a  schism  between  the  politician  and  the  bureaucrats technically under his command.617  As one PR  leader who was  interviewed highlighted, Hasan Ali may officially be the State Minister for Islamic affairs, but he has very little say over this portfolio. He  does  not  head  the  powerful  religious  council  MAIS;  he  has  no  power  to appoint officers in JAIS – the Sultan claims that role – nor does he seem to be able to  control  what  they  do,  even  though  he  is  their  boss.  The  debacle  over  the mosque officers’ statement was a reflection of this situation.618 It is ironic that he suffered this fate because in reality, existing ‘Islamic’ law already stipulates that mosque  officers  can  be  called  upon  to  help  out  with  enforcing  religious  laws. How nobody from the Syariah lobby came to his defence by pointing out this is revealing.                                                          616 ‘MB: Hasan can’t speak for religious affairs bodies’, NST, 1 Oct 2009, <www.nst.com.my/ Current_ News/NST/articles/10haali/Article/index.html>, Accessed: 3 Oct 2009. 617 Apart from the example discussed here, the high‐profile case involving the arrest of the former mufti of Perlis by JAIS officials demonstrates the latter’s powers. When news of this broke, the Chief Minister of Selangor was quoted as saying that he was unaware of the arrest, and that JAIS had acted independently in the matter (‘Selangor MB denies state linked to Asri’s arrest’, 
TMI, 4 Nov 2009, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/malaysia/42349‐selangor‐mb‐denies‐state‐linked‐to‐asris‐arrest‐>, Accessed: 10 Jan 2010). As a State department, JAIS is ultimately accountable to the Chief Minister. The fact that he was kept in the dark about the operations against the former mufti, raises questions over how much power he has over the State’s religious functionaries. 618 This incident was reportedly sparked‐off when JAIS officers raided a 24‐hour convenience store to stop it from selling beer. Another State Executive Councillor, Ronnie Liu, then stepped in and ordered JAIS to return the confiscated bottles. Hasan Ali stepped in and took Ronnie to task. To further demonstrate that he was in control, he made the announcement about the mosque officers (Interview with ‘Lee’, Pakatan Rakyat leader, 21 Dec 2009). 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A resurgence of the monarchs? The complications to the project of enforcing a singular Islam have mostly been due  to  tensions between politicians and bureaucrats.  In  recent years, however, another force – the monarchs – has emerged as a potential thorn to the Federal state’s  aspirations  of  gaining  better  control  of  Islam.  After  their  authority was drastically circumscribed by the Constitutional amendments of 1983 and 1993, the  palaces  learnt  to  survive  against  a  dominant  national  executive  under Mahathir’s  reign  by  adjusting  to  the  new  limits  on  their  powers.619  After  his departure  from  office,  some  rulers  have  shown  more  courage  to  assert  their authority even if it has meant going directly against the wishes of the centre.620   One clear  instance of  this emerged during  the pengkid  fatwa  episode. A month after  this  fatwa  was  decreed,  the  de  facto  Deputy  Minister  for  Islamic  Affairs conceded  that  not  a  single  State  had  enforced  the  National  Fatwa  Council’s 
                                                        619 For details of these two incidences, see Milne and Mauzy, 1999:30‐38. Crouch (1996) reminds us, however, that even though their powers were cut back during this time, the monarchy continued to retain some influence as the symbol of Malay political dominance (p147). 620 Right after the 2008 general election, the Sultan of Terengganu – also the King at the time – insisted on his preference for the Terengganu Chief Minister’s post, going against the candidate chosen by the Federal government. The Sultans have also grown in confidence in Perak and Selangor, two of the five States won by PR at the 2008 general election. In Selangor, for example, the ruler made it clear that his role was to act as a ‘check and balance’ to the State government’s administration, something he had not pointed out under the previous BN government (‘Ruler acts as last bulwark for people, says S’gor Sultan’, The Star, <http://thestar.com.my/news/ story.asp?file=/2009/11/24/nation/5169397&sec= nation>, Accessed: 26 Nov 2009). The royal palace has also taken over preparing the official speeches of the Sultan, a role that the Chief Minister’s office used to assume (Interview with ‘Lee’, Pakatan Rakyat political leader, 21 Dec 2009). Another important player in the Syariah lobby, the Persatuan Peguam Syarie Malaysia, has also proposed that Parliament’s legislative powers over Islamic matters be transferred to the Malay rulers, to prevent non‐Muslim Parliamentarians who have no knowledge about Islam from making decisions about ‘Islamic’ law. This episode was significant in exposing the powers of the monarchy that could still be unleashed (‘Muslim lawyers want Islamic law to be made by Malay rulers’, TMI, 12 May 2011, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/muslim‐lawyers‐want‐islamic‐law‐to‐be‐made‐by‐malay‐rulers/>, Accessed: 12 May 2011). 
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ruling.621  She went  to  great  lengths  to  explain  how  this was  not  because  they disrespected  the  National  Fatwa  Council.  She  also  reiterated  that  it  was  the latter’s prerogative to issue such fatwa.   More than exposing the extent to which religious functionaries at the centre go to  defend  the  Islamic  entities  they  have  created,  her  comments  affirmed  how States  can  exercise  control  over  religious  matters  if  they  choose  to.  In  this instance, the sultans were responsible for not approving this as law,  just as the majority  of  them  subsequently  did with  the  yoga  fatwa.622  There  are  different explanations  for  this  including  one  shared  by  a  senior  Syariah  judge  who believed that the Sultan of Selangor spoke out about the yoga fatwa because he was unhappy that it was being announced as final when he had not yet given his assent for it to come into force.623   
1Islam unspun The cracks and tensions described above are a product of a central project that was  inadequately  conceived  and  is  thus  slowly  unravelling  itself.  As  one  of  its original  proponents,  and  also  instrumental  in  fuelling  the  expansion  of  the religious  bureaucracy  by  upping  the  budget  for  Islamic  affairs  during  his  rule, Mahathir  conceded  in  2000  that  his  plan  was  not  turning  out  the  way  he intended.  Blaming  the  religious  narrow‐mindedness  of  Malays,  he  said  that                                                         621 ‘Isu pengkid tidak jejas imej Jawatankuasa Fatwa Kebangsaan’, Utusan Malaysia, 23 Nov 2008, <http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2008&dt=1223&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Parlimen&pg=pa_02.htm>, Accessed: 23 Dis 2008.  622 Though several State fatwa councils have deliberated on the pengkid fatwa – including Kelantan, Perak, Pahang, and Sarawak – the last update (Dec 2011) on the official fatwa website run by JAKIM <www.e‐fatwa.gov.my> shows that two years since the fatwa was declared, it has only been gazetted in FT, Melaka and Johor. These States have also discussed the yoga fatwa but apart from Melaka and the FT, none have implemented it either. 623 Interview with ‘Hassan’, 2 Jun 2009. 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‘Islam had become a rigid,  intolerant and seemingly an unjust  religion  [due  to] the  fanaticism and misplaced orthodoxy of people with vested  interests’.624 He attributed  this  to  the  worsening  rivalry  between  PAS  and  UMNO  where  the latter’s  poor  showing  in  the 1999  elections  led  some UMNO  leaders  to  believe that the party would only regain Malay support if it became even more Islamic.  As explained in Chapter 2, though Mahathir had sparked off a new phase of state‐led  Islamisation  when  he  assumed  leadership  of  the  government  in  1981,  his primary  objective was  never  about  creating  a more  religious  or  pious Muslim community. Rather,  it was a practical and strategic response to an  increasingly influential  dakwah  movement  led  by  organisations  like  ABIM,  as  well  as  to counter  detractions  by  PAS  about  UMNO’s  Islamic  qualifications.  More importantly,  he  was  able  to  rationalise  this  move  as  part  of  his  plans  to modernise  the  country,  or  more  to  the  point,  to  turn  it  into  an  industrialised nation that was grounded in moral and religious values.   To  further  assure  global  capital  about  the  stability  of  the  nation,  he  also distinguished  the  Islam  promoted  by  the  BN  from  that  of  PAS.  In  this construction,  the  former  was  painted  as  ‘moderate’  and  thus  not  a  threat  to foreign  investors;  the  latter  as  ‘radical’  and  hence  accompanied  by  political volatility.625  Because  his  ambitions  were  economically  and  politically  driven, Mahathir  did  not  take  kindly  to  official  Islamic  moral  policing  initiatives  that went awry and attracted negative international media coverage. This may be one 
                                                        624 ‘Mahathir slams intolerant Muslims’, Straits Times, 25 Oct 2000, p36. 625 Hamayotsu, 2002:358, 362. 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reason why he had  such  an  adverse  reaction  to  the  earlier mentioned  episode involving the three Malay beauty contestants.   Subsequent BN administrations under Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib Abdul Razak  maintained  this  approach  of  projecting  an  image  of  ‘moderate’  Islam. During Abdullah’s reign, for instance, he introduced the concept of Islam Hadhari as  an  alternative  to  the  Islamic  state  claims  that  both  Mahathir  and  PAS  had made (albeit with vastly different  interpretations). Sold as  ‘civilisational’  Islam, this offered a lot of promise, guided in its application by ten principles.626   Though  the  current  Prime Minister  Najib  Abdul  Razak  has  not  taken  after  his predecessors in crafting an Islamic slogan – preferring instead to emphasise the notion of a racially harmonious 1Malaysia – he too has affirmed that: Islam plays an integral part in the country’s policies and administration. We cannot separate Islam from the government in Malaysia. But having said that, it is also Islam that is moderate that we apply in Malaysia. For example, Islam in Malaysia is not associated with violence, Islam in Malaysia is benign and that is being practised by and large.627 Like Mahathir,  Abdullah  and Najib  also  intervened  to  exercise  damage  control whenever  the  religious  bureaucracy’s  efforts  to  regulate  morality  through  the enforcement of  ‘Syariah’ criminal laws have drawn the nation bad international 
                                                        626 Among them: ‘faith and piety in God; a just and trustworthy government; free and independent people; a balanced and comprehensive economic development; protection of the rights of minority groups and women; and cultural and moral integrity…’. Cited in Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, et al. (2009:111). In effect, Islam Hadhari was little different from Mahathir’s Dasar Penerapan Nilai‐nilai Islam (Inculcation of Islamic Values Policy) in its emphasis on modernisation and development. 627 ‘Malaysia offers the world moderate Islam’, NST, 24 Feb 2011, <http://www.nst.com.my/nst/ articles/MalaysiaofferstheworldmoderateIslam/Article/>, Accessed: 24 Feb 2011. 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publicity. However, lacking Mahathir’s force to compel some level of submission, they have had even less control over the Islamic machinery than he did.628   Backed by Abdullah’s religious reputation, at first Islam Hadhari enjoyed popular support  until  it  became  apparent  that  the  concept  had  very  little  substance beyond  the  rhetoric.629 Consequently, not only did he  fail  to  regain  the  respect and  support  from  the  Islamic  functionaries whom Mahathir  had  alienated,  his administration  also  suffered  from  entrusting  Islam  Hadhari  in  their  hands.630 When  the  religious  bureaucrats  realised  that  the  Abdullah  administration required their help to prop up its Islamic credentials because Islam Hadhari had ‘no real content’, they grew even bolder with their newfound powers.631  Under  Najib,  the  Islamisation  project  that  gathered  momentum  during Mahathir’s  tenure  has  continued  to  expand,  and  with  it,  the  challenges  the Federal  state  faces  in  reigning  in  its  religious  bureaucracy.  The  Kartika  beer drinking case is a good example where Najib had to tread carefully to ensure that he did not compound an already tense situation between the Syariah lobby and human  rights  defenders.  Having  kept  out  initially,  he  finally  intervened  in  an 
                                                        628 Though they gave him a hard time as well, ‘Mahathir was tougher. He just didn’t care [about telling the religious bureaucracy what to do and]… he got what he wanted (Interview with ‘Annuar’, social reformer, 17 Dec 2008). 629 For a critique of Islam Hadhari, see Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, et al (2009). Its failure has been ascribed to how it was merely another ‘political project to outwit Islamists [PAS] by hijacking a pivotal component of their agenda’ (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 2008:223). 630 JAKIM, for example, was appointed as the coordinating body to promote Islam Hadhari within government agencies (‘Garis Panduan Perlaksanaan Pendekatan Islam Hadhari di Agensi Kerajaan’, <www.islam.gov.my/portal/pdf/islamhadhari.pdf>, Accessed: 27 Oct 2008). 631 Interview with ‘Annuar’, social reformer, 17 Dec 2008. As stated, besides challenging the political leadership’s decisions about moral policing, they have also been embroiled in the controversial conversion cases. 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attempt to soothe matters. But his reminder to the nation that Islam emphasised sympathy, compassion and tarbiyyah (education) did little to ease hostilities.632   The  most  recent  altercation  involving  the mufti  of  Perak,  Harussani  Zakaria, further demonstrates the difficulties the current administration faces in juggling the  interests  of  an  increasingly  powerful  Islamic  bureaucracy  and  its  own political project of enforcing a singular  Islam. As  the State’s mufti  since 1985 – and prior to that he was the Chief Kadi of Penang for over a decade – Harussani is one  of  the  most  outspoken  of  the  religious  bureaucratic  fraternity,  gaining infamy  for  his  views  on  Islamic  doctrine  and practices.633 He  has  clashed with Federal political elites over this on several occasions, prompting one Minister to admit  that  Harussani’s  comments  ‘sometimes  place[d]  the  Government  in  a difficult position because no one dares to respond’.634  His penchant for controversy aside, Harussani’s  latest announcement about the Perak  Fatwa  Council’s  fatwa  on  poco­poco  –  a  dance  popular  among  Malay women (especially  those  from the upper echelons) – was significant because  it                                                         632 ‘Najib steps in over Kartika row’, TMI, 25 Aug 2009, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.net.my /index.php/malaysia/35985‐pm‐kartika‐should‐appeal>, Accessed: 25 Aug 2009.  633 Apart from the example here, he has also decreed that Muslims with HIV/AIDS should be banished to an island and that Malay women should not shave their hair off. Another time, he pronounced belly dancing as haram (forbidden) because the revealing clothes worn by these women would cause men to succumb to temptation. 634 The Minister of Culture, Arts and Heritage, Rais Yatim, was commenting on Harussani’s claims that Aidilfitri entertainment programmes were contrary to Islam because they contained immoral elements which ‘tainted’ the holy month of Ramadhan (‘Let Fatwa Council decide, says Rais’, The Star, 19 Oct 2006). At times, however, there have been some who are either brave or foolhardy enough to question the mufti’s authority. During a row about the use of the term ‘Allah’ by non‐Muslims, Harussani had challenged the Cabinet in its decision to allow churches to bring in Malay bibles containing this term, stating that this would be going against Syariah law. The Minister of Home Affairs, Hishammuddin Hussein brushed aside this threat but possibly because a larger political imperative was at stake: the bible issue was seen as potentially alienating BN of its support from the Christian indigenous voters at the impending Sarawak State election (‘Hisham dismisses Perak mufti’s dare’, TMI, 4 Apr 2011, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com /malaysia/article/hisham‐dismisses‐perak‐muftis‐dare/>, Accessed: 4 Apr 2011). 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Rather  than  attempting  to  detail  an  exhaustive  list  of  complications  resulting from the clash of  interests within  the Syariah  lobby,  this section has presented just some of the possible permutations that can upset the Federal government’s project of 1Islam. This can open to further challenge, official claims that there is only  one  way  in  which Muslims  in  the  country  can  believe  and  practice  their faith,  including what has been  introduced as  ‘Syariah’  law. Upheld by  the  state and  Islamic  lobby  as  ‘God’s  law’  and  hence  not  subject  to  question,  these different contestations may turn out to be the antidote that is required to show them up for what they really are: a set of man‐made laws created at a particular historical juncture and socio‐political moment. Where the regulation of sexuality is concerned, this development also has the potential to give Muslims new ways to  understand  the  moral  provisions  of  the  SCO  legislation  and  to  review  the necessity of their enforcement.  
Conclusion  This  chapter  set  out  to  account  for  the  emergence of  a more  conservative  and intolerant discourse on sexuality and gender that emerged from the  late 1990s onwards, one that is steeped in Islamic standards of propriety. It has shown how the seemingly greater  interest  in – and  the push  for harsher punishment  to be directed  at  –  the  bodies  of  sexual  dissidents  today  can  be  attributed  to  the sporadic  but  extremely  heated  contestations  around moral  policing  initiatives, particularly  when  the  SCO  provisions  are  involved.  This  conflict  has  been amplified through a media that  ignites and fuels matters with  its sensationalist coverage. 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The narrative presented here supports the call  for a wider conceptualisation of heteronormative  controls  and  has  suggested  that  this  also  be  understood  as  a product  of  the  Federal  state’s  desire  to  strengthen  its  powers  by  controlling Islam. This has meant politicising  the religion  to prop up a very particular and narrowly  defined  view  as  the  only  one  permissible  for Muslims.  This  explains why  every  time  there  is  resistance  to  state‐sanctioned  policing  of  sexual marginals,  the  Federal  Islamic  functionaries  are  the  first  to  react,  buoyed  by other actors in the Syariah lobby.   Another important revelation made here is about how, even though the Syariah lobby’s opposition to sexual transgressions is palpable, its actions are not always consistent nor predictable because this body is not a homogenous block. As this chapter has identified, there are at least three subgroups that all support greater ‘Syariahisation’  –  albeit  in  varying  degrees  –  but  which  employ  different arguments to back state‐led moral policing initiatives. While many in the Syariah lobby  are  the  products  of  the  Federal  state’s  Islamisation  policies,  they  do not always  obey  the  official  line  and  make  difficult  the  central  state’s  project  of constructing  a  singular  Islam  with  their  different  ‘voices’.  Thus,  despite  the authority  vested  in  and  generated  by  the  nation’s  central  executive,  it  cannot contain the social  forces that challenge what it dictates as official Islam. This in turn has ramifications on future state‐sanctioned efforts at regulating sexuality. 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Chapter 8 
Conclusion  In November 2011, any doubts about the existence of a dogmatic and intolerant discourse  on  sexual  marginality  in  Malaysia  were  put  to  rest  after  Seksualiti Merdeka  –  the  same  people  behind  the  controversial  ‘I’m  Gay,  I’m  Ok’  project mentioned at the start of this study – came under the spotlight once more. This time, however, the attention was more intense and vicious as the group and its planned annual festival (of the same name) were vilified for openly championing the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT).637  The  story  about  Seksualiti  Merdeka  was  sensationally  broken  by  the  UMNO‐owned Malay  language broadsheet, Utusan Malaysia,  infamous  for  its  efforts  at stoking  ethno‐religious  nationalist  sentiments.  Criticisms  of  the  festival’s promotion of loose moral values were initially painted as coming from different religious quarters.638 Nevertheless, this very quickly descended into criticisms of the event being un‐Islamic.639 Leading the censure were familiar faces: religious 
                                                        637 Since 2008, Seksualiti Merdeka has been organising an annual festival in Kuala Lumpur – with activities ranging from talks, forum, workshops, to art exhibitions, performances and dance parties – to raise public awareness about sexuality rights. This was the first year its theme ‘Queer Without Fear’ zoomed in on the rights of LGBTs as opposed to previous practice of addressing a wider gamut of issues under the rubric of sexuality rights. 638 This stopped after the apex body for non‐Muslims, the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST) issued a statement opposing ‘all forms of harassment, intimidation, threats and attacks on any Malaysian, including those from the lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) community’ (‘Panel says no to ban and all forms of harassment’, NST, 5 Nov 2011, <http://www.nst.com.my/nst/articles/5azsxm/ Article>, Accessed: 5 Nov 2011). 639 To the surprise of many, two cabinet Ministers – one in charge of Islamic affairs, the other legal matters – pronounced homosexuality as unconstitutional on the grounds that this went against Islam (‘Nazri: Homosexuality is unconstitutional’, Malaysiakini, 21 Nov 2011). Additionally, the mufti of Pahang Abdul Rahman Osman said that anyone who supported or was involved in ‘seks songsang (deviant sex)’ could turn them into apostates, considered a major religious offence under the government’s version of Islam (‘Sokong, terbabit seks songsang boleh 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functionaries,  Islamic  nationalists,  and  ethno‐religious  nationalists.640  Their opposition was  so  intense  that  shortly  after,  the  police  declared  a  ban  on  the event, stating that this was done as it had ‘create[d] uneasiness among the vast majority  of  the  population  [and  might]  result  in  disharmony,  enmity  and threaten public order’.641  The  Seksualiti  Merdeka  episode  is  an  apt  springboard  to  recap  the  main arguments  of  this  study.  Demonstrating  homo  and  transphobic  vitriol  at  its worst,  it  affirmed  that  in  the  dominant  discourse  on  sexuality  and  gender  in Malaysia  today,  there  is  no  room  for  those  who  disregard  –  or  worse,  are perceive  as  openly  deviating  from  –  the  heterosexual  model  that heteronormativity  idealises.  This  is  especially  true  for  members  of  the communities referred to here as sexual marginals.   It  has  been  argued,  however,  that  their  demonisation  is  a  contemporary phenomenon,  accelerating  as  Islam  rose  to  become  the  referent  of  sexual morality for everyone. Rather than blaming this on Islamists or fundamentalists                                                                                                                                                               jadi murtad’, Utusan Malaysia, 9 Nov 2011, <http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2011&dt=1109& pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=Terkini&pg=bt_25.htm&arc=hive>, Accessed: 10 Nov 2011).  640 Among those who spoke out included Ibrahim Ali of the ultra‐nationalist group Perkasa; Harussani Zakaria and Tamyes Abdul Wahid the mufti of Perak and Selangor respectively; former premier Mahathir Mohamad; Mashitah Ibrahim de facto Deputy Minister of Islamic Affairs; and Islamists like Zulkifli Noordin, PAS spiritual leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat and head of the Persatuan Peguam Muslim Malaysia Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar. Besides Perkasa, a number of NGOs that have been at the forefront in pushing the Malay supremacy agendas also spoke out, ranging from the more visible ones like Pembela (Persatuan Pembela Islam), Accin (Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic NGOs), Teras (Teras Pengupayaan Melayu), Badai (Badan Anti Liberalisme Agama), Prowaris (Pertubuhan Profesional Melayu dan Pewaris Bangsa) and the Gerakan Belia 4B, to lesser known outfits like Persatuan Pemikir Profesional Melayu, Jaringan Melayu Malaysia and Pemikad (Pertubuhan Perpaduan Melayu Kedah). Others included MUIS (Majlis Ulama Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia) and MAPIM (Majlis Perundingan Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia),  641 ‘Police move against Seksualiti Merdeka sparks heated debate between groups’, The Star, 4 Nov 2011, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/11/4/nation/9835994&sec= nation>, Accessed: 4 Nov 2011. 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per  se,  this  study  has  made  a  case  to  look  beyond  these  usual  suspects,  by understanding such developments as a product of other forces at play. At a basic level, this is connected to the enactment of standalone Syariah Criminal Offences (SCO)  laws  from  the  mid‐1980s  onwards  as  these  paved  the  way  for  the authorities  to  spell  out  in  greater  detail,  what  Islam  supposedly  regards  as unlawful  sexualities.  Through  this,  new  sexual  offences  including  –  but  not limited  to  –  non‐heterosexual  consensual  sexual  activity  and  heterodox expressions of  gender  identity  came  to be named, defined as  religious wrongs, and penalised as crimes against the state.  Even so, it is important to acknowledge that these ‘Islamic’ provisions were not introduced  as  part  of  a  deliberate  or  systematic  plan  to  regulate  sexuality. Rather, they were the result of a broader movement – termed in this study as the Syariah  lobby – which not only promotes Islam as supreme, but  insists as well, that its legal and administrative authority be improved and expanded. Believing Islam  to  be  subordinated  under  British  rule,  its  advocates  have  pushed  for Syariah  to be  reinstated  in  its  rightful place as  ‘law of  the  land’. How altruistic these motives  are  is  debatable,  recalling  that  the  enactment  of  SCO  legislation occurred  within  a  politicised  religious  context  where  Mahathir’s  project  of Islamisation had begun, and the UMNO‐PAS rivalry was well underway.  Hailed as ‘God’s law’, these ‘Islamic’ moral injunctions have commanded greater credence  over  time.  Far  from  ‘divinely’  ordained,  however,  ‘Syariah’  law  as adopted  in  Malaysia,  are  ‘part  of  a  complex  dynamic  of  state‐making,  social bargaining  and  individual  strategies’  whereby  these  laws  are  ‘continually 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remade’ (Iza Hussin, 2010:170). As this study has revealed too, they differ little from pre‐existing ‘secular’ provisions regulating sexuality as those have religious – albeit Christian – origins as well. Understandably, both share the same morally conservative  and  prudish  underpinnings  that  are  fixated  in  stamping  out ‘obscenity’, ‘indecency’ and ‘unnatural’ sex. Given these similarities, the assertion of ‘Syariah’ law and portraying it as unique and better than its civil counterpart is needed even more to legitimise calls for it to take the place of English common law. Further, attributing this to ‘God’s will’ makes it hard for anyone to question them, what more suggest that they be reformed or more drastically, repealed.   Interestingly, the hype over ‘Islamic’ law’s superiority – evident whenever there is news about sexual marginals breaching heteronormative boundaries –  is not matched by  its enforcement. Syariah court conviction  figures show that no one has  ever  been  penalised  under  the  liwat  or musahaqah  provisions  of  the  law. Though the mak nyah are not as fortunate – many of them have been subjected to  the  law’s  force  –  their  court  statistics  are  still  overshadowed  by  cases involving  heterosexual  transgressions.  From  the  evidence  presented,  it  can  be surmised that the state is selective in its utilisation of ‘Syariah’ law, and that the heteronormative  and  homophobic  rhetoric  it  espouses  has  more  to  do  with politics than regulating sexual ‘deviancy’.  It has also been demonstrated how the low conviction rates are not an accurate indicator of how the law impacts on sexual marginals. For one, they do not fully reflect the incidence or nature of the encounters between sexual marginals and enforcement officials, including religious ones. As this study shows, the mak nyah 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have had more  run‐ins with  the  law  than what news  reports or official  figures present.  As  well,  the  authorities  frequently  insult  and  assault  them  for  being transgender,  and  yet  some  have  no  qualms  extorting  the mak  nyah  for  sexual favours and monetary bribes.  Even when  ‘Syariah’ moral  law  is  poorly  implemented,  its  long  arm has  had  a way of adversely touching the lives of sexual marginals. On top of the occasional reminders of their existence, their mere enactment has succeeded in sending out the message  that  it  is unlawful  to have non‐normative sexualities and genders. This  notwithstanding,  the  law’s  impact  is  uneven  as  factors  like  class,  religion, gender,  and age all play a  role  in  shaping one’s experience with  it. Besides  the 
mak nyah who as noted, are more upfront about their identity, this has instilled shame and fear among the majority of gays and lesbians, such that in most cases, they  take  to  regulating  their  own  sexuality  and  keep  this  hidden  from  public scrutiny.  The  stigmatisation  and  demonisation  of  sexual marginals  also  goes  a long  way  to  justify  the  threats  and  violations  to  their  lives,  while  the  fear  of ‘Syariah’ leaves many feeling isolated and unsupported.  This study has depicted moral policing as a difficult business to run, and offered some explanations for this. Vague expressions in the law – a result of legislatures abdicating  their  law‐making  function where moral  rulings  are  concerned –  are partly to blame since this leaves the meaning of what constitutes a sexual offence open  for  interpretation  and  abuse.  Enforcement  has  been  a  challenge  too because there is no public consensus about using the law to compel obedience to God. A less obvious explanation lies in how religious enforcement has never been 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a  priority  for  the  state.  This may  account  for  the  poorly  trained  and  equipped enforcement  personnel.  But  more  noteworthy  is  how  jarring  this  neglect  is against the noisy defence of ‘Syariah’ law and its institutions each time these are implicated in religious raids or patrols gone wrong.  To make better sense of  the creation of a rigid and  intolerant heteronormative discourse governing sexual marginals  in Malaysia,  the answers can be  found  in the ambition of  the Federal state  to embolden  itself. From early on,  the central government  recognised  that  leaving  States  to  decide  on matters  pertaining  to Islam  –  as  they  were  constitutionally  entrusted  to  do  –  was  potentially destabilising and  could  challenge  the  centre’s dominance. Amongst others,  this could  result  in  a  set  of  unwieldy  and  varied  religious  laws  across  the  nation, making it more difficult for the Federal state to exert control over the periphery.   To  overcome  this,  it  embarked  on  a  project  to  streamline  and  standardise ‘Syariah’  law and  its  institutions,  ostensibly  to  improve  the administration and coordination  of  Islam,  but  in  reality,  to  ensure  conformity with  the  version  of Islam  endorsed  by  the  centre.  The  ‘surprise’  announcement  of  a  national Department  of  Syariah  Enforcement  and  Prosecution  being  established  should be  understood  in  this  context.  Given  that  enforcement  and  prosecution  have traditionally been bypassed in favour of religious education or dakwah activities in the budgets of the religious bureaucracy, this move is better seen as another attempt by the Federal state to reign in Islam and its believers. 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Unlike  early  Islamisation  that  brought  largely  symbolic  changes,  the  current phase of expansion, which began in the late 1990s, is more akin to a process of ‘Syariahtisation’.  In  this,  a distinguishing  feature has been  the augmentation of ‘Syariah’ in public life and governance – though often time this is conflated with claims of Malay  supremacy  (ketuanan Melayu)  –  to  reinforce hegemonic  Islam. The UMNO‐led Federal state has been a primary driver behind ‘Syariahtisation’, using this not only to boost its Islamic credibility but also to prop up a singular and  narrow  view  of  Islam.  By  strategically  claiming  and  reiterating  Syariah’s ‘divine’ origins, the state has managed to prevent many from questioning its own authority.  This  version  of  official  Islam  reifies  –  and  benefits  from  – heteronormativity, resulting in increasing levels of scrutiny and bodily controls, as well as prejudice and discrimination against sexual marginals.  The  Federal  state  has  not  been  alone  in  its  attempts  at  pushing  for  a  singular Islam.  Besides  state  religious  functionaries  (politicians  and  bureaucrats),  the centre’s mission to control Islam relies on non‐state actors. At least two groups can  be  identified  here:  one  religious  nationalists,  the  other  ethno‐religious nationalists.  The  former may  genuinely  believe  that  Islam  is  superior  and  that Syariah should  form  the basis of  the nation’s  system of governance. The  latter, comprise those who are motivated by varying degrees of Malay chauvinism but use  Islam  to  forward  their  case.  Collectively,  these  diverse  actors  form  the Syariah  lobby  which  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  any  controversy  involving sexual  marginals,  particularly  if  Muslims  are  directly  involved.  Indeed,  the foregoing account has revealed that while the central state has utilised Islam for its own gains,  this has not been a unidirectional relationship. Where its agenda 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meets  that  of  actors  within  the  Syariah  lobby,  it  has  also  resulted  in strengthening political Islam in the country.  With  ‘Syariahtisation’,  many  have  also  become  aware  about  the  existence  of religious laws and their contents. Added to the presence of a stronger civil rights movement,  growing  numbers  are  querying  the  legitimacy  of  these  religious injunctions.  These  include  those  who  themselves  are  targeted  for  regulation. Inevitably,  however,  any  attempt  to  raise  questions  –  especially  when  it  has involved defending sexual marginals – has been greeted with loud reactions from the  Syariah  lobby.  In  fact,  it  is  these  altercations,  amplified  by  sensationalist media  coverage,  that  have  led  many  to  believe  that  Islam  rejects  those  with heterodox sexualities and genders.  Though  these  contestations may  start out being about  ‘deviant’  sexualities  and genders, a closer examination shows that at the end of the day, objections come down  to  ‘safeguarding’  Islam  –  or more  accurately,  official  Islam. While  sexual transgressions may be the spark that ignites the clash between the Syariah lobby and  ‘secular’ human rights defenders, these are seldom the former’s concern in the ensuing public  contestation. As  the Seksualiti Merdeka episode proved,  the attacks  against  LGBTs  were  very  quickly  redirected  to  other  human  rights defenders  who  were  only  peripherally  connected  to  this  year’s  event  but otherwise have challenged the rule of the UMNO‐led state in other ways.642 Each was discredited by being painted as a proverbial opponent of Islam.                                                         642 Besides the civil society organisation Suaram and the Malaysian Bar Council, Ambiga Sreenevasan, the head of Bersih 2.0, a campaign for free and fair elections, suffered the brunt of these hostilities. Having been invited to launch the festival this year, she was incorrectly – or 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Bearing  in mind  that  ‘Syariahtisation’  has  been  a means  to  up  Federal  control over Islam, it is not surprising that every challenge against ‘Syariah’, whether its laws  or  institutions  or  personnel,  can  be  construed  as  a  threat  to  the  centre’s authority over Muslim affairs. This  is why  the Federal state’s  representatives – JAKIM,  the de  facto Minister  and Deputy Minister  of  Islamic Affairs,  officials  of national  Islamic  institutions,  etc.  –  have  featured prominently  in  disputes  over ‘deviant’  sexualities.  Indeed,  this  study  has  made  it  very  clear  that  the mobilisation of Islam’s defence is not always about sexuality and its discontents, but about the preservation of power, in this case, the power of the Federal state.  The  final  point  made  here  is  about  the  effectiveness  of  state  attempts  at disciplining  sexual marginals.  The  power  of  the  state‐led  Islamic  discourse  on sexuality  aside,  the  foregoing  account  has  shown  how  the  project  of  imposing heteronormativity  is  not  straightforward,  nor  does  it  come  with  predictable results. On one hand, the resistance provided by sexual marginals and those who support  sexuality  rights,  has  frustrated  efforts  at  forcing  conformity  to  the heterosexual ideal. On the other, Syariahtisation which has bolstered the centre’s Islamic credentials, has also exposed it to fissures and complications.   Specifically, the Syariah lobby that the Federal state relies on to forward 1Islam is also the same body that challenges the centre’s ability to construct a singular Islam.  Comprising  a  range  of  actors,  the  Syariah  lobby  does  not  always  speak                                                                                                                                                               perhaps deliberately – identified as being part of its organising body, and further swipes were levied at Bersih 2.0 to discredit its agenda. Anwar Ibrahim and his party, PKR, were not spared either as their initial silence was construed as condoning Seksualiti Merdeka. 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Government Materials (Parliamentary or State Legislative Assembly Debates, Reports) Dewan Rakyat, Penyata Rasmi Parlimen (House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard), various years Kelantan, Penyata Rasmi Dewan Undangan Negeri (State Legislative Assembly Debates), 1985 Malaysia, Akaun Awam Persekutuan (Federal Public Accounts) — Anggaran Belanja Mengurus: Senarai Perjawatan di Kementerian‐kementerian dan Jabatan‐jabatan dalam Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan (Operating Expenses Estimates: List of Posts in Ministries and Departments in the Federal Expenditure Estimates), various years — Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan (Federal Expenditure Estimates), various years — Bajet Persekutuan: Anggaran Perbelanjaan dan Belanjawan Bajet, Program dan Prestasi (Federal Budget: Expenditure Estimates and Budget, Programmes and Performance), various years — Belanjawan (Bajet) Persekutuan: Anggaran Perbelanjaan (The Federal Budget, Expenditure Estimates), various years 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Pahang, Penyata Rasmi Dewan Undangan Negeri (State Legislative Assembly Debates), 1982 Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States, 1911, 1937 and 1938 Selangor, Anggaran Bajet (Belanjawan) Negeri Selangor (Budget Estimates for the State of Selangor) 1992‐1998, 2004‐2006, 2007 — Rancangan Malaysia Negeri Selangor (Keempat, 1981‐1985; Kelapan, 2001‐2005; Kesembilan, 2006‐2010) Selangor, Penyata Rasmi Dewan Undangan Negeri (State Legislative Assembly Debates), 1995  
Legislation  Federal Territories, Muhammadan Laws Enactment 1904  — Akta Pentadbiran Hukum Syarak 1974 — Syariah Criminal Offences Act 1997 (Act 559) Federated Malay States, Muhammadan Laws Enactment 1904  — Offences by Muhammadans Enactment 1918 — Penal Code (Amendment) Enactment 1938 (FMS) — The Cinematograph Films (Control) Enactment 1927  — The Minor Offences (Amendment) Enactment 1931 — The Minor Offences (Amendment) Enactment 1938  Federation of Malaya, The Cinematograph Films Ordinance 1952 — The Minor Offences Ordinance 1955 Johor, Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 — Offences by Mohammedans Enactment 1919 — Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment 1997 Kedah, Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1962  — Courts Enactment 1914 — Syariah Criminal Code Enactment 1988 Kelantan, Council of Islam and Malay Custom and Kathis Courts Enactment 1953  — Muhammadan Offences Enactment 1938 (Kelantan) — Syariah Criminal Code Enactment 1985  — Syariah Criminal (Hudud) Enactment (II) 1993 Malaysia, Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (Act 588) — Film Censorship Act 2002 (Act 620) — Penal Code (Act 574) 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Group A: Syariah lobby (religious bureaucrats, ‘Syariah’ experts, politicians) 1. ‘Abdullah’, UMNO assemblyman in Terengganu, previously responsible for a moral policing initiative in the State, 2 Jun 2009 2. ‘Aishah’, Syariah academic, long‐term member of the Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws, 6 Mac 2009 3. ‘Hassan’, senior Syariah judge, 2 Jun 2009 4. ‘Nik’, local town council official in charge of Islamic affairs, 6 May 2009 5. ‘Rafidah’, law academic, high‐level religious official and member of the Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws, 1 Jul 2009 6. ‘Sulaiman’, senior official with the Kelantan Syariah Judiciary Department,  7 May 2009 7. ‘Suraya’, Syariah lawyer and academic who works with the religious bureaucracy, 5 Feb 2010 8. Abdul Hamid Mohamad, former Chief Justice of Malaysia, member of the Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws in the 2000s, 14 Jan 2010   
Group B: Sexual marginals (‘lesbians’, ‘gays’, ‘transsexuals’, non‐conforming heterosexuals) 1. ‘Aminah’, sex workers community organiser, 8 Dec 2009 2. ‘Anis’, middle‐class bisexual Muslim woman, ‘open to heterosexual marriage’, 22 Jul 2009 3. ‘Bobby’, gay Muslim man and sexuality rights activist, 12 Aug 2009 4. ‘Chris’, self‐identified butch and community organiser, 21 Jul 2009 5. ‘Dani’, mak nyah community organiser, 23 Aug 2009 6. ‘Hani’, Muslim heterosexual woman, ‘victim’ of khalwat policing,  10 Dec 2009 7. ‘Jubu’, former human rights and gay rights activists, currently mainstream film producer, 20 May 2009 8. ‘Keen’, gay man and sexuality rights activist, 23 Dec 2009 9. ‘Lat’, upper‐middle class, Muslim lesbian, ‘butch’ partner of ‘Mik’,  20 Jun 2009 10. ‘Lina’, middle‐class, sexually non‐conforming Muslim woman,  27 May 2009 11. ‘Melissa’, middle‐class, urban, Muslim bisexual woman, ‘slightly more attracted to women’, 14 Nov 2009 12. ‘Mik’, upper‐middle class, Muslim lesbian, ‘femme’ partner of ‘Lat’,  20 Jun 2009 13. ‘Nina’, middle‐class, urban Muslim bisexual woman, ‘victim’ of khalwat policing, 30 Oct 2009 14. ‘Roberta’, middle‐class, urban, Muslim woman, ‘mostly lesbian, somewhat bi’, 14 Nov 2009 15. ‘Samantha’, middle‐class, urban, Muslim woman ‘mostly lesbian, somewhat bi’, 14 Nov 2009 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16. ‘Sheila’, sex workers community organiser, 14 Nov 2009 17.  ‘Sri’, veteran mak nyah community organiser, 23 Aug 2009 18. ‘Steve’, gay man, ‘victim’ of moral police, 3 Jul 2011  
Group C: Other experts (activists, lawyers, scholars, etc.) 1. ‘Annuar’, prominent social reformer who has realigned himself in recent years in support of the ruling administration, 17 Dec 2008 2. ‘Badariah’, academic and social activist, 2 Mac 2009 3. ‘Fadiah’, Pakatan Rakyat politician and local councillor, 19 Oct 2009 4. ‘Goh’, veteran State assemblyperson in Selangor, presently with Pakatan Rakyat, 26 Nov 2009 5. Ivy Josiah, feminist activist and member of the Council of Churches Malaysia, 17 Feb 2011 6. ‘Lee’, former student and labour rights activist, currently Pakatan Rakyat Member of Parliament, 21 Dec 2009 7. ‘Lily’, formerly with the Attorney General’s Chambers and the Technical Committee on Syariah and Civil Laws, 8 Nov 2008 8. ‘Mat’, Middle‐East graduate and student organiser, 22 Dec 2009 9. ‘Mohamad’, former activist with an Islamic group, currently State assemblyperson, 24 Dec 2009 10. ‘Ramon’, senior criminal lawyer, 17 Aug 2009 11. ‘Rokiah’, law professor at the International Islamic University,  25 Jun 2009 12. ‘Rosli’, human rights activist and Syariah lawyer based in Kelantan,  6 May 2009 13. ‘Sal’, former UMNO Cabinet minister, 5 Jun 2009 14. Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, academic and expert on the history of the Islamic bureaucracy in Kedah, 20 Feb 2009 15. ‘Siti’, Muslim feminist activist and prominent social commentator,  22 Jun 2009 16. ‘Tina’, Syariah expert, 23 Feb 2009 17. ‘Tuti’, Muslim feminist activist, 8 Nov 2008 18. ‘William’, senior government social worker, 26 Nov 2009  
